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STEPHEN J. CHOI† AND ERIC L. TALLEY††

ABSTRACT
Many legal scholars agree that a robust market for corporate control
is critical for deterring managerial opportunism within public
corporations. Even prior to a tender offer, the threat of a takeover
provides a powerful deterrent aligning the incentives of managers and
shareholders. Conventional wisdom, therefore, views with suspicion any
practice that appears to reduce the takeover threat looming over managers
that perform poorly. One practice that has garnered particular attention in
this regard is managerial “favoritism” towards block shareholders.
Favoritism can take many forms, ranging from preferential stock
subscriptions, to selective information disclosure, to outright cash
payments. Regardless of form, the argument goes, such patronage is
potentially harmful to firm value, because it co-opts one of the most
plausible monitors of management. Thus, it is generally thought that law
should proscribe (or at least discourage) all forms of favoritism towards
block shareholders.
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This Article questions whether the case for prohibiting favoritism is as
compelling as conventional wisdom suggests. Our arguments are both
pragmatic and conceptual. From a practical standpoint, we raise doubts
as to whether piecemeal regulation is even capable of curtailing favoritism
writ large, rather than simply relocating it to less verifiable (and less
efficient) domains. From a conceptual standpoint, we argue that
permitting favoritism would likely enhance outsiders’ incentives to form a
large block in order to extract patronage. Anticipating outsiders’
incentives, a rational manager would have to choose ex ante between (1)
acquiescing to a division of her control benefits with block shareholders;
or (2) imposing significant constraints on her own self-dealing so as to
deter the initial formation of any block. Using a game-theoretic analysis,
we demonstrate that under many plausible circumstances, managers prefer
the latter option to the former. Consequently, playing favorites with block
shareholders may, ironically, be in all shareholders’ interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most vexing historical debates in corporate law concerns
whether regulations or markets are better equipped to address managerial
agency costs within public corporations.1 Although many traditionalists
favor immutable legal imperatives as the answer for misaligned incentives,2
an increasing number of commentators place greater faith in market

1. This debate is most salient when applied to public corporations for two reasons. First,
because the shareholdings of public corporations are often widely dispersed, managers may enjoy
greater leeway to operate the corporation to maximize their own welfare selfishly without fear of
significant shareholder dissent. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1933). Second, however, when shares are dispersed and
publicly traded, it becomes possible for a single entity or unified group to purchase a control block of
shares, threatening to wrest control from renegade managers. See generally Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10; 337-38 (1976); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288–89 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); ROBERT CHARLES CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW § 9.5.1, at 390–92 (1986).
2. Jack Coffee, for example, has assessed the value of takeovers as a mechanism to align the
incentives of managers and shareholders against other mechanisms, including “independent boards,
shareholder voting, derivative litigation, or mandatory disclosure statutes.” John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of The Tender Offer’s Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1999–2000 (1984) (contending that takeovers are “at
best a partial remedy and cannot be seen as a substitute for other modes of accountability”). Coffee
argues that a hostile takeover may not further social welfare for at least two reasons. First, Coffee notes
that other mechanisms are more effective at aligning the interests of managers and shareholders for all
but “massive managerial failures”. Id. at 1153. Second, Coffee contends that hostile takeovers may
result in “serious diseconomies.” Id. at 1153. Hostile takeovers may occur not because of efficiency
reasons but rather because the acquirer’s management seeks to maximize the size of their firm.
Additionally, the prospect of a hostile takeover may cause target managers to engage in more risky
behavior to boost the value of their firm. Coffee also argues that an active hostile takeover market may
reduce the security of managers in their jobs and thereby make the labor market less liquid as managers
require a higher amount of salary to compensate for their reduced job security. See id. at 1158–60,
1221–50.
See also ROBERT B. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 140–72 (1983) (advancing the
argument that takeovers force managers to pay excessive attention to short-term gains at the expense of
long-term planning); Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for
Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 268–309 (1983) (questioning the efficient market hypothesis and
arguing that a hostile takeover based solely on a low stock price is unlikely to be correlated with poor
management at the target firm); Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20–25 (1987) (arguing that the takeovers have resulted in overly
leveraged firms, harm to non-shareholder constituencies of a corporation, and an excessive focus on the
part of managers on short-term profits); Leo Herzel, John R. Schmidt & Scott J. Davis, Why Corporate
Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (1980) (contending that broad
authority for the board of directors to stop hostile tender offers forces the bidder to negotiate with the
board and thereby may lead to a higher premium for the target company’s shareholders).
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mechanisms to accomplish the same task.3 While many such mechanisms
operate simultaneously (including markets for output,4 labor,5 and capital6),
perhaps none has received more attention than the oft-celebrated “market
for corporate control” as a means for achieving deterrence.7 By providing a

3. John Pound, on the other hand, argues for a more “political” means of corporate oversight “in
which active investors seek to change corporate policy by developing voting support from dispersed
shareholders, rather than by simply purchasing voting power or control” (including for example proxy
contests and more informal consultations between management and investors). John Pound, The Rise of
the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1004–
10 (1993). Political means of oversight avoid the large transaction costs and disruption accompanying a
change in control and are more politically sustainable compared with takeovers where active investors
seek to change corporate policy by developing voting support from dispersed shareholders, rather than
by simply purchasing voting power. See id. at 1007–09.
4. Competition in the market for a corporation’s output products reduces profits within the firm
and thereby the rents available for managers to expropriate privately. Managers who shirk also run the
risk of unemployment as competition drives their firms from the industry. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L.
540, 557 (1984) (contending that competition in a firm’s market for output products forces the firm’s
managers to maximize firm value).
5. An active, competitive labor market gives manager an incentive to avoid developing a
reputation for self dealing, which would cause difficulties when they seek to obtain managerial
positions in the future. See Armen A. Alchian, CORPORATE MANAGEMENT AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 337, 338–49 (Henry G. Manne
ed., 1969). Cf. Shuichi Senbongi & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Managerial Reputation and the
Competitiveness of an Industry, 13 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 95 (1995) (predicting that managers produce
more quantity than maximize profits in imperfectly competitive industries as a means of increasing their
reputation in the managerial labor market).
6. The need on the part of some firms to return periodically to the capital market for new
sources of funds may also constrain the ability of managers to appropriate private benefits of control.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650
(1984).
7. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110,
113 (1965) (“Only the takeover scheme provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among
corporate managers and thereby affords strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of small, noncontrolling shareholders.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169–74 (1981) (arguing that
hostile tender offers are one way for an outside investor to collectivize the interests of dispersed
shareholders in monitoring management for agency problems); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 705 (1982) (“Corporate control
transactions can reduce agency costs if better managers obtain control of the firm’s assets or if they alter
the incentive structure facing existing managers. Corporate takeovers, and subsequent changes in
management, increase the wealth of investors.”); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841–45
(1981) (arguing that takeovers are superior to mergers, asset sales, or proxy contests in displacing
poorly performing managers).
See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1981) (contending that “[t]he effects of
[inhibiting takeovers] are substantial . . . . The reallocation of economic resources to their highest
valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the
tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well so that stock prices remain
high is reduced.”).
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constant and credible risk of hostile acquisitions, the takeover market
creates a powerful incentive for managers to constrain their own rapacity in
the interests of self-preservation.8 Consequently, the argument goes, a
principal normative aim of corporate law should be to ensure that the
market for corporate control remains active, robust, and competitive.
It is therefore unsurprising that even champions of market incentives
tend to cast lots with their pro-regulation counterparts in scrutinizing
defensive practices that foreclose the possibility of a takeover.9 Consider,
8. Some takeover-market proponents have also criticized the effectiveness of more traditional
means of aligning managers’ incentives, such as fiduciary duties. For example, in an influential paper,
Professors Fischel and Bradley write:
Many analyses of corporate law assume that liability rules enforced by derivative suits play a
fundamental role in aligning the interests of managers and investors. We have shown that this
widespread assumption is not supported by either the theory of liability rules, the available
empirical evidence, or the structure of corporate law.
Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate
Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 292 (1986).
9. For a taxonomy of different antitakeover devices, see Clark, supra note 1, at 571–77 (1986).
We should note, of course that antitakeover devices need not always work to reduce shareholder
welfare. Some such devices may enable managers to protect shareholders from coercive as well as
inadequate tender offers. Defensive tactics may also help to foment a competitive auction for control,
resulting in a higher price for target company shareholders. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1046–56 (1982) (arguing that
“acquirers may vary substantially in the amount of synergistic or managerial gains they can produce,
and a rule of auctioneering increases the likelihood that the target will be acquired by the firm to which
its assets are most valuable”). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 7, at 1175–77 (contending that managers
should remain passive even where defensive tactics may result in a higher bid price for the target firm);
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1, 2 (1982) (arguing that auctions for corporate control “do not benefit investors as a group even though
they may raise the price realized in particular cases. By raising the price, auctions reduce the number of
acquisitions and thus the amount of monitoring.”). For an empirical study of the wealth effects of
defensive tactics, see Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the
Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 6 (1995)
(providing evidence that defensive tactics increase the target company’s bargaining power and thereby
the premium target shareholders receive in a tender offer).
Notwithstanding the potential salubrious effects of defensive tactics, when an antitakeover
device simply precludes the possibility of any takeover, commentators are more unanimous in their
criticism. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, supra note 7,
at 1174–75 which states:
If the company adopts a policy of intransigent resistance and succeeds in maintaining its
independence, the shareholders lose whatever premium over market value the bidder offered
or would have offered but for the resistance or the prospect of resistance. This lost premium
reflects a foregone social gain from the superior employment of the firm’s assets.
See also Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1029 which states:
Whether or not bidding contests are desirable, there are strong reasons for opposing defensive
tactics, such as creation of antitrust obstacles, that obstruct the resisted offer. These tactics
can be abused, as Easterbrook and Fischel observe, by a management seeking to perpetuate its
control. Obstructing tactics also preclude shareholders from making their own decision
whether to accept the offer. These concerns justify the prohibition of such tactics, even if
Easterbrook’s and Fischel’s thesis on bidding contests is rejected.
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for example, the practice of paying “greenmail”— i.e., causing the
corporation to repurchase the stock held by an impending acquirer at a
substantial market premium.10 With few exceptions,11 supporters of the
takeover market view the possibility of greenmail (and other forms of
standstill agreements) as an unwarranted impediment to market
discipline.12 Greenmail, however, is but a focal point within a larger
universe of takeover-retarding practices where managers bestow
“favoritism” on certain block shareholders using corporate resources. Even
outside of the context of an impending takeover, favoritism can (and does)
exist in any number of forms: A manager may, for instance, sell discounted
shares to select shareholders, thereby giving the shareholders preferential
rights to the corporation’s profits. A manager might alternatively seek to
See also Ronald J. Gilson, supra note 7, at 875.
10. A close cousin of greenmail, so-called standstill agreements, have also received attention.
Through a standstill agreement, the target corporation pays money to a large block shareholder in return
for the promise on the part of the block shareholder not to acquire additional shares. Standstill
agreements frequently include a provision giving the block shareholder a seat on the company’s board
of directors. See Larry Y. Dann & Harry DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock
Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 279 (1983).
11
Jonathan Macey and Fred McChesney have attempted to provide one such exception, arguing
that greenmail provides the target company’s management the ability to cull out lower value bidders
and thereby encourage higher value bidders into an auction for corporate control. See Jonathan R.
Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985).
Under this account, greenmail provides compensation to an initial bidder in an action for corporate
control, inducing her to invest in research to determine whether a company is a worthwhile takeover
target. Id. at 28–32. Macey and McChesney also note the superiority of greenmail in relation to other
defensive tactic from a shareholder welfare perspective. See id. at 29 – 30 (“But greenmail is unlike
other defensive tactics, in that greenmail actually solves the free-rider problem that lowers the
probability of an ultimate takeover.“). Macey and McChesney also argue that standstill agreements
serve to induce outside investors to reveal credibly their information to the target firm on the value of a
potential merger. See id. at 34 – 37 (contending that “standstill agreements can also work as a bonding
mechanism permitting the transfer of information”). See also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders’ Interest, 17 RAND J. ECON. 293 (1986) (arguing that
greenmail provides a signal to the market of a potential profitable bidding opportunity and that
greenmail also allows the target company to initiate a competitive auction by removing the initial bidder
whose pre-existing low-cost stake in the firm gives it an otherwise large advantage in the auction). But
see Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Takeover Defensive Tactics: A Comment on Two
Models, 96 YALE L. J. 295, 315–317 (1986) (questioning whether management really has any
informational advantage in determining the presence of other, higher value third party bids).
12. See Ronald J. Gilson, Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibition, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 329,
330 (1988) (“From the perspective of the protakeover forces, greenmail is just another, albeit more
blatant, technique by which target management entrenches itself at the expense of target
shareholders.”). See also Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the ManagementEntrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1048–49 (1985) (relating the argument that
managers may use greenmail payments to entrench themselves in control); David Cowan Bayne, S.J.,
Traffic in Corporate Control–—Greenmail: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 511,
513 (1995) (“Greenmail is nothing other than a recondite species of the broader genus Corporate
Bribery, and as such is intrinsically illegitimate.”).
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divert corporate opportunities and other favorable business prospects
toward favored shareholders. Or, she may seek to procure block
shareholders’ quiescence more directly, through express payments of cash
or property in exchange for a portion of their shares. But notwithstanding
its form, the various types of favoritism share a common feature: they all
have the design (and frequently the effect) of co-opting the most plausible
acquirers of the firm—block shareholders—converting them from market
monitors into conspiratorial confederates of management. As such, the
argument goes, shareholder favoritism retards the disciplining threat of a
takeover, and is therefore likely to reduce aggregate firm value.
Critics of shareholder favoritism go further still, however, arguing that
patronage not only reduces the effectiveness of monitoring, but in addition
it permits managers to appropriate for themselves even greater levels of
firm value, all to the detriment of shareholders as a group (and potentially
other corporate stakeholders). Hence, conventional wisdom has largely
held fast to its view that the law should proscribe (or at least discourage)
the practice of favoritism towards block shareholders.13 The political
durability of this position may also help explain the existing array of
prohibitions against favoritism, ranging from bans on non-pro rata
shareholder dividends, to fiduciary duties of loyalty imposed on dominant
shareholders, to federal tax policies and securities laws that work to inhibit
various types of shareholder favoritism. Other examples abound.14
In this Article, we question whether the general case for prohibiting
favoritism is as strong as conventional wisdom suggests. Our analysis has
both practical and theoretical components. From a pragmatic perspective,
we argue that the very multi-dimensionality of shareholder favoritism
creates an immense regulatory obstacle for courts and legislatures. Indeed,
while some acts of patronage are relatively obvious and easy to verify
(such as outright cash payments to block shareholders), prohibiting such
acts would be unlikely to eradicate the overall practice of bestowing

13. See infra Part II (discussing the legal prohibitions against the various forms of shareholder
favoritism). On the other hand, certain forms of favoritism may also generate ancillary benefits to the
firm. When a firm hires a shareholder as an employee, the shareholder may represent the best potential
hire despite the danger that the firm is using the employment as a pretext to shift resources to a
particular shareholder. Similarly, shareholders with good information on the company may offer the
lowest cost source of additional capital for firms. Although these possible virtues are not central to our
analysis, we briefly revisit them below in Part II.
14. Most recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) promulgated regulations
limiting the ability of corporations to favor particular shareholders, among others, with selective
disclosures of non-public material information. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Selective
Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release No. 34-43154 (Aug. 15, 2000).
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favoritism. Rather, managers intent on playing favorites would simply
relocate their activities, choosing less verifiable actions (such as the in-kind
allocation of business opportunities). While regulators might attempt to
compensate through ad hoc prohibitions on those less direct forms of
patronage, so doing would not only add significant administrative costs, but
it might simply induce managers to readjust their strategies yet again. All
the while, in an effort to stay a step ahead of legal regulations, managers
would adopt increasingly indirect and inefficient contrivances for
transferring value, compounding the burgeoning administrative costs with
additional deadweight losses. This inefficient dynamic may ultimately
render the regulatory game unworthy of the candle.
Nevertheless, even if prohibiting favoritism at zero cost were a
practical regulatory option, we contend that the theoretical case for doing
so is far from clear; rather, we shall argue, explicitly permitting favoritism
might better serve the interests of shareholders as a group ex ante, even if it
might appear undesirable from an ex post perspective. Our theoretical
argument stems from a simple observation: Takeovers require substantial
investment on the part of an outside acquirer to execute successfully.
Nearly all acquirers, for example, must pay a hefty premium above the
current secondary market price to execute a hostile acquisition
successfully.15 Consequently, a number of potential acquirers may remain
docile in the face of outright waste or self-dealing by managers, fearing that
the payoff from a takeover does not justify its significant cost. And herein
lies the rub – for a legal regime that permitted favoritism would provide
investors with an enhanced incentive to assemble a significant block of
shares (a “toehold” block) in the first place. Indeed, a large toehold block
would now confer two valuable benefits on its owner: (1) a more credible
threat to acquire the firm (since the cost of premium for assembling the
block will subsequently be viewed as sunk)16 and (2) an option to lay claim
to a share of the manager’s private control benefits, threatening a takeover
if the manager refuses to render patronage. Furthermore, this second option
does not even require that the investor ever build a control stake in the firm,
15. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 598–601
(1989) (stating that the takeover premiums averaged 50% in the 1980s); Reinier Kraakman, Taking
Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88
COLUM. L .REV. 891, 892 (1988) (noting that takeover premiums “now average over 50% of prebid
share prices”). See also Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 13–15 (1991) (estimating that shareholders of target companies received approximately
$650 billion in premiums between 1976–1990). Potential acquirers may also need to expend resources
investigating a potential takeover target.
16. This first benefit, of course, would be present even if side payments were not possible.
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a cost savings that proves to be important when (as is often the case) the
premium required for assembling a block of shares increases with the size
of a block.17
However, this enhanced attraction for forming a toehold is but half the
story. Anticipating the possibility of toehold investors, a corporate
manager must herself choose between two different responses. On the one
hand, she could simply accommodate whatever block shareholders emerge,
securing their quiescence through patronage and favoritism.18 While such
a strategy might insulate the manager somewhat from a takeover (and even
increase the amount of private benefits she can safely appropriate from the
firm19), it also requires her to share whatever surplus she gleans with
others. On the other hand, the manager could choose an alternative
response of deterrence, so constraining her own consumption of private
benefits as to render the formation of any block unprofitable. In this
Article, we argue that under many plausible circumstances, managers
would prefer deterrence to accommodation, opting (much like Beëlzebub20)
to consume all of a small pie than a meager portion of a large one. In so
doing, managers would voluntarily commit themselves to appropriating
even less firm value than they would in a world where favoritism was
effectively prohibited (and outside investors had to make a binary choice
17. Indeed, investors tend to pay a significantly larger per share premium as the size of the block
they are purchasing increases. See infra Part III.
18. Note that Macey and McChesney question the rationality of using greenmail to deter a hostile
takeover when managers act opportunistically. See Macey and McChesney, supra note 11, at 41 (“The
greenmail game . . . is one that any number can play. If management pays greenmail once in order to
protect its jobs, it must be prepared to pay it again and again.”). Other forms of shareholder favoritism,
nevertheless, do not result in the repurchase of all of the favored shareholder’s shares. For example,
allowing the favored shareholder to exploit a corporate opportunity provides the shareholder a benefit
without reducing the shareholder’s ownership percentage in the firm. Once co-opted, the presence of a
management-friendly block of shares then will raise the cost to other potential acquirers. The acquirer
at the very least must assemble a control block larger than the pre-existing pro-management block. As
the Article discusses below, the presence of the pre-existing block may also raise the cost to the
acquirer of purchasing shares from among the remaining dispersed shareholders. See infra Part III.
19. As our model below demonstrates, even this proposition is questionable. Indeed, if the
manager significantly increases the amount she expropriates from the firm, she might inadvertently
make it into such a strong takeover target that it is impossible to deter the outside investor, even with
with patronage. See infra Part III.
20. In Milton’s PARADISE LOST, Beëlzebub rationalized his exile into Hell in a manner similar to
(albeit with graver consequences than) our hypothetical manager, stating:
. . . Here at least
We shall be free; the Almighty hath not built
Here for his envy, will not drive us hence:
Here we may reign secure, and in my choice
To reign is worth ambition; though in Hell:
Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.
JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST I:258-63 (Christopher Ricks ed., Penguin English Poets 2000) (1667).
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between inaction and outright acquisition). Furthermore, in conventional
market settings where multiple outside blocks could potentially form (each
demanding patronage from managers) this incentive to deter entry by block
shareholders grows even stronger. As such, playing favorites with block
shareholders may, ironically, be in all shareholders’ interests.
The implications of our argument hold particular salience for those
who would champion the market for corporate control as a central means
for remedying incentive problems. Indeed, our analysis suggests that a
prohibition on favoritism—far from ensuring competition in the market for
corporate control—may instead be an unintended incubator of managerial
mischief. Consequently, we conclude that efficiency-minded courts and
policymakers would do well to consider abrogating such prohibitions (at
least in certain situations21). Doing so would force managers to reckon
with the possibility that outside investors could form blocks solely to
extract patronage, thereby inducing greater managerial discipline. This
inducement, moreover, exploits managers’ own expertise and knowledge in
designing effective corporate governance devices to achieve deterrence.
And, because the threat of block shareholder entry is ongoing and
persistent, the incentive to engage in self-restraint would similarly be
ongoing, even after the initial sale of securities to the public.
Significantly, because the benefits from allowing selective payments
to shareholders derive from the ex ante incentive effects that are placed on
managers, our argument extends even to (and indeed, particularly to)
situations where the corporation is not an active target.22 Consequently,
our argument provides a more general defense of shareholder favoritism
based not on those instances where it occurs, but rather on those in which it
does not.
Even for advocates of regulatory discipline over markets, however,
our analysis may prove useful, in that it spotlights a significant danger of
piecemeal prohibitions against shareholder favoritism. For pragmatic
purposes, governmental actors are initially most likely to regulate the most
overt forms of favoritism, such as outright cash payments to select
shareholders. Indeed, these acts are the easiest for regulators to detect,
21

We spell out what some of these situations are in Part IV of this Article, infra.
22. A different possible argument exists in support of managerial actions that reduce the threat of
a takeover. Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers contend that entrepreneurs may wish to implement
antitakeover devices to protect the interests of managers in the firm-specific human capital they develop
within the corporation. Such protection, in turn, induces managers to invest in their firm-specific
human capital. See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 33, 42 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
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evaluate, and ultimately punish. The problem with a piecemeal approach,
however, is that managers may respond by simply masquerading their acts
of patronage, embedding them within other, otherwise value-enhancing
type of transaction (such as supply contracts). Once such adjustment takes
place, however, it may now appear to policy makers as if this alternative
activity constitutes little more than veiled patronage, thereby justifying a
categorical extension of regulatory scrutiny. This serial process can lead to
a regulatory structure that is dangerously over-broad and ultimately selfdefeating, inducing the true regulatory targets to substitute into another,
yet-unregulated sphere, while leaving more legitimate actors caught in the
regulatory crossfire. Moreover, such complex contrivances can themselves
introduce costs and inefficiencies that would not be present if devices of
overt favoritism were allowed. Hence, even if one were convinced that
shareholder favoritism is undesirable,23 it is far from evident that
attempting to prohibit it with conventional regulatory machinery is a
realistic (or prudent) policy choice.
Finally, our analysis exposes an important lesson for corporate
scholars of all stripes who wish to assess the effects of shareholder
favoritism as an empirical matter. Indeed, in our view, it is the threat of
having to share benefits that induces managers to exercise restraint,
deterring the emergence of a block shareholder in the first instance. This
deterrence benefit would simply not be apparent if one limited her
empirical inquiry only to those cases where a block shareholder emerges
and receives preferential treatment—indeed, in such instances the side
payment need not make others better off.24 However, our principal
argument is that the “off-equilibrium” benefits of deterrence
(corresponding to those bribes which are never actually paid) may well
swamp the costs detected in observed incidents of patronage. Thus, in
order to conduct a balanced and more coherent analysis, legal scholars
must remain mindful that observed instances of favoritism present them
with a biased diagnostic sample.25

23. As noted above, we question the validity of even this logical predicate.
24. But see supra note 11 (citing arguments that selective payments even in situations where they
actually are made may increase overall corporate welfare).
25. For example, in their rebuke of Macey and McChesney’s pro-greenmail arguments, Gordon
and Kornhauser focus only on greenmail transactions that actually occur, arguing that the predominance
of shareholder value-decreasing greenmail transactions over value-increased greenmail transactions
argues possibly for a complete ban of greenmail. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 320.
Our analysis, however, points out that in assessing greenmail among other forms of shareholder
favoritism, commentators must focus also on the incentive effect placed on managers even where the
payment is never made.
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Four caveats to our analysis deserve explicit mention before
proceeding. First, our principal focus in this Article is the impact of
shareholder favoritism on the threat of a possible takeover to align the
incentives of managers with shareholders. There are, of course, countless
other mechanisms that provide incentives in a parallel fashion that do not
work through a block of shares (including executive compensation
schemes, fiduciary duties, and so forth). Although we will touch briefly on
many of these alternative devices, they are ultimately somewhat tangential
to our enterprise. To be sure, responsible policymakers ultimately must
evaluate an entire “portfolio” of incentive devices, of which markets for
corporate control are only a part. But to the extent that such markets can be
made to operate more effectively, they also can occupy a more prominent
space within this regulatory portfolio.26
A second (and related) caveat concerns our supposition that managers
are in a position to manipulate their firms’ governance structures in order to
appropriate value inefficiently. One might justifiably wonder, then, why
organizational structures preventing them from doing so are not in place
from the very beginning. Indeed, a well-known argument in corporate
finance maintains that entrepreneurs have strong ex ante incentives to
select the best corporate governance structure possible in order to
maximize the price investors will pay for shares at an initial public
offering.27 Thus, if managerial value diversion were inefficient, this
reasoning asserts, the initial charter would prohibit it. While this argument
is well taken, we find it to be of limited usefulness in a world of
uncertainty. Indeed, the needs of most corporations vary over time, and
most entrepreneurs lack the ability to predict with precision the firm’s
prospective needs. As such, it is virtually impossible to design complete
governance structures that come close to maximizing firm value far into the
future without also allowing for some managerial flexibility over
governance.28 Of course, this flexibility may also allow managers to
exploit governance “gaps” by self-dealing. But at the same time, it is
26. Indeed, all we must argue is that the reforms we advocate do not systematically undercut the
ability of firms to utilize these other incentive devices as well.
27. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 305–07.
28. For example, in order to maximize shareholder value, a firm’s entrepreneurs might have
contemplated requiring that a certain fraction of its board consist of outside directors. However, the
value of particular outside directors will depend on their individual expertise and reputation for
independence. Without good knowledge of the available pool of outside directors down the road,
entrepreneurs would have difficulty determining the optimal mix of inside to outside directors. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1573 (1989)
(arguing that “[o]pportunistic amendment is possible because the corporate contract is inevitably
incomplete. The parties cannot specify terms to cover even plausible contingencies….”).
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precisely in such circumstances where the market for corporate control
becomes an important deterrent. As noted above, our analysis offers
insights about how such a market can be made to operate more effectively,
providing durable and continuous benefits well after a firm’s initial public
offering.
Third, it is important to underscore that our deterrence arguments
focus on how permitting patronage affects firms whose shares are already
widely dispersed. While this class of corporations is an important one from
a corporate governance perspective,29 not all corporations have such
widely-held ownership structures.30 For such firms, it is simply not possible
to “deter” investors from forming an influential block – for one already
exists. There, introducing a permissive regulatory regime may offer few
benefits for non-block shareholders, and may even come at the cost of
inducing managers to co-opt existing block shareholders, who might
otherwise be good monitors.
And fourth, although we believe our arguments to be relatively
general in nature, they depend crucially on a key assumption pertaining to
managerial commitment. Explicitly, we assume that even if a manager’s
choice of precisely how much firm value to divert ex post is hard to detect,
she must possess the corporate governance tools ex ante to constrain
credibly her subsequent diversions of value at some maximal level, and in a
manner that is observable to outsiders. Indeed, it is precisely this act of
commitment that enables shareholder favoritism to provoke the deterrent
effect that we envision. In the absence of such tools, a manager’s mere
statement of her aspirations towards maximizing corporate value would be
little more than cheap talk, incapable of deterring the formation of blocks.31
Notwithstanding the centrality of this assumption, however, we maintain
that numerous actions falling within the domain of managerial power have
exactly the effect we envision, including (inter alia) executing long-term

29

See note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
Many firms outside the United States and the United Kingdom, in fact, are characterized by a
controlling block shareholder comprised of either a controlling family or the state. See, e.g., Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J.
FIN. 471, 471 (1999). Our analysis therefore applies primarily to U.S. and U.K. corporations.
31. Put another way, the manager’s representation lacks credibility. Absent constant monitoring,
once the pressure on managers is relieved, managers will simply appropriate as much value as possible.
Of course, in a repeat relationship, managers may attempt to develop a reputation for maximizing
corporate value above their own narrow self-interest. Part III.C.2 discusses reputation among other
devices for managers to commit to limiting their private benefits of control.
30
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contracts, installing outside directors, and engaging in reputational
bonding.32
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part II provides the pragmatic
portion of our argument, presuming (provisionally) that shareholder
favoritism is undesirable, and questioning whether effective regulation is
practically feasible. This section offers a taxonomy of methods through
which a corporation may favor its shareholders selectively, and describes
the regulatory system that governs them. We argue that the patchwork
nature of this legal landscape is both inevitable and hazardous, raising
serious doubts about whether effective regulation in this area is attainable.
Part III then turns to the conceptual portion of our thesis. Here, we reverse
our inquiry, presuming that effective regulation is feasible, but questioning
whether the goal of eliminating favoritism is itself justified. We formally
develop the argument that shareholder favoritism may, ironically improve
overall corporate welfare. To do so, we employ a simple33 example drawn
from game theory that analyzes how managers might constrain their
abilities to take private benefits within the shadow of a legal rule that
(alternatively) prohibits and then permits favoritism. Using this example,
we demonstrate how, if patronage were allowed, managers would prefer to
deter the entry of block shareholders who expect patronage, and in so doing
would commit to even less value diversion than they would in situations
where favoritism are prohibited. Part IV discusses various reform
implications from this insight. Because numerous means of favoring
shareholders are possible, we argue that lawmakers should consider the
interaction of these different payment schemes with one another. In
particular, while courts and policy makers have moved to regulate the most
easily observable forms of opportunistic payments more stringently, our
analysis suggests that a better course of action (at least in certain
circumstances) may be to permit more direct and observable forms of
shareholder favoritism while regulating the more indirect forms. Part V
concludes, discussing possible extensions of our analysis.
II. FAVORITISM IN PRACTICE
In order to conduct a meaningful assessment of shareholder
favoritism, it is first important to be clear about how and when it is
32. We explore these various devices (and others) infra Part III. In Part III, we also discuss two
other (less pivotal) assumptions that underlie our analysis: the increasing marginal cost of purchasing a
block of shares and the allocation of bargaining power between the block shareholder and the manager.
33
As noted above, while we pursue a simple example for reasons of tractability, our analysis extends to
a more favorable environment. See Choi & Talley, supra note ††.

CLEAN COPY CHOI.TALLEY USC REVISED 12-24-2001

1999]

PLAYING FAVORITES WITH SHAREHOLDERS

1/2/2002 9:37 AM

115

observed in practice. This Part, therefore, provides a description of various
methods by which managers favor shareholders selectively, and the
challenges that courts and legislatures have had in regulating them.
Although ostensibly distinct, all of the methods noted below share at least
two mutual characteristics. First, each provides an institutional mechanism
for allocating a favored shareholder some benefit, property or legal claim
whose value exceeds (in a pro rata sense) what other shareholders receive.
Second, the methods below historically operate as instrumental alternatives
for one another. In other words, the introduction of a prohibition against
one method of selective payment can shift managerial behavior towards
some alternative (and as yet unregulated) method. This cat-and-mouse
game is reflected in a pattern of piecemeal legal regulation in which courts
and legislators struggle to keep pace with an ever-shifting system of
shareholder patronage. Thus, conscientious regulators must assess the
desirability of regulating each selective payment method not only
individually, but also in light of the likely substitution effects that would
occur after regulation.34
For clarity of exposition, we shall employ throughout the remainder of
this Article a hypothetical designed to illuminate many of the central issues
at play. Consider Acme Corporation, a nationally prominent manufacturer
of ten-gallon cowboy hats. Acme has 10 million shares of common stock
outstanding, trading initially on NASDAQ at a secondary market price of
$100 per share, thereby giving Acme a total market capitalization of $1
billion. Assume that this initial $100 per share price reflects the true
fundamental value, in present discounted value, of Acme’s future cash flow
(that is, if managed selflessly). Unless otherwise specified, we presume
Acme to have many thousands of dispersed, well-diversified shareholders,
each of whom holds a negligible percentage of Acme’s shares. Acme’s
management team acts as a cohesive group, owns zero common shares in
Acme, and individually receive a fixed wage.35 In addition, we consider
one other possible player, Merit Investments, a privately owned mutual
fund. Like other shareholders, Merit initially owns a negligible stake in

34. Regulators of course could respond with an attempt to block all forms of selective payments.
Such a broad regulatory prohibition, however, is not without cost. Different forms of selective
payments may generate varying benefits to overall corporate welfare. Prohibiting all interested
transactions with shareholders, for example, may rob the firm of an important source of capital and
expertise. As the next Part discusses, moreover, social welfare may benefit from even the opportunistic
use of payments to select shareholders.
35. In order to concentrate on the takeover market as a disciplining device, we suppress (for
now) the role that incentive compensation (such as options or stock compensation) might play in
providing managerial incentives.
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Acme, but it has sufficient liquidity to amass as much Acme stock as it
desires. By purchasing a sufficiently large block, Merit might be able to
extract patronage from Acme’s management team, threatening to
consummate a takeover (displacing current management) if its demands are
not satisfied.
A. A TAXONOMY OF PATRONAGE
Ignoring any legal prohibitions, Acme management has numerous
mechanisms at its disposal to confer benefits on Merit. Although it is
beyond our ken to canvass every one of them, six warrant explicit
description: (1) direct distributions of cash and property; (2) loans and
capital contributions; (3) interested transactions between a firm and its
shareholders; (4) the allocation of corporate opportunities; (5) the
allocation of business activities; and (6) the selective disclosure of nonpublic information. We address each in turn, briefly analyzing their current
legal status as well.
1. Distributions of Cash and Property
Outright transfer payments are perhaps the most obvious means to
confer benefits on shareholders. Most directly, Acme may simply
distribute cash drawn from the corporation’s treasury to Merit (and
potentially other block shareholders); Acme could also transfer title to
Merit of some of its assets or entitlements, possibly as a part of sales
transaction at a price far below market value.
Somewhat more indirectly, Acme might also be able to transfer cash
to Merit through the selective repurchase of Acme’s shares. Share
repurchases may occur in any number of ways, including negotiated oneon-one transactions, open market repurchases, or formal repurchase tender
offers on behalf of the corporation.36 Note, however, that if they are done
at prevailing market prices, share repurchases do not systematically favor
the tendering shareholders over others. Indeed, suppose that Merit
Investments has accumulated a large block of shares (say 1 million), and
Acme now seeks to repurchase some of them. If the purchase price were
set at $100 per share—the prevailing secondary market price—Merit would
not experience an appreciable gain from the repurchase.37 Only if the
36. For a discussion of the different types of share repurchases, see Jesse M. Fried, Insider
Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 427–34 (2000).
37. Some gains, nevertheless, are possible. A large block shareholder may not have the ability to
sell a significant fraction of its shares into the secondary market at the prevailing secondary market

CLEAN COPY CHOI.TALLEY USC REVISED 12-24-2001

1999]

PLAYING FAVORITES WITH SHAREHOLDERS

1/2/2002 9:37 AM

117

purchase price exceeded $100 per share does Merit Investments gain at the
expense of the non-selling shareholders.38 Referred to as greenmail within
the takeover context,39 favorably priced share repurchases from select
shareholders can occur at any time (even in the absence of an imminent
acquisition).40
More subtly still, Acme may be able to bestow favor on Merit by
purchasing other shareholders’ stock at a discount. Of course, such a
transaction would require Acme to convince other shareholders to sell
below intrinsic value, but in certain circumstances this might be
accomplished.41 For example, suppose that Acme management has just
learned some non-public information about its future prospects (such as
signing Garth Brooks to a cowboy hat endorsement deal) that would
increase its fair market value to $1.2 billion, resulting in a per share value
of $120. Acme might seek to repurchase 5 million shares from non-Merit
shareholders at the prevailing market price of $100 per share. After the
repurchase, Acme will be left with $700 million and 5 million outstanding
shares, giving a per share value of $140. If Merit does not tender any of its
shares, Acme’s purchase from others will leave Merit with gains of $20 per
share.42
Selective transfers of firm resources then impose at least two potential
harms on non-favored shareholders. First, the firm suffers a reduction in its
amount of resources available to itself and the shareholders as a group.
When Acme’s managers seek to favor Merit Investments with a transfer of
price. Once the market learns of the large block shareholder’s planned sale, for example, the secondary
market price may drop. The drop could occur either because the market takes the planned sale as a
signal that the block shareholder believes the secondary market price is too high or because of the
pressure a large influx of new shares into the market places on the secondary market price. The block
shareholder could, of course, attempt to disguise its sales or negotiate a sale to one party seeking to
accumulate a large number of shares.
38. Suppose that Merit sells 1 million shares back to Acme at a price of $200 per share. After
the repurchase, Acme will have a total value of $800 million (down from its initial $1 billion) and
Acme will have 9 million shares outstanding. Each share will then be worth only $88.
39. See Bayne, supra note 12, at 514-15 (defining greenmail).
40
After Ross Perot resigned from the board of General Motors in 1986, for example, GM repurchased
all of Perot’s shares in GM for $700 million. See Arizona Republic, GM Stockholders Irked by BuyOut of Perot Warn Against ‘Greenmail’, Jan. 29, 1987, at C2.
41. Note that a large-scale repurchase of the shares of public shareholders may be characterized
as a repurchase tender offer. As a tender offer, such transactions are then subject to federal securities
regulation under the Williams Act. For a discussion of the issues surrounding the regulation of
repurchase tender offers, see Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1377, 1384–87 (1986).
42. Merit, of course, must know enough not to tender its shares. Some form of selective
disclosure must therefore occur from management to Merit. For a discussion on the limits of firms to
engage in selective disclosures, see infra Part II.A.6.
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cash from Acme’s bank account, Acme’s total value drops. To the extent
the payment is non-pro rata, the transfer results in a net decrease in value
for some shareholders matched with an increase in value for the recipient
shareholders.
Second, the reduction in resources may affect the firm’s ability to fund
new and ongoing projects. With a lower amount of cash reserves, Acme
will have a reduced ability to initiate new research projects or enter into
new product markets for example. However, to the extent the firm’s
projects have a positive net present value, the firm may go to the capital
markets and other sources of funding to finance the projects. In situations
where imperfect capital markets exist, nevertheless, the reduction in
resources in the firm may leave the firm without adequate resources to
pursue even positive net present value projects. Firm value therefore
suffers an indirect loss equal to the expected return from the foregone
projects.43
Of those transactions discussed above, a feature that distinguishes
outright cash distributions from other types is the ease with which they can
be observed and verified in court. Indeed, assessing a direct cash
distribution requires only that one observe the amount of dollars
transferred. Once this amount is known, no other uncertainty exists as to
the value of the transfer. In contrast, courts assessing transactions that
involve a more indirect transfer of value to a block shareholder (such as a
share repurchase at a premium) must compare the contracted price with the
prevailing market price to determine whether the firm transfers any value to
the shareholder. In a share repurchase, courts must assess the price paid
against the value of the shares; nevertheless, the presence of a liquid
secondary market for most publicly held corporations provides courts with
an easily observable market price to use as a proxy for share value.44
43. Note that this capital reduction may also be true for pro rata distributions, but it can be
particularly salient in non-pro rata repurchases, particularly when the recipient shareholder is a potential
competitor. See infra note 56 (discussing a similar point with respect to Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien).
44. Whether the market price in fact is a good proxy for share value depends on whether the
market price in fact incorporates all available information related to the value of the share. The
efficient capital market hypothesis provides one justification for this assumption.
Several versions of the efficient market hypothesis in fact exist. The strong form of the
hypothesis holds that all information, whether public or non-public, is incorporated in the secondary
market securities price. The semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis in turn
posits that the secondary market price of companies reflects all publicly available information on the
company. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25
J. FIN. 383 (1970) (providing a survey of theoretical implications of efficient markets and empirical
testing of the efficient markets hypothesis). See also Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the
Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911–12 & n.11 (“The empirical
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Perhaps accordingly, both courts and regulators are quickest to scrutinize
non-pro rata cash transfers, and do so in at least four ways.
First, federal tax law imposes a cost on all forms of distributions of
cash and property, whether pro rata or not. Consider the direct distribution
of cash and property to shareholders. To the extent a corporation has
positive earnings and profits, shareholders must treat the transfer of cash or
property from the corporation as a dividend, taxable at ordinary income
rates.45 Even shareholders of corporations without sufficient earnings and
profits must pay taxes at capital gains rates to the extent the amount in total
they receive from the corporation exceeds their individual bases in the
corporation’s stock.46 The tax on distributions from the corporation
therefore reduces the value of direct transfers to shareholders. For every
dollar a manager uses to favor a particular shareholder, the shareholder
receives much less than a dollar due to taxes.47
Second, in the context of share repurchases for cash, pro rata
repurchases generally are treated the same as a direct distribution of cash
and property for tax purposes.48 For non-pro rata repurchases, however,
selling shareholders usually face (more favorable) capital gains treatment
for any excess price paid above their basis to the extent the repurchases are

evidence to date (with some exceptions) appears to establish the validity of the weak and semi-strong
versions but not the strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis.”). Unless otherwise
specified, the Article utilizes the term “efficient market” to refer to a trading market that displays
features of a semi-strong efficient market.
Others have argued that markets are not efficient because of investor irrationalities and
cognitive limitations in processing information. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and
Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 853–54 (1992); Lynn A.
Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81
VA. L. REV. 611, 648–50 (1995) (reporting skepticism on the part of financial economists on the
validity of the efficient market hypothesis).
45. Under Section 301(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, distributions considered a “dividend”
are taxed as ordinary income. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (2001). Section 316 then defines a dividend as a
distribution to the extent of available current and accumulated earnings and profits. See I.R.C. § 316.
Although not formally defined in the tax code, the earnings and profits concept attempts to track the
total capital surplus within the corporation. See JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 38C:01 (1997) (defining earnings and profits as “an economic concept the tax law utilizes
to approximate a corporation’s power to make distributions in excess of shareholders’ initial
investments”). Adjustments to earnings and profits are provided under Section 312. See I.R.C. § 312.
46. See I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(2), (3).
47. Although note that non-profit shareholders pay no taxes on investment gains, among other
things. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
48. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(1). See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 312 (1970), rehearing
denied 397 U.S. 1071 (1970) (“Congress clearly mandated that pro rata distributions be treated under
the general rules laid down in §§ 301 and 316 rather than under § 302, and nothing suggests that there
should be a different result if there were a ‘business purpose’ for the redemption.”).
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substantially disproportionate.49
Non-selling shareholders that gain
disproportionate value as a result of repurchases from others may also face
taxation.50 Interestingly, then, disproportionate repurchases that favor
particular shareholders may receive even more favorable tax treatment than
pro rata purchases. Nevertheless, to the extent gain exists on the shares,
even under the more favorable tax treatment the recipient shareholder must
pay some amount of taxes.
Third, state corporate law systematically prohibits virtually all non-pro
rata cash distributions to favored shareholders. Typically addressed in the
context of dividend payments that favor a dominant shareholder,51 state law
bans outright any non-pro rata dividends paid to shares of the same class.52
Moreover, even when a corporation has several classes of shares and makes
correspondingly different dividends to the separate classes, courts
frequently apply the stringent “intrinsic fairness” standard to ensure that a
dominant shareholder does not benefit at the expense of minority

49. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (providing that a distribution to a particular shareholder is
disproportionate if “the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder
immediately after the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time, is less
than 80 percent of . . . the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder
immediately before the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time”).
Repurchases that are “not essentially equivalent to a dividend” are also granted basis return and
preferential capital gains treatment. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(1). Repurchases that completely terminate the
shareholder’s interest in the firm or result in a partial liquidation of the corporation also receive such
favorable tax treatment. See I.R.C. §§ 302(b)(3), (4).
50. See I.R.C. §§ 305(b)(2), (c); Reg § 1.305-3(e), Example (8). See also MERTENS, supra note
45, at § 38B:92 (noting that “periodic redemptions are particularly suspect under the disproportionate
distribution rules of Section 305(b)(2)”). Mertens writes:
For example, if pursuant to a plan for periodic redemptions a corporation agrees to redeem up
to 5% of each shareholder’s stock each year and some but not all of the shareholders have
stock redeemed under this plan, the remaining shareholders’ proportionate interests in the
assets and earnings of the corporation will be increased. Provided that the cash received by
the shareholders who have some of their stock redeemed is taxable under Section 301, the
remaining shareholders will be deemed under Section 305(c) to have received a taxable
distribution under Section 305(b)(2) equal to their proportionate increase in the ownership of
the redeeming corporation.
Id. On the other hand, a single isolated redemption will probably not result in the non-redeemed
shareholders being deemed as receiving a distribution under Section 305(c). See id.
51. For a good discussion of the law dealing with controlling shareholders see Mary Siegel, The
Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1999).
52. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (1998); Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.40; 11
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP. § 5352 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1995); ERNEST L. FOLK,
RODMAN WARD JR., EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW, Fundamentals § 170.2, at 34–41 (Little Brown ed. 1993). See also Edward B.
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority
Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 921 (1999) (“It would be clearly illegal—and
easily challenged—if the majority shareholder paid itself $1 per share in dividends, while only paying
minority shareholders $.10 per share.”).

CLEAN COPY CHOI.TALLEY USC REVISED 12-24-2001

1999]

PLAYING FAVORITES WITH SHAREHOLDERS

1/2/2002 9:37 AM

121

shareholders holdings shares of a different class.53 Pro rata cash
distributions, on the other hand, have generated far less judicial scrutiny.
In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,54 for example, the Delaware Supreme Court
declined to overturn a large pro rata dividend that depleted a corporation’s
liquidity, arguably to the benefit of the parent corporation that was the
dominant shareholder. Instead, the Court applied the business judgment
rule to the dividend,55 holding that absent waste the dividend was not a
violation of the parent corporation’s fiduciary duty to the subsidiary’s
minority shareholders.56
Finally, state corporate law also scrutinizes the managers themselves
who cause the payments to be made, imposing upon them the fiduciary
duty to act in the best interests of the firm and its shareholders as a group.
Managers who force the firm to make a payment to a specific shareholder
solely for the purposes of entrenching their own positions would violate
that duty of loyalty, and would therefore be subject to liability.57 At the
53. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) (noting in dicta that a
parent corporation that receives an overly large dividend for one class of shares compared with minority
shareholders holding another class of shares would face the stringent “intrinsic fairness” standard of
court review).
54. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
55. Id. at 721–22 (stating that “Sinclair [the parent] received nothing from Sinven [the
subsidiary] to the exclusion of its minority stockholders. As such, these dividends were not self-dealing.
We hold therefore that the Chancellor erred in applying the intrinsic fairness test as to these dividend
payments. The business judgment standard should have been applied.”). See infra note 60 (describing
the business judgment rule).
56. See id. at 720–23 (stating that the intrinsic fairness test for transactions involving a parent
and subsidiary corporation will be applied only where self-dealing is present and defining self-dealing
as occurring “when the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act
in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment
to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary”).
The law, however, is not perfect in its attempt to block the ability of corporations to favor
shareholders disproportionately even through cash payments. Even pro rata distributions of corporate
resources may benefit individual shareholders differentially. Return to the Sinclair Oil case. Although
the minority shareholders received the same pro rata portion of the cash dividend as the parent, the
different sets of shareholders may still have had conflicting interests. The parent, for example, may
have faced a large liquidity crisis, leading it to remove cash from the subsidiary even where the cash
would provide a higher long-term value within the subsidiary. Other minority shareholders lacking
such a liquidity crisis may very well have desired to keep the money inside subsidiary.
57. The fiduciary duty of loyalty forms the core prohibition against managerial appropriation of
private benefits. The duty of loyalty prohibits managers from competing against the corporations.
Managers may not generally profit at the expense of the corporation. Self-dealing transactions between
the managers and the corporation are not allowed unless deemed objectively “fair”. See Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (stating that the duty of loyalty involves “the exercise of the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive”). See generally CLARK, supra note 1 at § 18.4 (describing the
duty of loyalty under state corporate law). Self-dealing transactions lose the more favorable business
judgment standard of review. Instead, courts apply the much more stringent “entire fairness” standard.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983). Delaware, nevertheless, allows
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same time, demonstrating an actual loyalty violation in court is no simple
feat. Unlike situations where managers obviously stand on both sides of
the transaction (and where courts apply heavy scrutiny58), acts of
favoritism toward block shareholders do not clearly betray self-interested
motives.59 In order to proceed on a duty of loyalty claim, then, plaintiffs
must be able to demonstrate self-dealing, or risk dismissal under the
business judgment rule.60 Moreover, complaining shareholders must
navigate a tedious and complicated set of procedural hurdles associated
with asserting such claims derivatively—hurdles that become more
difficult to cross in cases where the alleged disloyalty is relatively
attenuated.61
managers to cleanse a self-dealing transaction through a variety of procedural means, including a vote
on the part of disinterested directors or shareholders. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
58. See Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 128, (1985) (“Once it is shown a
director received a personal benefit from the transaction . . . the burden shifts to the director to
demonstrate not only the transaction was entered in good faith, but also to show its inherent fairness
from the viewpoint of the corporation . . . .”).
59. Several corporate welfare enhancing motivations may lie behind favoring shareholders
selectively. For example, firms may seek to subsidize the formation of blocks of shares that may have a
greater incentive and ability to monitor managers for agency problems. Without more, therefore, the
mere flow of payments to a block shareholder does not necessarily imply opportunism. Moreover, even
where opportunism exists, the support of the block shareholder for management is often indirect and
therefore hard to observe. Block shareholders, for example, may support management through votes in
subsequent proxy contests.
60. Delaware’s statement of the business judgment rule is represented in Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985):
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental
principle, codified in 8 Del. C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware
corporation are managed by or under its board of directors. In carrying out their managerial
roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders. The business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free
exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors. The rule itself “is a
presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company. . . .
Id. at 872–73 (citations and footnote omitted). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984) (stating the business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will
be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts
rebutting the presumption.”); 3A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 52, at § 1036 (describing the
application of the business judgment rule).
Plaintiffs that seek to allege waste face a high hurdle. See Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610
(Del. Ch. 1962) (“Where waste of corporate assets is alleged, the court, notwithstanding independent
stockholder ratification, must examine the facts of the situation. Its examination, however, is limited
solely to discovering whether what the corporation has received is so inadequate in value that no person
of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what the corporation has paid.”).
61. A manager’s duty of loyalty is technically owed to the firm, and thus the firm enjoys the sole
right to pursue such suits. See CLARK, supra note 1, at § 15.1 (1986); DEBORAH A. DEMOTT,
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:01 (1987) (stating that “[d]erivative
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The ability of managers to play favorites without violating their
fiduciary duties, therefore, turns in part on their ability to obscure their selfdealing motives from courts, usually by burying the transfer within a larger
transaction. While share repurchases would seem to be one way to obscure
a naked transfer, any premium above market price is also a relatively easy
red flag to which plaintiffs may point.62 And thus, even though courts have
accorded presumptive validity to share repurchases on terms deemed “fair”
to the corporation,63 the inability to disguise a premium over market price
makes it significantly harder for managers executing non-pro rata
repurchases either to invoke the business judgment rule or to rely on
procedural hurdles in order to forestall litigation. As such, managers have
turned over time to less telltale forms of favoritism, which we take up
below.64
2. Loans and Capital Contributions
From time to time, it is typical for firms like Acme to require
additional capital in order to fund new and ongoing endeavors. In such
situations, Acme might choose to seek funding from any number of
sources, including internally generated funds, bank loans and capital
markets.65 If, however, Acme’s management team also wishes to conceal
favoritism toward a shareholder like Merit, it may often be possible to do
so as a part of the terms of a loan executed directly with Merit. In a similar
litigation is a uniquely complicated form of civil litigation, in part simply because the real party in
interest in the litigation, the corporation, is not the plaintiff”). Consequently, a plaintiff must first
demand that the board pursue the action (which is often unlikely), or she must successfully claim that
making a demand was excused, as it was “futile.” See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights
and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1349–56
(1993) (describing the demand requirement, excuse, and waiver of demand). Although what makes
demand futile varies across jurisdictions, most jurisdictions require some degree of involvement in the
challenged transaction on the part of the board assessing the demand. Id at 1351.
62. See supra text accompanying note 44 (discussing the efficient capital market hypothesis
justification for the assumption that the market price reflects the value of a firm).
63. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) (applying heightened judicial scrutiny to
greenmail agreements). See also Viacom Int’l Inc. v. Icahn, 946 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1122 (1992); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988), aff’g, 526 A.2d 914 (Del. Ch.
1987) (upholding a greenmail repurchase of shares because the terms were “fair”).
64. While it may still sometimes be possible for managers to pay patronage by purchasing
others’ shares at below-market prices, the factual premises needed to convince shareholders to sell at a
discount (such as private information about firm value) are somewhat uncommon.
65. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 648 (1988) (noting that “[internal
o]perating revenues finance an average of 61% of corporate expenditures”) (citing R. BREALEY & S.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 291, table 14-3, (2d ed. 1984)). For a discussion of the
disadvantages of relying on bank financing or internally generated funds, see Bernard Black, The Legal
and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 832 (2001).
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vein, Acme might be able to issue additional securities to Merit in return
for hard capital.
In any transaction between a firm and one of its shareholders, the
potential for favoritism obviously exists. In this case, for example, Acme
might agree to pay an excessively large interest rate, or otherwise provide
Merit with new securities at a discounted price for securities issued in
return. Suppose once again that Merit owned 1 million of Acme’s 10
million shares outstanding. So long as it has sufficient treasury shares,
Acme may decide to sell 1 million additional shares to Merit in return for
$50 million (or $50 per share). After the transaction, Acme will have a
market capitalization of $1.05 billion and 11 million shares outstanding,
resulting in a $95.46 per share value. Although Merit loses along with all
other shareholders on the shares held prior to the sale, Merit also gains
$45.46 on each share that it purchases. All told, then, Merit’s net benefit
from the transaction is equal to $40.9 million.66
Although raising capital from a favored shareholder at discount prices
also faces several legal obstacles, such obstacles appear to be somewhat
less prohibitive than those applicable to direct payments. First, no direct
tax consequences affect Merit Investments from this transaction. Merit
loses some value on its pre-existing shares and more than makes up for it
on the discounted shares it purchases in the above example. The gain on
the shares to Merit, under present federal tax law, is not realized until Merit
actually disposes of the shares.67 So long as Merit holds onto the shares,
the gain will remain unrealized and therefore non-taxable. Compared with
direct payments of cash or property, managers may therefore transfer a
greater amount of corporate value to a particular shareholder through the
issuance of new securities. Recipient shareholders that seek to convert this
value into cash, however, will eventually face tax consequences when they
sell their shares.68
Second, while fiduciary duties still constrain self-interested decisions
to raise capital, the practical reach of those duties is somewhat constrained
by a court’s limited ability to observe and verify the manager’s intent to
66. Merit loses $4.54 on each of its initial 1 million shares (for a total loss of $4.54 million) but
gains $45.46 on each of the new 1 million shares it purchases (for a total gain of $45.46 million). The
net gain to Merit is therefore equal to $40.9 million.
67. The realization requirement under federal tax law requires that a sale or exchange, among
other possible events, must occur before the gains or losses on an asset are recognized for tax purposes.
See I.R.C. § 1001. See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
271 (11th ed. 1997).
68. Because sales may occur in the future, the shareholder still benefits from the deferral of tax
consequences.
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self deal in the issuance of securities. Unlike direct distributions of cash or
property, it is much harder to detect a non-pro rata distribution in the
context of raising capital through issuing new securities. Indeed, not only
do such transactions carry the pretext of having a legitimate purpose,69 but
Acme managers can often also demonstrate legitimate justifications for the
apparent discount given to Merit. For example, U.S. securities laws
severely limit the ability of purchasers to resell securities purchased
through a private placement,70 and thus part of the discount Merit receives
could represent compensation for future illiquidity. Additionally, the
decision to raise capital may send an adverse signal that managers believe
the company to be overvalued, or reveal a liquidity crisis within the firm.
Such a signal would cause any purchaser to demand a discounted price.71
Viewed in this light, pre-existing shareholders (such as Merit) who are
relatively familiar with the company are somewhat less vulnerable to such
signals. As such, these investors—while still demanding a discount—
might nonetheless require less of one than would third parties not already
familiar with Acme’s operations.72 With such readily available
justifications, managers stand a good chance of defending discounted sales
to a block shareholder under fiduciary principles even where just a pretext.
69. Indeed, evidence exists that the market reacts favorably to news of an equity private
placement. See Sophie Hopper Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence
from Private Equity Financing, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 8–9 (1989) (finding a positive secondary market
reaction to news of an offering in a study of equity private placements into the United States from 1979
to 1985). In particular, where share concentration increases as a result of the offering, the secondary
market reaction is even more positive. See id. at 10–23 (arguing that greater share concentration leads
both the increased monitoring of management and a raised probability of an eventual takeover). Wruck
theorizes that private equity placements typically involve a fewer number of purchasers able to
negotiate with management for access to non-public information to gauge the value of the company.
See id. at 10.
70. Securities sold through private placements are typically referred to as “restricted” securities.
Absent an exemption from the public registration requirements of the securities laws, investors may not
resell restricted securities without engaging in a registered public offering. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1994),
Securities Act of 1933, Rule 144 provides one such exemption. Under Rule 144, investors must hold
their restricted securities at least one-year, among other requirements, before engaging in resales. See
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1.
71. See Stewart Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 132 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 219–20 (1984)
(describing the incentive of managers to sell securities where the secondary market price overvalues the
company relative to its fundamental value).
72. Because the comparison is between the discount the pre-existing shareholders actually
negotiate against what discount, hypothetically, outside investors would have demanded for the same
securities, courts may have difficulties in observing the reduction in discount that pre-existing
shareholders may demand. For example, a pre-existing shareholder may negotiate a discount of 15%.
Without more, this discount seems large in magnitude. However, where the firm’s next best alternative
is to issue equity to an outsider at a 20% discount, the firm in fact saves 5% in financing costs by
issuing the securities to the pre-existing shareholder.
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Finally, capital market transactions with block shareholders face only
minimal scrutiny from federal securities laws. For private placement
transactions with a specific shareholder, the securities laws provide a safe
harbor under Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities
Act”),73 imposing only minimal disclosure requirements. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) reporting companies that seek to
raise capital through a private placement only need to furnish their most
recent annual Form 10-K filing to purchasers, among other things.74 To the
extent the shareholder is considered an accredited investor, moreover, firms
are not affirmatively required to disclose any information.75 Block
shareholders that own greater than 5% of any outstanding class of equity
securities, on the other hand, face disclosure requirements under the
Williams Act.76

73. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (1994). Regulation D provides a safe harbor for private placements
pursuant to Sections 3(b) and 4(2) of the Securities Act. See Sections 3(b), 4(2), Securities Act.
74. See Rule 502(b)(2)(ii), Securities Act. See also 15 U.S.C. §7 (1994), Exchange Act of 1933,
Form 10-k, available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/10k.htm (as of Dec. 23, 2001).
75. See Rule 502(b)(1), Exchange Act (noting however that “[w]hen an issuer provides
information to investors pursuant to paragraph (b)1, it should consider providing such information to
accredited investors as well, in view of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws”).
Accredited investors are defined to include investment companies registered under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, corporations with total assets in excess of $5 million, and any natural person
meeting minimum net worth or income requirements. See Rule 501(a), Securities Act.
Regulation D imposes a number of additional requirements. Among such requirements is the
requirement that the issuer not engage in “general solicitations”. See Rule 502(c), Securities Act.
Private placements pursuant to Rule 504 that are “exclusively in one or more states that provide for the
registration of the securities, and require the public filing and delivery to investors of a substantive
disclosure document before sale, and are made in accordance with those state provisions” (among other
exceptions) are exempt from the prohibitions on general solicitations. See Rule 504(b)(1), Securities
Act. In discussing the scope of the general solicitation requirement, Donald Langevoort writes that:
[T]he SEC has adhered to a subtextual principle: any ‘general solicitation’ of investors is
necessarily inconsistent with the notion of a nonpublic offering. In other words, one cannot
advertise or otherwise cast one’s net broadly in the hopes of finding qualified investors, but
instead must solicit only those whom, based on some pre-existing relationship, one has good
reason to believe do not need the protection of the registration requirement.
Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of “Technological
Disintermediation” for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1 (1998).
The general solicitation requirement may therefore channel issuers seeking to raise a small amount of
capital quickly to turn to a pre-existing investor in the company.
76. The Williams Act requires persons with a beneficial ownership interest of more than five
percent in a class of a firm’s equity to make a Schedule 13D disclosure filing with the SEC pursuant to
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act and the SEC’s own rules and regulations. See Section 13(d)(1),
Williams Act. Among the required disclosure items include the identity of the owner, the source and
amount of the funds used to make the purchase, and any plans the owner may have to liquidate, merge,
and make a major change to the corporation if the purpose of the owner is to acquire control. See
Section 13(d)(1), Williams Act.
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It is difficult to justify (at least on first principles) the differential
degree of regulation that governs capital market transactions versus direct
payments. Indeed, the risk of opportunism in the two types of transactions
seems strikingly similar. In theory, managers may opportunistically
transfer just as much corporate value through the issuance of securities as
through the direct distribution of cash or property to a particular
shareholder. Although the corporation does not directly suffer a reduction
in capital on its books, it does bear a loss relative to the value it would have
obtained had the securities been sold at a fair market price.77 The cash
infusion from the offering proceeds, moreover, may provide managers with
a greater ability to siphon resources off for their own personal uses.
Moreover, by channeling managers towards this less regulated
mechanism for favoritism, the existing legal regime may have created even
greater inefficiencies. Indeed, bestowing patronage through the issuance of
shares may impose additional costs not present with a direct payment of
cash or property. First, although Merit may have some informational
advantage over the outside market in valuing Acme, Merit still suffers from
an informational disadvantage on the exact value of the firm compared with
the management team itself. To the extent the block shareholder is wary
that the firm’s managers may in fact be selling overvalued securities, the
shareholder will demand an additional discount for the risk it bears.
Moreover, the issuance of new shares will cause the purchasing shareholder
to increase its undiversified ownership of securities in the firm. 78 The
shareholder will therefore raise its level of firm-specific risk and require a
larger discount in compensation.79 In light of these added costs, the

77. All shareholders of the corporation suffer pro rata from this loss in potential value.
78. In addition, the federal securities laws restrict the ability of investors that purchase shares
through a private placement to resell the shares (termed “restricted shares”) immediately. Rather, the
investors must either have the issuing corporation register the shares under Section 5 of the Securities
Act or the investors must find an exemption from Section 5 to resell the shares. See Section 5,
Securities Act. For example, investors may resell restricted shares pursuant to Rule 144 of the
Securities Act to the extent the investors, among other requirements, hold onto the shares for at least a
one-year period. See Rule 144, Securities Act. Investors in private placements within the United
States, therefore, face an illiquidity risk during the period in which resales are prohibited and will
demand a greater discount from the issuer to compensate for this illiquidity.
79. Empirical evidence exists that shares sold through a private placement typically are sold at a
large discount from the issuer’s current secondary market price. See Michael Hertzel & Richard L.
Smith, Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately, 48 J. FIN. 459, 478
(reporting a 35% mean discount for equity private placements of greater than $25 million in securities);
William L. Silber, Discounts on Restricted Stock: The Impact of Illiquidity on Stock Prices, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., July–Aug. 1991, at 60. (reporting a 33.75% mean discount for a sample of equity private
placements involving 69 issuers).
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systematic discouragement of direct payments may well have induced an
alternative outcome that is even more inefficient.
3. Interested Transactions
Another mechanism that is often available for benefiting select
shareholders consists of more garden-variety business relationships. A
firm might, for example, hire representatives of a block shareholder as
employees, or to provide independent contracting services. Where a block
shareholder operates a separate line of business, the firm may also transact
for the provision of goods and services from the separate business.80
Where the transactions occur at prevailing market rates, the
shareholder acts as any other market provider. Firms will utilize the
shareholder as opposed to other providers of goods and services only to the
extent the shareholder provides greater value than the other providers.81
Not all transactions, however, occur on market-based terms. Managers that
seek to favor a particular shareholder may do so through a contract that
provides the shareholder terms more favorable than in the market.
Suppose, for example, that Merit operates a temporary financial analyst
service, providing consulting services for a fee. Acme could employ
Merit’s analysts at higher than market rates, thereby shifting value from
Acme to Merit.
As with direct payments of cash and property, legal limits exist on the
ability of firms to favor particular shareholders through interested
transactions. Once again, however, the limits are not as stringent in
practice as those facing direct payments. Tax law does provide some
limitations on these forms of business transactions. Although not formally
a dividend, federal tax law may recharacterize an interested transaction as a
“constructive dividend,” forcing the corporation to lose a potential business

80. For example, Ed Rock details the relationship between General Motors and the Du Pont
Company, a major shareholder in General Motors in the first half of the 1900s. See Edward B. Rock,
Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987, 995–97 (1994) (providing
examples of “bad” relational investing where the outside large shareholder uses its influence to obtain
private benefits). Du Pont served as a major supplier to General Motors during the time period and kept
many Du Pont people within General Motors to keep “tabs on the amount of GM business going to Du
Pont and the amounts placed with Du Pont’s competitors.” Id. at 997.
81. In many situations, for example, a firm’s shareholders may act as the best outside source for
a particular good or service. A firm’s shareholder, for example, may have better information than
others about the particular needs of the firm and therefore enjoy a greater ability to tailor its goods and
services for the firm. As well, a firm may place greater credibility in a shareholder that it knows well
and that has an incentive derived from its share ownership to want the firm to succeed compared with
other outside providers of a good or service.
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expense deduction for the payment82 and, to the extent the shareholder
otherwise would not face a tax on the payment,83 rendering the premium
over market price as taxable to the shareholder.84 Tax officials seeking to
apply the constructive dividend doctrine, however, face a challenge when
the good or service at issue is sold within a thin market.85 For here, in
order to detect a premium, courts must first determine the fair market value
against which to measure the contractual price. In the absence of a wellestablished market, this determination is fraught with inaccuracy, and
perhaps consequently, many courts tend to err on the side of resisting the
constructive dividend doctrine, except in extreme and egregious cases.86

82. Note that the loss of a business deduction to the corporation ultimately reduces overall
corporate value and thereby hurts all shareholders on a pro rata basis.
83. For example, where the corporation pays for a shareholder’s “expenses” made on behalf of
the corporation, the shareholder ordinarily would not have to pay taxes on the payments as income. See
I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(A) (providing for the deductibility of reimbursed business expenses paid to an
employee from gross income).
84. For a description of the constructive dividend doctrine, see MERTENS, supra note 45, at §
38:47 (noting that “[b]y their nature constructive dividends must be determined by the facts and
circumstances of a particular case”).
85. Courts also provide a higher level of scrutiny on transactions involving closely held
corporations where the shareholder also acts as a director of the corporation. See, e.g., Seminole
Thriftway, Inc. v. United States , 42 Fed. Cl. 584, 590 (1998) (noting that “closely-held corporations are
operated by their shareholders, who often take on the management roles of officer and director in order
to serve their shareholder interest”). Managers of publicly held corporations that use interested
transactions to favor particular outside shareholders may therefore have an easier time to avoid the
constructive dividends doctrine.
86. Many cases that actively recharacterize interested transactions as a constructive dividend
involve egregious fact patterns. See Hardin v. United States., 461 F.2d 865, 872–73 (5th Cir. 1972)
(holding that payments by a corporation to the widow of a shareholder’s brother as a constructive
dividend to the shareholder where the corporation had never paid a formal dividend, the widow was not
a shareholder of the corporation, and the corporation owed no formal legal obligation to the widow);
Frazier v. Commissioner, 85 F.3d 640 (10th Cir. 1996), aff’g TC Memo 1994-358, 68 TCM 253
(treating corporate payments for a CEO-shareholder’s travel and entertainment expenses, including
payments for the CEO’s spouse’s expenses as well as for visits to friends and relatives, as a constructive
dividend where the expenses were primarily for the CEO’s personal benefit); Estate of Chism v.
Commissioner, 322 F.2d 956, 956 (9th Cir. 1963) (upholding a tax court decision treating “loans” from
a corporation to shareholders as a constructive dividend where the loans were never “evidenced by
promissory notes or other written instruments, no interest was ever paid or charged on the outstanding
balance, and no collateral security was ever given for them,” no expectation for repayment exists, and
the corporation had never paid any formal dividends); Seminole Thriftway, Inc. v. United States., 42
Fed. Cl. 584, 591 (1998) (treating fees paid to shareholders for their guarantee of a loan to the
corporation as a constructive dividend because the fees were paid many years after the guarantee was
actually given and thus was not required to obtain the guarantee).
Cf. Alpha Medical, Inc. v. Commissioner, 172 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding all of a sole
shareholder’s payment from the corporation of $4.4 million for work done as president of the
corporation as deductible compensation and not a constructive dividend because “reasonable
shareholders . . . would have agreed to [the shareholders] level of compensation” because of the
shareholder’s “accomplishment, the risks he assumed, and the amazing growth [in the corporation]”).
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This obfuscatory advantage of thin market transactions provides managers
with a limited cover to bestow patronage through business transactions—at
least on the margin—without triggering the law’s scrutiny.87
State fiduciary law also limits the ability of managers to engage in
interested transactions where the managers benefit at the expense of
shareholders. However, as a practical matter, the deterrent effect of state
law is relatively limited in scope. Ordinarily, when a firm engages in an
interested transaction with a dominant shareholder, courts treat such
transactions as presumptive self-dealing, applying intensified scrutiny to
the transaction.88 However, many block shareholders are not currently
87. Because of the emphasis on whether an “arms-length” transaction took place, shareholders
and the corporation have a greater ability to avoid recharacterization as a constructive dividend to the
extent formalities are followed. In addition, because of the lack of precision in determining when a
payment to a shareholder truly is a constructive dividend, a corporation may seek to spread an intended
dividend to a shareholder across many different forms of interested transactions to avoid the scrutiny of
the IRS. See, e.g., An Introduction to Business Entities, WFT-BUSENT Ch. 10 Doc. 4,
2001 WL 423413 (US) (“If shareholders wish to distribute corporate profits in a form deductible to the
corporation, a balanced mix of the possible alternatives lessens the risk of constructive dividend
treatment. Rent for the use of shareholder property, interest on amounts borrowed from shareholders, or
salaries for services rendered by shareholders are all feasible substitutes for dividend distributions. But
overdoing any one approach may attract the attention of the IRS.”).
See also Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999)
(contending that multi-factor tests used to determine whether executive compensation in fact should be
recharacterized as a constructive dividend “invites the Tax Court to set itself up as a superpersonnel
department for closely held corporations, a role unsuitable for courts . . .”). Judge Posner writing for
the 7th Circuit in Exacto Spring Corp. instead followed an “independent investor” test under which a
court must ask whether a passive, independent investor would pay the compensation. See id. at 838 (“If
the rate of return is extremely high, it will be difficult to prove that the manager is being overpaid, for
[replacing the manager with a lower-paid manager] . . . would be killing the goose that lays the golden
egg.”). While avoiding the pitfalls of having courts determine proper compensation levels, the
independent investor tests gives great leeway to companies earning superior returns for investors to
disguise dividends as compensation.
88. See Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 628 (Del. 1977) (“Where the majority
shareholders stand to benefit at the direct expense of the minority shareholders by action of a board of
directors they control, the backdrop provided by the fiduciary obligations owed by the directors to the
minority requires that the proposed action be closely examined before being effectuated.”); Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947) (holding that a controlling shareholder owes a
fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders similar to that of a director). See also FLETCHER,
supra note 52, at § 5811.10 (“When a majority, dominant or controlling shareholder deemed to be a
fiduciary is challenged for having engaged in self-dealing in property or services of the corporation, that
shareholder has the burden of coming forward with evidence and the burden of persuasion to show that
the transaction was scrupulously fair.”); Id. at § 5810 (noting that “[t]he same fiduciary duty is due from
a dominant or controlling shareholder or group of shareholders to the minority as is due from the
director of a corporation to the shareholders”).
In a transaction between a parent and subsidiary corporation, Delaware, among other
jurisdictions, has applied the stringent “entire fairness” standard in reviewing the transaction. See
Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 406 (Del. 1988) (“It is well established in
Delaware that one who stands on both sides of a transaction has the burden of proving its entire
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“dominant” under conventional definitions due to their lack of a 50% or
more ownership stake or explicit control over the corporation.89 In such
cases, a finding of self-dealing seems significantly less likely for numerous
reasons. First, just as above, it is often difficult to discern whether the
challenged transaction really does result in a benefit to the outside
shareholder, especially in thin markets. Where the transaction is on purely
market-based terms, the outside shareholder benefits no more than from
any other market transaction. Furthermore, even where the outside
shareholder clearly benefits relative to a market-based transaction, the
benefit may actually be demonstratively justifiable. Merit, for example,
may possess better expertise than other providers of services in the market,
or it may enjoy greater productivity (therefore justifying a higher rate per
hour). In addition, as noted above, Merit may have a better understanding
of the firm’s needs than outside suppliers, giving it a lower cost of
providing services for the firm.
As before, the reduced scrutiny of interested transactions compared to
direct transfers may channel many managers towards bestowing favoritism
through interested transactions. And, just as with sales of securities, this
indirect form of transferring benefits may introduce greater inefficiencies
as well. Indeed, interested transactions may crowd out contracts between
the firm and more efficient providers of a good or service. By hiring Merit
to do its financial analysis, Acme may well bypass higher quality or lower
cost analysts. From Acme shareholders’ standpoint, it would be far better
to retain the services of one of these alternative providers, even if Acme
subsequently made a side payment to Merit to induce its quiescence. In-

fairness.”). But see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (stating that the entire
fairness standard of review will be applied to a parent-subsidiary transaction only if the parent “receives
something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to the minority stockholders of the
subsidiary”—and holding that a pro rata dividend did not meet this test).
89. Shareholders with a 50% or more ownership stake in a corporation’s outstanding stock are
presumed in control of the firm. For a shareholder that owns less than 50% ownership of a
corporation’s outstanding stock, whether the shareholder is considered a “controlling” shareholder for
fiduciary duty purposes depends on whether the shareholder exercises control over the firm, an issue of
fact for the court to determine. See FLETCHER, supra note 52, at § 5811 (stating that a shareholder with
less than 50% ownership of a corporation’s outstanding stock is not considered a controlling
shareholder unless there is “some evidence demonstrating control . . . since the presumption is against
it”) (citing Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984)). See also Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Systems, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (holding that a shareholder with a 43.3% minority
ownership interest was a controlling shareholder because of the shareholder’s exercise of control over
the corporation); Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 1983) (imposing a fiduciary duty on a
shareholder owning only 34.8% of a corporation because the shareholder exercised “actual control and
direction over corporate management”).
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kind favoritism, therefore, tends to introduce additional technical
inefficiencies, reducing overall corporate welfare.90
Significantly, the inefficiencies introduced by business transactions
with a favored shareholder are likely to increase with the size of the desired
transfer. Merit, for instance, may offer only a certain “package” of
financial services to the market. Fiduciary duties and market-constraints
may then limit the ability of managers to pay too much above the
prevailing market-based fee for such a package.91 Thus, where Acme’s
managers seek to use interested transactions to transfer even more to Merit,
Acme may need to employ alternative services that Merit is not well
equipped to supply.92 For example, Acme may very well hire Merit to help
manufacture more ten-gallon cowboy hats for Acme’s discount mall sales.
To the extent Merit’s comparative advantage lies in financial services,
however, Merit will serve as an ill-suited source for cowboy hats.
Compared with direct selective payments of cash or property,
therefore, interested transactions constitute both a less scrutinized and less
efficient mechanism for playing favorites. Most immediately, the law
provides greater leeway for a firm to favor shareholders with interested
business transactions, therefore channeling the firm towards such activities
instead of direct distributions. Consequently, the use of interested
transactions to generate support will tend to cause the firm to employ
technically inferior inputs in their production process, generating even a
larger social loss than that which would occur in the context of cash
distributions.

90. Managers might attempt to avoid the crowding out effect by hiring the shareholder for a
service that the firm does not otherwise require. Acme, for example, may hire representatives from
Merit Investments to conduct worthless “market research” for Acme on the dynamics of the beach
scene in the Bahamas, paying Merit an exorbitant fee for the research. Such transactions, however, are
arguably just as inefficient given that there are other individuals with modest opportunity costs (such as
the authors of this Article) who would be willing to do the same sort of market research at cost.
Moreover, such contrived expenditures may begin to look clearly like direct payments, triggering
enhanced legal scrutiny noted above. See supra text accompanying notes 48–56.
91. For example, the firm may pay Merit $200 per hour for its analysts as compared with the
prevailing market payment of $100 per hour. Once the firm starts paying Merit $1,000 per hour or
higher, however, the firm may attract unwanted scrutiny from potential hostile acquirers, tax officials,
and plaintiffs’ attorneys seeking to initiate a fiduciary duty suit.
92. See An Introduction to Business Entities, supra note 87 (which recommends spreading
favoritism across a series of different possible interested transactions to reduce the possibility of IRS
attention).
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4. Allocation of Opportunities
A fourth manifestation of shareholder favoritism comes through the
allocation of potential business opportunities that the firm has yet to
exploit. Such corporate opportunities may arise from any number of
sources, such as specific assets and expertise within a firm’s scope of
control, information learned within the course of the firm’s business, or
simple happenstance. For some opportunities, such as new potential
customers for its existing product line, the firm itself is clearly the highest
valuing recipient. Other opportunities, however, may provide profit to a
wide variety of different possible recipients. Acme, for example, may learn
of new valuable mineral resources located on property next to its
production facility. Acme could exploit such an opportunity through the
purchase of the property itself, or others connected with the firm may
appropriate the profit from the mineral find through a purchase of the
property. Managers, for example, could increase their private benefits of
control through the direct purchase of the property. Managers that desire to
benefit a particular block shareholder could also notify the shareholder of
the property, giving the shareholder the opportunity to purchase the
property.
As with new issues of securities and interested transactions, federal
tax laws provide few barriers to the allocation of opportunities. Because
shareholders engage in no direct transactions with the firm to obtain the
opportunities, no taxable transaction exists (at least with respect to the
shareholders’ expropriation of the opportunities). General state law
fiduciary duties continue to apply under the rubric of the corporate
opportunities doctrine.93 Courts applying the corporate opportunities
doctrine follow a two-stage approach, asking first whether a particular
business project in fact is a corporate opportunity and then whether
managers in giving an opportunity to a particular outside shareholder has

93. For a general discussion of the corporate opportunities doctrine, see Eric Talley, Turning
Servile Opportunities into Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108
YALE L.J. 277, 286–310 (1998). See also American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05 (1994) (defining a corporate opportunity as
including “[a]ny opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a senior executive becomes
aware and knows is closely related to a business in which the corporation is engaged or expects to
engage”). Under the American Law Institute approach, a manager may take a corporate opportunity
only to the extent (a) full disclosure is made to the corporation; (b) the corporation rejects the
opportunity; and (c) either the rejection meets a test of total fairness, disinterested directors reject the
opportunity in advance, or disinterested shareholders ratify the manager’s appropriation of the corporate
opportunity. See id.

CLEAN COPY CHOI.TALLEY USC REVISED 12-24-2001

1/2/2002 9:37 AM

134

[Vol. 75:276

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

taken the proper steps in appropriating the opportunity.94 Under the most
prominent test for whether a business project constitutes a corporate
opportunity, courts examine whether the project is in the same “line of
business” as the corporation.95 Although somewhat vague what constitutes
a line of business, courts in applying the line of business test focus on the
ability of the corporation to exploit the opportunity, based on the
corporation’s endowment of resources and expertise.96
Nevertheless, while funneling new business prospects to shareholders
may constitute a technical violation of the corporate opportunities doctrine,
managers engaging in such activities are unlikely to face a serious risk of
liability. First, the manager’s self-interested motivation is often difficult to
detect, since it is not the manager who ultimately appropriates the
opportunity, but rather a non-control block shareholder. Courts and other
outsiders may have difficulty in distinguishing whether the shareholder
obtained the opportunity from the managers or through bona fide
competition. When Acme informs Merit of valuable mineral resources on
property adjoining Acme, Merit may react through a purchase of the
property before news of the mineral resources becomes public. Only
Merit’s purchase transaction, however, is directly observable to outside
parties. Without a clear trail leading back to Acme’s tip to Merit, Merit’s
purchase is consistent with Merit itself engaging in research and
uncovering the presence of mineral resources on the land without Acme’s
assistance.97 Moreover, to the extent no direct cash payments occur from
the block shareholders to the managers, no evidentiary trail exists to link
the shareholder’s use of the opportunity with the managers.
Much like the foregoing examples, the use of corporate opportunities
to benefit a particular shareholder may introduce several inefficiencies
compared with direct payments of cash or property. Suppose, for example,
that Acme received an opportunity to enter into a new market for western
clothing tailored to women, and the Acme management passed this
opportunity on to Merit Investments. Being unfamiliar with both the
western clothing market characteristics, Merit might view the new
opportunity as risky relative to the perception of a well-established market
participant like Acme. To the extent that Merit is averse to these risks, it

94. See Talley, supra note 93, at 286–310.
95. See id. at 289 (stating that the line of business test “pulls within its ambit any project that the
corporation—given its current assets, knowledge, expertise, and talents—could adapt itself to pursue”).
96. See id.
97. Of course, where the information is clearly the type that only Acme would know, Merit may
have a harder time convincing a court that it generated the information independently.
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will discount the value of the opportunity it receives.98 In addition, Acme’s
experience in the market also puts it at a comparative advantage to exploit
the opportunity. Indeed, Acme’s expertise and sunk investments in
production technology may make Acme a relatively low cost entrant into
the new market. Thus, although Merit may profit from the opportunity, it
will not receive as much profit as Acme could itself. The cost to Acme will
therefore exceed the benefit transferred to Merit. Once again, the legal
attractiveness of using business opportunities to dole out favoritism comes
with an inefficiency cost that would not be realized in the instance of a cash
payment.
5. Allocation of Business Activities
Closely related to the granting of interested transactions is the
allocation within the firm of resources to particular business activities.
Firms engage in all sorts of business activities, from the purchasing of
inputs, to the hiring of employees, to marketing, distribution, and ultimate
sale of their outputs. The allocation of the firm’s resources among these
tasks may have significant indirect effects on others’ business – including
that of a block shareholder.
For example, Acme’s cowboy hats might be made out of any number
of materials, including straw, wool, felt, and beaver fur.99 Suppose that
Merit Investments has purchased a large ownership position in one of the
chief national producers of wool felt. Acme’s managers could indirectly
assist Merit by increasing the number of hats they produce composed of
felt, thereby increasing the market price of the material and buoying
Merit’s ownership stake. Alternatively, the managers could have Acme
reduce its own in-house production of felt, directing it to buy rather than
make the material, which would again increase the overall market price of
felt, indirectly benefiting Merit.100
Several other means exist for a firm to re-channel its own business
activities to benefit one of its shareholders even without an explicit
contract. Acme might lobby for regulatory reforms that work to favor
98. For the same amount of dollar benefit Merit receives, therefore, Acme’s managers must
expend greater resources providing this benefit through the allocation of corporate opportunities
compared with outright cash payments.
99. Readers who find their appetites whetted for the purchase of a cowboy hat may refer to the
Cowboy Hat Store, at http://www.cowboyhatstore.com (last visited July 10, 2001) for a wide variety of
hats.
100. Note that Merit does not necessarily need to purchase from Acme to obtain the benefit of the
lower cost. Because the overall market supply has increased, Merit may turn to any supplier to receive
a lower price.
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investment companies like Merit. Acme could also expend money in
developing common resources that benefit the both companies’ businesses.
For example, Acme may research common technology that benefits both
Acme and Merit’s businesses and then release the technology into the
public domain. Acme may also develop human capital in its workers
tailored specifically for the needs of Merit’s business, thereby saving Merit
the training costs for any employees it hires laterally from Acme.101
There are virtually no adverse tax consequences that stem from the
reallocation of (generally deductible) business expenses within a firm.102
As to fiduciary duties, state law limits—at least in theory—a manager’s
ability to allocate business activities opportunistically. In practice,
however, the probability of facing heavy judicial scrutiny is low. As with
several of the other forms of opportunistic payments to outside
shareholders, managers are not directly benefited. Instead, favored
shareholders may repay managers later through their support in proxy
voting.103 Courts and other outside observers therefore face a challenge in
determining whether a particular allocation of business activities in fact
constitutes self-dealing. Without hard proof, plaintiffs will find it difficult
to rebut the business judgment rule presumption, leaving them with the
more daunting task of demonstrating that the directors’ decisions
constituted waste.104 Indeed, because no ready measuring stick exists for
evaluating how a firm should allocate its business operations, courts may
find it next to impossible to determine whether a particular allocation is
driven from a self-dealing motivation.

101. For example, Acme could expend considerable resources training its own in-house financial
analysts using methods of analysis that Merit prefers and then terminate the analysts at the end of
training. Merit could then attempt to hire the analysts. Significantly, the tailored expertise in the hands
of the analysts will not draw a significant increase in wage from other competing employers to the
extent the expertise is specific for Merit. Merit may therefore hire the analysts at a fair market wage
and profit from lack of any need to expend resources in training the analysts.
102. To the extent no market transaction occurs, the reallocation of assets within a firm would
lack the required realization event required for taxation. See supra note 67 (describing the realization
requirement). In theory, the expenditures made within the firm solely to benefit an outside shareholder
selectively may be viewed as a “business gift” to the extent the firm receives nothing in return.
Business gifts are generally not deductible to the donor to the extent such gift exceeds $25. See I.R.C. §
274(b). Nevertheless, the IRS, among others, would find it difficult to recharacterize a shift in internal
business activities that results in no direct flow of cash or property to the outside shareholder as a gift.
103. Shareholders typically vote to elect the board of directors, to ratify certain self-dealing
transactions on the part of managers, affirm an amendment to the corporate charter, and to approve
(some but not all) mergers involving the corporation, among other things. For a general discussion of
shareholder voting, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic
Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347 (1991).
104. See supra note 60 (citing Delaware’s formulation of the business judgment rule).
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Almost by definition, the reallocation of business activities within a
firm done for the sole purpose of paying patronage introduces productive
inefficiencies. Not only is the benefit to the block shareholder highly
uncertain and speculative, but each dollar spent on benefiting the block
shareholder almost certainly generates less than one dollar’s worth of
expected benefits. Firms that seek to enter a new product market to benefit
a block shareholder, for example, must expend resources designing and
advertising the new product. As well, the firm must search for new
employees to provide needed expertise related to manufacturing, marketing
and distributing the product, among other things. Industries in which
economies of scale exist may require the firm to expand volume rapidly to
achieve such economies.105
But even beyond these fixed costs, opportunistic reallocation of
activities leaves the firm relatively unbalanced in its portfolio of outputs,
production technology, and inputs. Accordingly, the total value of the firm
will suffer. For example, by supporting an artificially high price in the
market for wool felt production, Acme may be required to generate demand
by reducing its retail price far below cost, thereby losing money. For the
sake of favoring a particular block shareholder, then, managers may shift
the firm into activities that have low or even negative net present values.
Thus, significant inefficiencies (relative to outright cash distributions) may
be an unintended consequence of the relative laxity of legal restrictions on
favoritism through business activities.
6. Disclosure of Non-Public Information
Finally, firms at many important junctures are repositories of a wealth
of non-public information that, once made public, materially affects the
trading price of their securities.106 Acme, for example, may have nonpublic information that its upcoming quarterly earnings will fall short of
market expectations. Investors who learn this information before it is

105. Indeed, in many industries, high barriers to entry exist. See JOE STATEN BAIN, BARRIERS TO
NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956)
(identifying economies of scale and sunk costs, product differentiation, and absolute cost advantages as
three possible barriers to entry). But see Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47
(1982) (questioning the relevance of barriers to entry).
106. Extensive evidence exists, for example, that insiders profit significantly from the use of the
firm’s non-public insider information. See generally Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of
Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 321–22 (1998)
(citing several empirical studies showing that insiders earn significant excess returns through insider
trading and hypothesizing that “the most plausible explanation for this result is that insiders are trading
on information that is not available to the rest of the market”).
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publicly disclosed can reap a significant trading advantage, selling their
inventory of Acme’s shares at the prevailing (and overvalued) market price.
Alternatively, the informed investors could sell Acme’s shares short,
borrowing shares to sell immediately at the overvalued price and then
purchasing shares after the earnings announcement is made at the new
lower expected price.107 If Acme management sought to favor Merit, then,
it might do so by disclosing non-public information to Merit selectively
before its public announcement.
Several layers of legal prohibitions exist against the provision of
selective disclosures in situations where managers seek to entrench
themselves. First, state corporate law fiduciary duties nominally prohibit
such activity. As before, however, many forms of information disclosure
can occur from benign motivations, such as a desire to disseminate
information on the company to the market, increasing stock price accuracy
to the benefit of all shareholders.108 In both cases, neither the manager nor
the shareholder receives a detectable payment. As such, it is at least
possible that courts would find it difficult to distinguish benign instances of
disclosure from opportunistic ones.109
Second, the federal securities laws may treat shareholders receiving
non-public inside information from managers in violation of their fiduciary
duty as similar to insiders. The Supreme Court, in Dirks v. SEC,110 set
forth the test for when a tippee receiving non-public material information
from a corporate insider faces insider-trading liability. Writing for the
Court, Justice Powell held that shareholders that receive a tip from an
insider in a situation where the shareholder knows or should know that the
insider is breaching her fiduciary duty commit insider trading when they

107. Short sales allow an investor to sell shares that the investor does not own. Investors seeking
to execute a short sale first borrow shares from a broker. Then the investor sells the borrowed shares at
the prevailing secondary market price, pocketing the cash from the sale. The investor must later repay
the borrowed shares through the purchase of new shares in the market. Where the repurchase price is
lower than the price the investor initially sold the borrowed shares, the investor profits.
108. For a discussion of the beneficial uses of selective disclosures, see Stephen Choi,
Symposium, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming
2001).
109. For example, Acme’s managers may transmit information on Acme’s upcoming financials to
Merit Investments. Merit, in turn, may trade based on such information for its own profit without
sharing anything directly with Acme’s managers. Instead, Merit may simply vote for the managers’
candidates for directors at the next proxy vote in return. To the extent their relationship is long-term,
Merit and the managers may engage in such activity without the need of any formal contractual
relationship. Lacking any traceable direct benefit to Acme’s managers from the disclosure, courts may
find it difficult to discern a fiduciary duty violation.
110. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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trade based on the information.111 Justice Powell further elaborated on
what constituted a fiduciary breach on the part of a tipper, writing that a
breach occurs when “the insider receives a direct or indirect personal
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational
benefit that will translate into future earnings.”112 Despite the theoretical
reach of insider trading prohibitions to block the opportunistic use of tips to
outside shareholders, enforcement is often problematic due to the difficulty
of demonstrating that the manager violated her fiduciary duty where she in
fact received no direct trading profits.
Third, the SEC has recently promulgated new regulations to block the
transmission of material non-public information to selective recipients
altogether. Encompassed within Regulation FD,113 the new rules define a
class of recipients to which the firm, top officers of the firm, as well as
employees that speak for the firm may not make selective disclosures.114
Among such recipients are broker-dealers, investment companies,
investment advisors, and investors that are reasonably expected to trade
based on the information.115 Regulation FD requires firms that engage in
such selective disclosures intentionally to disclose the information
immediately to the public markets.116 For unintentional disclosures,
Regulation FD still requires firm to make the information known to the
public markets within 24 hours or when trading commences on the New
York Stock Exchange, whichever is sooner.117
The SEC’s approach to selective disclosures differs from the
regulatory prohibitions applied to most of the other forms of selective

111. See id. at 660.
112. Id. at 663.
113. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Rel. No.
34-43154, Aug. 15, 2000, 2000 WL 1239722 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Promulgating Release]. Regulation
FD represents the culmination of one of former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt’s top priorities. See David
Schellhase, Arthur Levitt’s Cultural Crusade, THE RECORDER, Aug. 16, 2000.
114. See Rule 101(b), Regulation FD (defining “issuer” to encompass primarily Exchange Act
reporting companies). See Rule 101(c), Regulation FD (stating that “‘Person acting on behalf of an
issuer’ means any senior official of the issuer (or, in the case of a closed-end investment company, a
senior official of the issuer’s investment adviser), or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer
who regularly communicates with any person described in Rule 100(b)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii), or with
holders of the issuer’s securities.”).
115. See Rule 100(b)(1), Regulation FD.
116. See Rule 100(a)(1), Regulation FD (requiring simultaneous disclosure in the case of
intentional selective disclosure).
117. See Rule 100(a)(2), Regulation FD (requiring disclosure “promptly” in the case of
unintentional selective disclosures); Rule 101(d), Regulation FD (defining “promptly”). Because of the
possibility of nuisance suits, Regulation FD excludes the possibility of private causes of actions based
on violations of Regulation FD. See Promulgating Release, supra note 113, at *5.
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payments to shareholders. Unlike the approach taken for issues of new
securities, interested transactions, and the allocation of business
opportunities and activities, the SEC’s approach does not attempt to divide
between opportunistic and more benign forms of payments to shareholders.
Instead, Regulation FD resembles the outright prohibition on non-pro rata
direct dividends from a corporation to shareholders of the same class. As
such, firms seeking to grant favoritism to block shareholders are relatively
less likely to do so by selective disclosures than through one of the other
mechanisms studied above.118
In spite of the relatively significant degree of regulation that selective
information disclosure faces, it is not altogether clear from an efficiency
perspective that such practices always reduce overall corporate welfare.119
Firms, for example, may use selective disclosures to subsidize analysts
initiating coverage of the firms as well as the formation of blocks of shares
that work to monitor the firm for agency costs. Selective disclosures may
also provide firms an easy avenue to inform markets without comprising
confidential information or exposing the firm to frivolous antifraud
lawsuits.120 The prohibition on selective disclosures may cause firms to
remain silent, inducing some outside analysts to make large expenditures in
uncovering similar information on which to make trading profits.121 Given
that these analysts may not be the lowest cost investigators, the prohibition
of selective information may generate unnecessarily high and duplicative
research costs in the securities markets.
On the other hand, of course, allowing selective disclosures has its
downsides as well. Indeed, non-block outside shareholders would probably
expect always to be at a disadvantage relative to favored recipient, and
would therefore pay much less up front than they otherwise would for the
firm’s shares. Moreover, non-favored analysts may reduce their coverage
of the particular firm (given their disadvantage relative to analysts that
118. We should note that in proposing Regulation FD, the SEC focused much attention on the
danger of selective disclosure to analysts (and in particular on the risk that managers may give
information selectively to analysts in return for the analysts’ willingness to give the company’s stock a
good recommendation). See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos. 337787, 34-42259, 64 Fed. Reg. 72590, 72592 (Dec. 28, 1999). Nevertheless, the scope of Regulation FD
as promulgated includes investors reasonably expected to trade on the information. See Rule 100(b)(1),
Regulation FD.
119. For a discussion of the beneficial uses of selective disclosures, see Choi, supra note 108.
120
121

See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L.
REV. 1449, 1463–64 (1986). See also Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak
to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 992–95 (1991) (describing market specialists as “palace guards”
able to learn material corporate information prior to other outside investors).
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receive selective disclosures), increasing the amount of price volatility in
the stock and raising the cost to investors of engaging in research related to
the firm. Managers will then face a reduced amount of firm resources from
which they may appropriate.122
B. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH PROHIBITION
As we noted in the Introduction, the practice of bestowing favoritism
on block shareholders (regardless of the precise means for doing so) evokes
deep suspicion among many legal scholars. Indeed, it is eminently
plausible that a chief motivation behind such patronage is to entrench
managers, negating the block shareholders’ takeover threat, and thereby
harming overall corporate welfare.123 If this view is correct, then
shareholder favoritism is undeniably problematic, and may warrant
prohibition.
Nevertheless, even if one were sympathetic to the prohibitionist
argument in theory,124 implementing it in practice can be at best difficult,
and at worst haphazard and counterproductive. Perhaps the most
immediate practical problem (noted numerous times above) stems from the
multiplicity of mechanisms that managers can employ to play favorites,
including outright transfers, capital market transactions, business dealings,
diversion of corporate opportunities, selective information disclosure, and
so forth. Each of these devices is likely to play an important role in
patronage, and collectively, are likely to be perceived as substitutes of one
another in the eyes of a manager.
Piecemeal prohibitions against one form of payment or another, then,
are apt to have little overall effect beyond shifting activity towards other
forms of patronage. For example, the stringent prohibitions on making
outright cash distributions to a block shareholder might well cause
122. Where firms choose to make selective disclosures to favored block shareholders, various
externalities may result in the securities market. To the extent analysts are crowded out through the
transfer of inside information to block shareholders, analysts may choose not to engage in as much
securities research on the firm. Goshen and Parchomovsky make the argument that analysts provide a
benefit to all investors from their research activities that they only partially capture. See Zohar Goshen
& Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in
Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2001). Crowding out analysts, therefore, may hurt the ability of all
investors to engage in informed securities analysis. Such investors therefore may pay less for the firm’s
security when the firm initially raises capital, leaving managers with less money to appropriate.
123. See supra note 9 (citing commentators that view defensive tactics that simply close off the
possibility of a hostile takeover as inimical to shareholder welfare).
124. In Part III of the paper we question whether, as a theoretical matter, prohibitions against
managerial favoritism of shareholders in fact increases overall shareholder welfare.
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managers instead to seek a one-sided contractual relationship with or shift
their business activities to the shareholder. While this regulatory cat-andmouse game is a difficult and costly one to play in its own right, the
inefficiencies it presents are not limited to the costs of designing new
regulations and devising end runs around them. Indeed, many substitute
mechanisms for playing favorites—those that are least susceptible to
effective regulation—impose additional inefficiencies themselves. While
direct cash distributions result in a dollar-for-dollar transfer in value, for
instance, patronage through transferring corporate opportunities to a
favored shareholder can decrease efficiency by channeling projects to a
higher-cost producer.
Regulators, of course, might attempt to respond to this problem by
categorically tightening all prohibitions of favoritism. Indeed, the SEC’s
Regulation FD might represent such an attempt for informational
patronage. But even here, it seems unlikely that regulating entities will be
able to capture the entire domain of circumstances where favoritism can
exist, or alternatively that highly motivated managers cannot eventually
find a way to skirt the prohibition, perhaps by some ingenious innovation
that introduces even more technical inefficiencies.
Another problem with such across-the-board regulation is the danger
of over-inclusiveness. In many circumstances, a number of legitimate
justifications exist for managers’ business decisions, even if (on first blush)
they resemble in-kind favoritism. Indeed, a manager may hire a
shareholder as a consultant to the firm because the shareholder in fact holds
expertise valuable to the firm. Alternatively, a shareholder may have good
information on the firm, and might therefore serve as the lowest-cost
source of capital for a loan. Particularly for hard-to-value goods and
services, courts often lack the ability to distinguish when the purpose of a
particular act of largess represents favoritism or simple good sense.
Regulators that seek to address the problem of stopping shareholder
favoritism across all possible circumstances in which managers may give
patronage face one additional hurdle. The present barriers to patronage
span federal (and state) tax law, federal securities law, and state corporate
law. Devising a cohesive system to address all instances of shareholder
favoritism therefore requires some degree of coordination across these
varying regulatory bodies—not all of which focus on shareholder welfare
as their primary regulatory goal. Although not impossible in a theoretical
sense, the necessity of harmonizing these various bodies of law presents a
high transaction cost to regulators at the very least.
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This danger of inaccuracy has perhaps led courts and policymakers (at
least in part) to resist across-the-board expansion, focusing on the most
direct and obvious mechanisms for playing favorites (such as cash
distributions) as the chief targets for scrutiny. Such a pattern seems all the
more natural given that the more direct the benefit, the more transparent
and verifiable it is to third parties. What this regulatory scheme has
wrought, however, is a perforated legal landscape, rife with safe havens for
managers willing to supply patronage to favored shareholders through less
direct (but often more costly) methods. Thus, even if one were committed
to the proposition that favoritism warrants abolition, it does not necessarily
follow that instituting a series of piecemeal prohibitions can feasibly allay
these concerns. Regulators may simply drive managers toward the less
direct means of favoring shareholders, resulting in just as much
opportunism but at a higher inefficiency cost to the detriment of all
shareholders.
III. RE-ASSESSING FAVORITISM
Our discussion thus far has focused on the legal regulation of
shareholder favoritism from an administrative-cost perspective. In other
words, we have taken for granted the desirability of prohibition, and have
questioned whether such a goal is a practical feasibility. We now turn to
our theoretical argument, which requires us to reverse logical course,
presuming the feasibility of effective regulation, and questioning whether
the argument for prohibition is self-evident on its own terms. We argue
that it is not, and that much to the contrary, allowing managers to play
favorites may have an independent efficiency rationale that cuts to the very
heart of a firm’s incentive structure.
The kernel of our argument is simple. As noted in the Introduction, a
legal regime that permitted favoritism for widely held firms would expose
managers to an increased risk that outside investors would assemble a
block of shares solely for the purpose of “holding up” the manager,
extracting some sort of payment in consideration for abandoning their
takeover attempt. By paying off the block shareholder, then, a manager
may be able to entrench herself, but only at the price of sharing her private
benefits of control. Alternatively, the manager could attempt to deter the
formation of a block (and thus the ensuing bribe) in the first instance, by
committing to a governance structure that limits her own ability to
appropriate firm value. So doing both increases the cost of forming a
toehold, and credibly limits the size of the bribe that managers are willing
to pay. We argue below that in many plausible circumstances, the manager
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would prefer deterrence to acquiescence, and thus that permitting
favoritism can work in the interests of all shareholders.
A. RECEIVED WISDOM
As a prelude to our conceptual analysis, it is perhaps worthwhile to
pause at this juncture to review what one might call the “received wisdom”
about shareholder favoritism. Doing so will help to gain perspective both
on our contribution and its relationship with the (admittedly vast) law-andeconomics literature on corporate governance.
Most economically motivated description of the corporation (and ours
is no exception) have at their core what might be called an “agency cost”
account of the firm. This perspective emanates from a familiar observation
that shareholders in publicly held corporations face a significant incentive
problem in dealing with a company’s managers.125 Particularly when
shares are widely dispersed, no single shareholder has both the incentive
and resources to monitor management closely. (After all, a principal
reason to employ managers is to allow public shareholders to provide their
capital but not their time or expertise to a business).126 This separation of
ownership from control, in turn, provides managers with considerable
discretion to make decisions that systematically benefit their own interests
at the expense of shareholders, either through shirking or outright
appropriations of company value.
Such perverse managerial incentives can be disquieting for any
number of reasons. From an economic perspective, however, acts of
managerial self interest are a concern principally because they are
organizationally inefficient—that is, the benefits to self-serving managers
are strictly less than the costs imposed on shareholders (along, perhaps,
with other stakeholders), thereby causing aggregate company value to fall
short of its potential. Rational shareholders, of course, can (at least in
theory) anticipate downstream managerial misconduct and adjust their
initial behavior accordingly, by either refusing to invest in the company or

125. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 308–10; Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288–89 (1980); Fama & Jensen, supra note 1, at 304.
126. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). Recently, economists have introduced evidence that large publicly-held
corporations lacking significant blocks of shares are a relatively rare phenomenon in the world capital
markets. Many firms outside the United States and the United Kingdom, in fact, are characterized by a
controlling block shareholder comprised of either a controlling family or the state. See, e.g., La Porta,
et al., supra note 30, at 471. Our analysis, therefore, applies most directly only to the United States, the
United Kingdom, and other markets where shareholders are dispersed.
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by investing only on highly discounted terms.127 But even so, this
adjustment still increases the cost faced by a corporation of raising outside
capital, an impediment that causes many socially valuable business
ventures to be passed up. Consequently, much scholarship within
corporate law focuses on how legal rules, compensation schemes,
ownership structures, and outside markets can each help mitigate the
agency costs that dwell in the gulf between ownership and control.
One oft-proposed “Coasean” solution to this problem combines
market forces and legal constraints. At the time a firm initially goes public,
the firm’s promoters have a strong incentive to make credible assurances
that corporate management has a limited ability to self-deal. Indeed, so
doing can reduce the firm’s cost of raising capital in the securities market.
Consequently, this argument contends, the entrepreneurs in control of the
firm will find it attractive to implement contractual obligations and
corporate governance structures that limit the ability of management to
expropriate value from shareholders.128 If courts stood by reliably to
enforce such self-restraints, this type of ex ante commitment becomes
credible, and can significantly decrease the equity premium attributable to
prospective managerial agency costs.
In practice, of course, the Coasean solution often falls far short of its
theoretical promise. For starters, ex ante contracting is a costly and time
consuming endeavor, requiring significant and detailed foresight about the
future obstacles and opportunities a company may face. Entrepreneurs
frequently lack the requisite ability to specify sufficiently detailed
provisions to govern every possible future contingency.
In such
circumstances, an attempt to limit managerial discretion ex ante may
backfire and stifle future corporate flexibility. In addition, even if such
contractual foresight were possible, nothing guarantees that a court or other
regulatory body, attempting to interpret the terms years after they were
executed, would be able to decipher them accurately.
In light of these limitations, alternative means for aligning the
incentives of managers and shareholders must play a greater role.
Corporations scholars have therefore devoted significant efforts at
specifying and formalizing such alternative mechanisms. For legal
scholars, state corporate law and other forms of regulatory intervention
127. For example, a well-documented lack of protections for minority investors against the
opportunism of managers in Russia has led to extremely low asset valuations in that country. See Alan
Cullison, Merger Madness Hits Russia’s Exporters, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2001, at A22 (reporting that
low asset valuations are leading to a merger wave in Russia).
128. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 305–07.
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have traditionally received significant attention.129 Most notably, fiduciary
duties can work to restrict the ability of managers to expropriate corporate
value selfishly.130 Whether managers attempt to extract value directly
(through outright transfers of cash to themselves) or more indirectly
(through, for example, shirking or conflicted transactions with the firm),
the duties of loyalty and care can act as an effective deterrent. But
regulatory approaches are not without their own limitations. The
requirement that shareholders seeking to enforce the duty of loyalty must
do so through a derivative suit imposes large procedural impediments to
such suits (such as demand requirements, heightened pleading standards,
and deference to independent litigation committees).131 While restricting
the number of frivolous suits, such procedural hurdles potentially render
mute numerous legitimate suits aimed at opportunistic managers.
Moreover, even for those plaintiffs who can surpass the procedural
obstacles, the contours of the substantive law they will face frequently lean
toward management’s corner, through either the protective business
judgment rule or the well-known “cleansing” ratification procedures
through which directors can insulate themselves.132 As such, regulatory
approaches alone are not likely to be a complete solution to agency cost
problems.
Given these difficulties, numerous economists (and law and
economics scholars) have also championed market forces as a potentially
important device for effecting managerial discipline. Managers who care
about their future employment prospects in the labor market, for example,
may limit the amount they expropriate.133 Managers may also work
pursuant to employment contracts that provide for variable pay based on
the firm’s performance; similarly, managers may receive stock options tied
129

Indeed, recently economists have focused attention on the value of strong minority investor
protections in explaining differences in financial development across countries. See Rafael La Porta,
Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin.
1131 (1997) (demonstrating link between investor protection and capital market activity).
130. See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 8.30(a) (“A director shall discharge his
duties as a director, including the duties as a member of a committee . . . in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”). See also Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman,
The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045
(1991) (providing a law and economics analysis of the fiduciary duties); supra note 57 (describing the
duty of loyalty).
131
See supra note 61 (discussing the demand requirement).
132
See supra note 57 (discussing ratification under Delaware state corporate law).
133. See Fama, supra note 1, at 305-06. Cf. Senbongi & Harrington, Jr., supra note 5, at 305–06
(predicting that managers produce more quantity than maximize profits in imperfectly competitive
industries as a means of increasing their reputation in the managerial labor market).
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to the value of the firm’s stock.134 Product market competition may also
reduce the rents within the corporation available for managers to purloin as
private benefits of control.135 And shareholders may even attempt to rely
on the business ethics of managers not to purloin too great a level of firm
value.136
Of all these market-based approaches, however, the market for
corporate control is one of the most oft-cited sources of discipline
constraining managerial agency costs. Particularly when a company’s
dispersed shares are publicly traded and widely dispersed, a hostile
takeover may become attractive when the overall performance of a
manager results in anemic corporate value. Indeed, the worse a manager’s
performance becomes, the lower the company’s share price will sink, and
the more attractive a takeover becomes. Managers who slack or choose to
divert corporate resources for their own individual purposes may therefore
be the authors of their own demise.
Because of the unique role played by takeover markets in disciplining
managers, most corporate law scholars agree that it is important to maintain
the robustness and competitiveness of such markets. This attention is for
good reason: for managers may be able to take a number of actions that
reduce the effectiveness of the takeover market. They may, for example,
implement a poison pill,137 which forces a potential acquirer to first wage a
proxy contest to takeover the board of directors before it may cancel the
pill.138 Managers may alternatively respond to the threat of a proxy contest
through a classified board. Directors on a classified board typically hold

134. See Michael C. Jensen & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV.
BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 1989, at 64–66; Michael C. Jensen, Management Compensation and the
Managerial Labor Market, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 4–6 (1985).
135. See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 375, 379 (1983). But see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 330 (“[T]he existence of
competition in product . . . markets will not eliminate the agency costs due to managerial control
problems. . . . If my competitors all incur agency costs equal to or greater than mine I will not be
eliminated from the market by their competition.”).
136. Many business schools, for example, require students to enroll in business ethics courses.
See Richard Donkin, Business Ethics: The Rights and Wrongs, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at 4.
137. Although a wide variety of poison pills exist, all of them share a type of “scorched earth”
feature: that is, once a change in control becomes likely, the pill provides attractive rights to outside
parties that drastically reduce the value of the company (thereby rendering the takeover unprofitable).
See generally HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAW § 25:79 (1998) (providing a description of a poison pills).
138. Under so-called dead hand pills, even a newly-elected board of directors of the target
corporation are unable to redeem the outstanding poison pills. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say
Never?” Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted By-Laws: An Essay for Warren
Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511 (1997).
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their seats for overlapping terms of three or more years,139 forcing an
acquirer to wait many years before obtaining control over the board. To the
extent that these (and other) maneuvers dilute and retard the market for
corporate control, shareholders as a body lose.
Viewed in this light, it should not be surprising that shareholder
favoritism is thought to constitute yet another device that impairs the
takeover market. In particular, managers fearing a hostile takeover may
seek to form a coalition with a block shareholder to ensure her quiescence.
Such coalitions can be helpful even when the block shareholder does not
own sufficient shares for control, since the block shareholder’s cooperation
with management will increase the cost to other outside investors
contemplating a hostile takeover. In the context of our example, an
alliance with Merit means that any third party acquirer would have to
assemble a block larger than Merit’s (which strongly supports management
in return for management’s favoritism). And, since Merit probably
acquired its shares from the shareholders with the lowest reservation price
for their shares,140 the remaining dispersed shareholders are likely to be
even more reluctant to sell their shares, raising the cost to another outside
investor yet again.141 Alternatively, the pre-existing block shareholder
itself may represent the most likely candidate to initiate a hostile takeover.
Paying him off may therefore reduce the value of pursuing a costly control
contest to the block, to the benefit of the incumbent managers.
Much of the received wisdom on shareholder favoritism maintains
that opportunistic patronage works to entrench managers and reduce overall
shareholder welfare.142 Indeed, selective payments to favored shareholders
can represent a thinly veiled quid pro quo for the block shareholders’
ongoing passivity. Acme’s managers, for example, may desire to
appropriate significant private benefits from the firm, in the form of (say)
higher wages, greater perks, interested transactions between the managers
and the firm. If left unaddressed, the very existence of Merit as a potential
acquirer clearly constrains management’s ability to appropriate such
benefits. Indeed, as value appropriation increases, the trading price of the
firm’s shares will drop, making an acquisition of the firm a more credible

139. See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(d); Model Business Corporation Act §8.06.
140. Although this may sound peculiar on first blush, shareholders can have differential
proclivities to sell because of different tax status, expectations of firm value, and the like.
141. For a discussion of the rationale behind an upward sloping supply curve, see infra text
accompanying notes 169–172.
142. See Rock, supra note 80 (providing examples of “bad” relational investing where the outside
large shareholder uses its influence to obtain private benefits).
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threat.143 By assembling a toehold, block shareholders like Merit put
themselves in an even better position to engineer such a takeover, since
they have already traveled part of the way there by virtue of their existing
ownership stake. Obtaining the support of block shareholders, then, is of
preeminent importance to Acme management, for it both nullifies their
takeover threat, and it further raises the cost to other outside investors of
assembling an independent control block. Managers therefore may enjoy
an increased ability to appropriate private benefits in the presence of such
payments.
While Acme’s management has obvious incentives to cut a deal with
Merit, Merit itself may stand to gain from one as well.144 Indeed, payments
of cash (and to a lesser extent, property or other business activities) provide
a fixed and certain benefit for the recipient shareholder. In deciding to
support management in return for the payment, the shareholder can avoid
bearing the high costs and risks implicit in attempting to make good on a
takeover threat. Moreover, the ease with which cash distributions are
valued (versus other sorts of favoritism) may further enhance this benefit.
Consequently, it is perhaps easy to understand why selective payments are
so attractive to managers and large block shareholders. Likewise, it is easy
to understand why courts and legislatures have viewed such side payments
so critically.
Notably, a small number of legal scholars have questioned whether
this common wisdom is correct, positing (like us) that shareholders as a
group can benefit from such transfers. In the context of an active takeover
contest, for example, Professors Macey and McChesney have argued that
paying greenmail to a potential acquiring shareholder may help compensate
the shareholder for its initial investigation in determining a worthwhile
takeover target.145 The prospect of receiving greenmail, therefore, may
143
Alternatively, large block shareholders may find it worthwhile to employ substitute
mechanisms of disciplining managers including a proxy control contest as well as the initiation of a
fiduciary duty derivative lawsuit.
144. Merit may use not only the threat of a takeover but also the threat of initiating a shareholder
issue proposal or a proxy control contest among other actions to extract rents from managers. See
generally Gordon, supra note 103, at 376–84 (providing a discussion of how shareholders may seek to
extract their own private gains when given the power to pursue shareholder initiatives). Significantly,
the larger the size of Merit’s block of shares, the more votes Merit will supply in favor of its
shareholder initiative and the more likely other shareholders may view Merit’s proxy issue proposal or
control contest as legitimate (to the extent Merit will have a greater incentive to maximize share value
the greater the fraction of shares in Merit’s hands).
145. See, e.g., Macey & McChesney, supra note 11. Alternatively, managers may use greenmail
to payoff an initial bidder, giving other higher valuing bidders the necessary time to put forth their own
bids. See id.
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help induce value-increasing takeovers. While this explanation is a good
one for rationalizing patronage in the immediate context of a takeover
context, it has less explanatory power in situations where takeovers are not
a looming threat.
Outside of the takeover context, Professors Ayres and Cramton have
highlighted the possibility that block shareholders may also become
excellent monitors.146 In particular, block shareholders that maintain a
long-term relationship with the firm may work to monitor management and
help implement implicit contracts that would not otherwise be possible.147
Since the benefit from such activities accrues to all shareholders, however,
it is unlikely that a single investor will have sufficient incentives to form a
block of shares in order to monitor. The prospect of receiving payments
from the firm may, Ayres and Cramton note, help induce outside investors
to form such relational blocks of shares.148
While Ayres and Cramton’s account also seems plausible, it suffers
from one potentially significant drawback: nothing in their theory precludes
the possibility that a block shareholder, once occupying that position, will
find that collecting side payments from opportunistic management is more
lucrative than monitoring.149 Even under Ayres and Cramton’s view, then,
regulators may still wish to prohibit acts of patronage when done solely to
nullify a takeover threat and induce the block shareholder to abstain from

146. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1033, 1062–63 (1994) (arguing that block shareholders with a long-term relation with
management may serve to monitor for agency problems and help implement optimal implicit
contractual arrangements). See also Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 298–303 (1996) (summarizing various theories of relational investing);
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON.
461 (1986) (noting that large block shareholders have greater incentives than small dispersed
shareholders to monitor managers for agency problems).
147. In addition, a block shareholder’s repeat relationship with a firm’s management allows for
various implicit contractual devices to reward and punish managers. For example, not all instances of
opportunism are verifiable in a court. Nevertheless, a block shareholder with a high level of monitoring
may observe such violations and condition their support of management on controlling the level of such
violations. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 146, at 1062–63.
148. See id. at 1051. One of the authors has made the argument that firms may use selective
disclosures as an inducement to outside investors to form blocks of shares that work to monitor
management, to the benefit of all shareholders. See Choi, supra note 108. In contrast, Ayres and
Cramton also remark that: “The occasions in which incumbent management have subsidized the
creation of a relational owner have included a number of entrenching maneuvers. Therefore, it is
unsurprising to find that such friendly preferred placements have often lead to reductions in the value of
common stock.” Ayres & Cramton, supra note 146, at 1051.
149
And Ayres and Cramton note as much. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 146, at 1051.
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monitoring.150 Discerning the “noble” acts of patronage from those that are
merely “opportunistic” presents its own set of substantial problems.
Thus, while other commentators have made specific arguments that
selective payments to shareholders may have benefits in addition to the
costs of opportunism, we take a different approach. In short, we embrace
opportunism. In many circumstances, we argue, regulators in fact may
wish to ignore motivation and simply allow unimpeded favoritism for two
reasons.
First, as we argued in the previous Part, even if patronage were
anathema to corporate welfare, regulators would be foolish to focus their
sights solely on individual acts without also considering substitute
mechanisms available to managers intent on transferring value to a favored
shareholder.151 At the very least, the presence of such substitute
mechanisms renders questionable the efficacy of prohibitions against direct
selective payments. In fact, if anything, the effort spent by managers
concocting substitute mechanisms and the added distortions they introduce
represent additional inefficiencies and costs of overinclusiveness that might
reduce overall corporate welfare even further. Moreover, because
patronage agreements are likely to be implicit and difficult to detect, it is
doubtful that courts would be able to detect and sanction them with great
reliability.
Second (and more importantly), we submit that judging shareholder
favoritism only in light of ex post effects misses an important piece of the
puzzle, particularly for advocates of the takeover market. In the
subsections below, we offer a somewhat more general argument that

150. This paper later questions this view of regulation. See supra Part III.
151. In the context of greenmail, Ronald Gilson notes one objection against potential greenmail
prohibitions is that “clever” lawyers and investment bankers may devise equivalent methods of
indirectly providing greenmail. Gilson, supra note 12, at 350–51. Gilson responds that the “substance
of a greenmail transaction is far less malleable than its form” and thus despite different possible forms,
courts should have the ability to identify greenmail “equivalent” transactions. Id. Gilson’s analysis,
however, ignores the problem with the selection of a form of greenmail payment that also may have
legitimate uses. In such situations, courts may have difficulty untangling whether in fact the particular
transactional form is being used for greenmail or for a legitimate use. Particularly where thin markets
exist and whether the shareholder recipient of a payment is in fact receiving a premium is difficult to
ascertain, courts may need to expend large amounts of resources in making a decision. Moreover, from
the perspective of managers and large shareholders, forms that provide the most “cover” against courts
recognizing the true nature of the transaction also may generate the most inefficiency. As discussed in
Part II, a straight cash payment from the firm to a particular shareholder is the most efficient means of
transferring value. Once a firm shifts toward hiring the shareholder for a job to which the shareholder is
ill-suited (among other indirect forms of payments), the firm incurs large additional costs for each
dollar of value transferred to the shareholder. See supra Part II.
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regulators not need to distinguish opportunistic driven forms of shareholder
favoritism. Opportunistically driven payments to block shareholders may
in fact work to increase overall corporate welfare. Even where an
opportunistic payment completely eliminates the possibility of a takeover,
permitting such payments may make shareholders even better off from an
ex ante perspective. In such circumstances, therefore, regulators may wish
to rethink their opposition to such payments.
B. A New Theory of Payments to Shareholders
In this section, we turn to a more formal presentation of the conceptual
portion of our argument, developing a simple game-theoretic model to
study the strategic interaction between rational managers and rational
potential block shareholders.152 Using this model, we demonstrate how
giving managers the ability to make selective bribes to shareholders may,
ironically, provide managers incentives to take value-maximizing actions
and choose efficient governance mechanisms, in order to deter outside
investors from building blocks solely for the purpose of extracting side
payments. Consequently, we show, permitting favoritism can benefit even
those shareholders who receive no patronage.
1. Basic Framework
In order to facilitate our analytical argument, we resuscitate the Acme
Corporation hypothetical narrative developed in the previous section.
Recall that Acme is a publicly traded firm with 10 million shares of
common stock outstanding, and 10 million well-diversified and highly
dispersed shareholders, each owning a negligible fraction (in particular, one
share) in the company.153 The relevant activities we consider take place
over two periods, which we denote as “Period 1” and “Period 2”; we
further assume that future payoffs are discounted to present value at a
uniform rate of 10 percent—and thus, a $1 payment in Period 2 is worth
approximately 91 cents in Period 1.154 Our principal enterprise is to
consider (i) how Acme’s management team (denoted as player M) will
choose to manage the company in light of a potential threat from an

152. We present only a simple, primarily numerical example to illustrate the intuition of our
argument in this paper. In a companion technical piece we provide a more rigorous mathematical
model of the impact of managers playing favorites with shareholders. See Stephen J. Choi & Eric L.
Talley, supra note ††.
153. So long as Acme’s shareholders are all relatively dispersed, nothing turns on the one-shareper-shareholder assumption.
154. That is, ($1 / 1.10) = $0.9090.
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external block shareholder (denoted as player B); (ii) whether the
prohibition of “side deals” between M and B changes significantly on this
interaction, and (iii) if so, what it means for other shareholders and
corporate welfare as a whole.
In order to proceed with our analysis, it is important for us to spell out
precisely how the relevant parties are assumed to interact with one another
in each period as summarized below:
Period 1: Management (M) chooses the maximal level of private
benefits (X) to which it commits, and the outside investor (B) decides
whether to purchase a block of shares. M may also be able to negotiate
with B for the payment of a “bribe” to B in return for B’s support of
management (depending on whether such bribes are legally permitted). If
no such deal is permitted or bargaining fails, B may decide to purchase a
controlling stake in the firm.
Period 2: Player M (or B, if a takeover has occurred) chooses the
amount of private benefits to expropriate, subject to the maximal
commitment level that M set in Period 1.155
Of the two periods, Period 2 is easiest to describe. In this period, only
one relevant decision is made: M (or its successor156) decides how much of
firm value she will appropriate for herself in the form of private benefits of
control. If Acme were managed in a completely selfless fashion, its
expected fair market value at the end of Period 2 would be $1.1 billion—or
$110 per share. When discounted back to present value at the beginning of
Period 1, then, a selflessly managed firm would have a total market value
of $1 billion—or $100 per share.157 Nevertheless, M may have some
ability to appropriate a fraction of the firm’s value in Period 2 for her own
personal benefit. For convenience, we will sometimes denote this
fractional value by the variable x. Thus, if M appropriated say, x = 25% of
Acme’s firm value for herself, Acme’s Period 2 value would be 75% of
$1.1 billion, which has a present value (as of Period 1) of $750 million—or

155. Here we abstract from the possibility that B may actually enjoy synergy advantages that
result in a higher overall valuation for the firm in B’s hands than in M’s hands. While certainly an
important motivating force behind a takeover, we contend that synergy is simply orthogonal to our
analysis. Whatever the value of a taking control to B, the prospects of also benefiting from extracting
rents from managers (when B forms a toehold block as we discuss later in the paper) will increase the
willingness of B to purchase shares to form a block potentially opposed to management.
156. As it will turn out in our model, this party will always be M, who will have done “just
enough” in the previous period to remain in control and fend of a hostile takeover.
157. At a 10% rate of discounting, the present value of $1.1 billion is equal to ($1.1 billion) / (1 +
0.10) = $1 billion.
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$75 per share. While hurting Acme’s shareholders, such a diversion
obviously helps M. Nevertheless, we shall assume that in spite of her
personal gain, M’s actions are socially wasteful, and that for each dollar of
firm value that M appropriates, she only benefits herself by 40 cents.158
Consequently, by reducing Acme’s present value by $250 million, M reaps
a substantially smaller benefit, valued at $100 million.
To focus squarely on the role of the market for corporate control as a
disciplining device, we assume that M’s decision about how much value to
appropriate is “non-contractible,” in that her wages and other forms of
compensation cannot be tailored to punish her from taking private benefits
of control. All that constrains M during this period is whether she has
previously (in Period 1) placed a credible constraint upon herself,
effectively putting an upper bound on the amount of private benefits she
can appropriate (described at greater length below).
Assuming the parties anticipate these actions in Period 2 (all the while
discounting them to present value in Period 1), we can now describe the
first (and more interesting) period of the model. As noted above, we
assume that in Period 1, M can commit to a maximal level of private
benefits she can expropriate from the firm, which we will call X. And it is
here where the presence of the outside investor, B, becomes important. For
B (as well as other investors), a failure by M to make any such commitment
towards abstinence is tantamount to a manifest intent to pillage the firm,
decimating its future value.159 In Period 2, player M—assuming there are
no constraints on her behavior—will choose simply to abscond with the
entire firm. Anticipating this outcome, shareholders in Period 1 will
discount the per-share price they are willing to pay for the firm (also to
zero), thereby making it relatively easy for the outside investor to take over
the firm by purchasing a majority stake, firing M in the process. It is the
fear of just such an acquisition that can (and, as it turns out, will) motivate
M to commit voluntarily to some maximal level of value appropriation, X.
Although we later catalog a variety of means with which M can so
158. The paper assumes that managers are unable to appropriate value without some degree of
inefficiency. To the extent fiduciary duties limit egregious acts of appropriation, for example, managers
may need to hide their private benefits through perks and other non-monetary means of transferring
value that may not provide full dollar value to managers. The very act of hiding benefits may also
require costly resource expenditures. Managers may also force the firm to deviate to less profitable
activities to enhance their ability to appropriate value. For each dollar benefit that a manager receives
from appropriation, firm value as a result may drop by more than one dollar; moreover, the inefficiency
is likely to increase the higher the levels of expropriation. Overall corporate welfare therefore is
maximized in the simple model when managers appropriate no private benefits.
159
See infra text accompanying note 223 (discussing the problem of credible commitment).

CLEAN COPY CHOI.TALLEY USC REVISED 12-24-2001

1999]

PLAYING FAVORITES WITH SHAREHOLDERS

1/2/2002 9:37 AM

155

constrain herself in a credible fashion through various corporate
governance devices,160 for current purposes we remain agnostic about the
precise means for doing so. At the very least, M may want to constrain
herself just enough to keep the stock price relatively high, and by so doing
make a takeover somewhat expensive to engineer.
Continuing with Period 1, once the manager has chosen the
commitment level X, the outside investor decides whether to purchase
shares with an eye towards a takeover.161 Although in the real world, such
purchases can take place incrementally over time (through, say, a
“creeping” tender offer), we shall simplify the analysis somewhat so that
the outside investor must make all his purchases in at most two
transactions—both occurring during Period 1.162 First, player B can
attempt to purchase a “toehold” position in the firm—one that falls short of
taking a majority of shares, but nonetheless gives him a credible threat to
carry out a takeover. Second, B can decide to increase his toehold position
in the firm by purchasing whatever he still needs to take control of the firm,
which we shall assume takes place at the 50% threshold.163
Permitting B to purchase shares at two discrete points during Period 1
allows us to study how bargaining between M and B in the intervening time
affects overall corporate welfare. It is the spoils of this bargain that we
perceive to be the motivation behind both shareholder favoritism and ex
ante deterrence. Indeed, if M can make an opportunistic payment to secure
the support of the toehold shareholder, then M will find herself in a difficult
position of choosing either to (1) form a coalition with the non-control
block shareholder or (2) commit to such selfless governance that the block
shareholder never emerges despite the possibility of extracting rents from
managers. As we shall demonstrate below, rather than share her value with

160. See infra Part III.C.2.
161. For now, we shall assume that only one outside investor possesses the financial resources to
assemble something more than a trivial block of shares. We shall return to the possibility of numerous
block shareholders shortly (a complication that reinforces our thesis rather than undercutting it). See
infra text accompanying note 236.
162

This assumption is consistent with modern securities law, given that creeping
tender offers must now be disclosed early on. See Rule 13D. [complete cite].

163. Under state corporate law, shareholders elect the board of directors. DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §
211(b); Model Business Corporation Act § 8.03(d). The board of directors is given the power (unless
otherwise specified in the corporate charter) to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.
DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(a); Model Business Corporation Act § 8.01(b). Directors are elected through
a plurality of the votes case unless the corporate charter specifies cumulative voting. See DEL. GEN.
CORP. L. § 214; Model Business Corporation Act § 7.28.
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a toehold block, M will often prefer to commit to a lower level of private
benefits (i.e., a lower X) so as to deter the formation of any toehold.164
With the basic framework in hand, our next task is to characterize how
the equilibrium level of value appropriation changes in the absence and
presence of bargaining, respectively. We discuss each of these cases in
turn.
2. The Takeover Deterrent in the Absence of Favoritism
Consider first the constraints that the takeover market places on
managerial opportunism in a world where bargaining for patronage by B is
prohibited. As noted above, managers who appropriate a large fraction of
firm value can induce depressed share prices, thereby increasing the
possibility of a hostile takeover. In particular, mismanagement by M can
make it profitable for B to assemble a block of shares sufficient to obtain
control over the corporation. Once in control, B can replace M with
himself (or loyal agents), change firm policies, and (possibly) appropriate
private benefits for himself.
At the same time, however, even with obvious mismanagement,
takeovers are costly to engineer. An outside potential acquirer faces not
only legal requirements with respect to disclosure and the price paid, but
may also suffer higher costs due to implementation of various antitakeover
devices. And importantly, the acquirer must usually pay a “premium” to
dislodge current shareholders from their interest—a premium that increases
with the size of the block purchased.165
Such costs, in turn, provide managers with at least some leeway to
appropriate private benefits without tempting a takeover. To represent this
concept, we shall assume that M can commit to a ceiling that limits her
ability to siphon corporate wealth (which we have called X). If M is
interested in maintaining her position, she will attempt to select this ceiling
so that it “just” deters a takeover from occurring. When no bargaining is
allowed, we shall define this critical ceiling as Xnb. Critically, if Xnb is
sufficiently small to drain all the profit incentives from an acquisition, B
will choose not to engage in one.

164. The alert reader will no doubt recognize that allowing for a two-stage purchase by B is
meaningful only insofar as bargaining is allowed between purchases. If no bargaining occurred, then
nothing is added by explicitly permitting B to make a two-stage purchase.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 214–222.
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Just what value, then, will M choose to set for Xnb? To investigate this
question, we need to “solve” the game backwards starting with Period 2.166
Assume that M has retained control of the company during Period 1, and is
now considering how to manage the firm in the second stage. Here, her
incentives are fairly straightforward: No longer facing the specter of a
hostile acquisition, M will have an incentive to divert as much value as
possible (subject, of course, to the ceiling that Xnb imposes upon her).
Consequently, then, the company will be worth (1- Xnb)× ($1.1 billion) in
Period 2, which has a discounted value of $(1- Xnb) billion dollars at the
beginning of Period 1.
Now, consider B’s position in Period 1, contemplating whether to
engineer a hostile takeover of Acme.167 In deciding whether to construct a
control block to takeover the firm, the outside investor will compare the
benefits he receives for taking over the firm to the costs he must pay to
construct a control block. As to the benefit, B’s return is made up of two
probability-weighted components. First, he might be able to appropriate
private benefits himself after a takeover—though he might do so only
somewhat inefficiently: just like M, we assume that B benefits by only
some fraction of a dollar for each dollar’s worth of firm value he
appropriates.168 But second, an acquiring B might find that because he
owns a large fraction of equity in the company, his interests would be
better served by maximizing the value of the firm and realizing a large
capital gain over her investment.
As to the cost of amassing a control share of the firm, B must be
willing to offer a sufficiently large price to lure a strict majority (i.e., 5
million plus 1) of Acme’s shareholders to tender their shares. This can be a
costly enterprise, and B must take care to anticipate the “supply curve” of
shares accurately. As with many applications in finance theory,169 we shall
assume that it becomes increasingly costly on the margin for B to amass
larger and larger blocks of shares, and thus this supply curve is an upward
sloping one. While this assumption is critical to our analysis, it can occur
for many (non-exclusive) reasons. For example, shareholders may face a
166. Our analysis uses a rather conventional “backward induction” approach to characterize
equilibrium behavior. That is, we begin with an analysis of the outcome of Period 2 of the model, and
then discuss of the impact of that behavior on the parties’ behavior in Period 1.
167. As noted above, the absence of bargaining in this version of the analysis allows us to collapse
the two-stage purchase by B into a single one, implicitly assuming that B purchases nothing at her first
opportunity to purchase shares.
168. See infra notes 184-186 and accompanying text.
169. For an extensive review of the evidence in support of upward sloping supply curves for
shares, see Fried, supra note 36, at 434 n.65.
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range of different tax consequences from the sale of their shares.170
Shareholders may also have a range of heterogeneous expectations as to
firm value.171 And finally, as the outside investor assembles a sufficiently
large block to make a takeover inevitable, the news may filter into the
market, raising the expectation of shareholders in the market as to the value
of their stock and thereby the secondary market price.172
We therefore posit that the outside investor faces an upward sloping
supply curve for shares, and thus must pay a higher premium (over present
value) the larger the block of shares he seeks to construct. In particular, to
animate our analysis, we assume that the supply curve of shares has the
following specific functional form: If the outside investor offers a price of
P dollars for each share, the quantity Q(P) shareholders will tender their
shares, where:

10 ⋅ E (V ) 

Q ( P ) = (10 million) ⋅ 11 −

P


The term E(V) in this expression denotes the expectation that
tendering shareholders have of the Period 2 per share value of the company
should they tender.173 Importantly, this value may shift depending on

170. For example, some shareholders may be non-profit organizations and face no tax liability.
Other shareholders may hold shares primarily purchased over one year in the past and therefore enjoy
long-term capital gains preference on any appreciation in their shares. Still other shareholders may hold
shares purchased within one year and face taxation at ordinary income rates for the appreciation in their
shares. Shareholders who face differential tax liability upon the sale of their shares will require
differential prices to induce them to sell, a trait that leads directly to an upward sloping supply curve for
shares. See also David T. Brown & Michael D. Ryngaert, The Determinants of Tendering Rates in
Interfirm and Self-Tender Offers, 65 J. BUS. 529, 530 (1992) (reporting evidence that public
shareholders with varying tax costs associated with tendering may result in some shareholders accepting
a tender offer while others decline such an offer).
171. See Stout, supra note 44, at 625–35 (1995) (advancing the theory that investors in the stock
market may hold heterogeneous expectations as to share values).
172. To be sure, this generalization is not without caveats. For instance, investors may not have
full information on the incentive of an outside investor in forming a block of shares. Often blocks of
shares are assembled even when a takeover is not imminent. Under the William’s Act 5% rule, for
example, outside investors may assemble a block consisting up to 5% of the outstanding stock without
having to disclose their ownership. See supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text. The outside
investor may therefore obtain the initial toehold block without having to pay a significant premium. On
the other hand, the differential tax and heterogeneous expectations explanations for an increasing
supply curve for shares may still result in the outside investor paying a premium even for blocks smaller
than 5% of the outstanding shares. We concentrate on the tax rationale below.
173. More formally, E(V) stands for the expected per share value of the corporation in Period 2.
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whether the shareholder believes herself to be a “pivotal” shareholder in an
acquisition—that is, if her share is required to cause a change in control to
occur. In this case, a pivotal shareholder will realize that if she refuses to
tender her shares the firm will continue under current management, while if
she tenders, the firm will be governed by new management in a (possibly)
different fashion. To the pivotal shareholder, therefore, E(V) will represent
the expected Period 2 value of the firm where a takeover does not occur
(because it is the pivotal shareholder’s potential decision not to take the
offer that may scuttle the takeover). 174

FIGURE 1: GRAPH OF THE SUPPLY CURVE
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Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the size of the block and the
price that the outside investor must pay for the block, under the assumption
that E(V) = $30 (giving a total firm a value of $300 million in Period 2).
Although seemingly arbitrary, the specific supply function for shares we
use in fact represents the supply for shares that dispersed shareholders with
varying tax rates would provide the purchasing outside investor.175
Consider a particular shareholder facing the decision whether to tender

174. We assume that a takeover requires strictly more than fifty percent of outstanding shares, and
thus the shareholder that represents the 5,000,001th share of B’s nascent control block realizes that she
is pivotal. Given the differential tax rate assumption behind the upward sloping supply curve for shares,
the shareholder selling the 5,000,001th will realize her pivotal position based on her tax rate relative to
other shareholders. In more realistic settings, the shareholder may not know this with certainty, of
course. But even here, each shareholder may be able to make a relatively accurate conjecture of her
position, so that something close to what described in the text occurs.
175. See supra note 170 (describing various sources for differential tax rates among shareholders).
The mathematical derivation of this supply curve can be found in Choi & Talley, supra note ††.
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shares to B in Period 1 or to hold on to the shares until Period 2.
Shareholders that tender their shares in Period 1 face an immediate tax
consequence on any gain, and then can invest their after-tax earnings at
some outside interest rate (which we assume arbitrarily to be 10%), which
is itself taxed in Period 2. All told, then, shareholders who do not to tender
retain the ability to avoid any taxes in Period 1 (and thereby enjoy tax-free
buildup of their investment). Any shareholder with a positive marginal tax
rate, therefore, will demand some premium be paid on top of the present
value of the shares. By correlative reasoning, the higher the tax rate facing
a shareholder, the greater the premium she will demand. Although we
adopt this “tax” account for presentational ease, the intuition of our
analysis applies regardless of the specific reason that supply function is
upward sloping; what is critical is that the average cost of building a block
of shares is increasing with the size of that block.
Our supply function implicitly assumes that B must pay the same price
to all shareholders.176 Under this assumption, note from the figure that if B
offers $30 per share in Period 1 (equal to the future expected per share
value of the firm in Period 2), he can purchase all 10 million shares. Even
shareholders facing relatively high tax rates will choose to sell their shares
in Period 1 for $30 in present value terms (and then face taxes on any gain)
rather than wait until Period 2 to receive the same nominal $30 (again
facing taxes on the gain).177 Conversely, if he offers any less than
approximately $27.27 (i.e., the present discounted value of $30 in period
2), no one will tender.178 Finally, if B offers (approximately) $28.58 per

176

This assumption is justified in part by the best price rule for tender offers under the Williams Act.
See Exchange Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(7) (2001).
177. Assume that a shareholder faces a 95% tax rate on any gains (and has a zero basis in her
shares). If the shareholder chooses not to tender she will receive $30 (E(V)) for her share in Period 2
and will be taxed at the 95% rate, leaving the shareholder with $1.50 at the end of Period 2.
Discounting back to Period 1, the shareholder will receive a net expected value of $1.36. On the other
hand, if the shareholder tenders her share in Period 1 for $30 to B, the shareholder will receive $1.50 in
Period 1 (and is thus better off compared with the situation where the shareholder does not tender). In
fact, for all tax rates up to 100%, the shareholder is strictly better off from tendering where B makes
E(V) the Period 1 bid price.
178. Assume that a shareholder faces a 5% tax rate on any gains (and has a zero basis in her
shares). If the shareholder chooses not to tender she will receive $30 (E(V)) for her share in Period 2
and will be taxed at the 5% rate, leaving the shareholder with $28.50 at the end of Period 2.
Discounting back to Period 1, the shareholder will receive a net expected value of $25.909. On the
other hand, if the shareholder tenders her share in Period 1 for $27.27 to B, the shareholder will receive
$25.907 after tax in Period 1 (and is thus better off compared with the situation where the shareholder
does not tender). In fact, for all tax rates down to 0%, the shareholder is strictly better off choosing not
to tender where B makes $27.27 (equal to E(V)/1.1) the Period 1 bid price.
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share, then he can induce 5,000,001 shareholders to tender.179 This last
figure is a critical threshold for B, since it is the least cost manner in which
to engineer a takeover; purchasing a larger stake would not only require B
to raise the price paid to the additional shareholders, but since he cannot
determine who is the highest versus the lowest valuer among existing
shareholders, he would have to raise the offered price to all tendering
shareholders.180 Engineering such a takeover would therefore cost B (in
this particular case) a total of ($28.58)×(5,000,001) = $142.9 million.181
Hence, for this particular example, player B will find a takeover
profitable when and only when his private payoff from such a purchase
exceeds the above cost. To determine the benefit side of this comparison,
realize that B gains in one of at least two possible ways from a successful
purchase of a control block. First, B may choose to operate the firm at full
efficiency, maximizing the value of the firm for all shareholders (including
himself). The firm value in Period 2 where B successfully engages in a
takeover and pursues a strategy of maximizing firm value will equal be
E(V) = $1.1 billion. Because B owns a little over fifty percent of the
outstanding stock, B will receive an expected benefit of $550 million in
Period 2 (equal to $500 million in Period 1 dollars).
Alternatively, B may choose to use his control to expropriate private
benefits from the firm. As with the managers, B will suffer some
inefficiency in engaging in expropriation.182 Unlike the managers,
however, B suffers an additional cost from expropriation of value. The
more value B expropriates, the lower the value of B’s own shares of
common stock in the firm. In fact, only where B’s efficiency at
expropriation exceeds 50% will B prefer extracting private benefits
compared to the first strategy of maximizing overall firm welfare. For
example, B may enjoy the ability to capture 60 cents for every dollar taken
179. This last number (and the specific supply function for shares used in the paper) depends on
the assumption that Acme’s shareholders are arrayed uniformly in their tax rates from 0% to 100%. As
with the other specific assumptions used to generate the paper’s example, our analysis does not depend
on this assumption. The key point is that shareholders may differ in their tax rate and thus face varying
preferences between tendering today compared with staying invested in the firm’s shares into the future.
A different range of tax rates would result in a different breakpoint price at which 5,000,001
shareholders will choose to tender their shares to B. The supply equation also depends on the
assumption that all shareholders share the same equilibrium expectation of the future value of the firm.
For an explicit derivation, see Choi & Talley, supra note ††.
180. Moreover, under the Williams Act, to the extent a formal tender offer is initiated, the acquirer
must pay all shareholders the highest price it offers any shareholder. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2001).
181. More generally, we can calculate the offer price P that B must put forth to obtain a control
block of shares: P = (20/21) E(V).
182. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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as private benefits. In this situation, for each dollar B expropriates, B gains
60 cents directly and loses 50 cents from the loss in value of B’s control
block (as the firm value is reduced by $1 dollar, B’s control block of a little
over 50% of the shares drops in value by 50 cents accordingly). B will
therefore choose to expropriate the maximum possible level of private
benefits, constrained only by the incumbent managers’ initial selection of
corporate governance devices to constrain private benefits, Xnb.183
We assume that B will not know his precise efficiency at expropriating
private benefits until after B in fact obtains control over the firm.184 To
determine B’s overall expected benefit from purchasing a control block,
therefore, we need an assumption on the probability that B will in fact have
the ability to expropriate private benefits at an efficiency level greater than
50%. We assume that B’s efficiency at expropriation is distributed
uniformly from 0 to 1.185 Under our assumptions, it turns out that B will be
a relatively efficient appropriator half of the time (while the other half of
the time he will find that maximizing firm value to be more profitable).
Moreover, we assume that when B in fact is able to expropriate at a greater
than 50% efficiency level, B’s expected efficiency is equal to 75%.186 B’s
expected benefit from assembling a control block (E(πB)) is therefore equal
to:187
183. Suppose instead that for each dollar B expropriates, B gains 40 cents directly (due to a 40%
efficiency in extracting rents from the firm) and loses 50 cents from the loss in value of B’s control
block (as the firm value is reduced by $1 dollar, B’s control block of a little over 50% of the shares
drops in value by 50 cents accordingly). B in this case will lose 10 cents for every dollar appropriated
as private benefits. B, accordingly, will choose to operate the firm at its maximal value without any
private benefit expropriation.
184. B, for example, may not have full knowledge of the various confidential projects and
opportunities within the from which he may have some uncertain (and unknown at least prior to a
takeover) degree of success in expropriating value.
185
Our qualitative analysis changes little if the block shareholder knows the marginal value of his
private benefits at the beginning of the model (though the analysis becomes quantitatively a bit more
complicated).
186. Given a uniform distribution, there is a 50% probability that B’s efficiency of expropriation
is 50% of under (and that therefore B—holding a control block of slightly more than 50% of Acme’s
shares—will not find expropriation of value profit-maximizing). Moreover, conditional on the
efficiency of expropriation being larger than 50%, the mean efficiency level given a uniform
distribution is equal to 75%. Once again, these assumptions are not critical to our analysis, but lend
themselves to greater tractability.
187. More formally we can state that:
E(πB) = Prob(efficiency≤ 0.5)·(0.5·$1.1 billion) +
Prob(efficiency > 0.5)·(0.5(1 - Xnb)($1.1 billion) + (0.75· Xnb ·$1.1 billion))
Where B’s efficiency of expropriation is 50% or under, he gains more from maximizing the value of his
50% block rather than expropriating any value. Where B’s efficiency of expropriation is more than
50%, he gains from expropriating value in an amount equal to his efficiency of expropriation (assumed
equal to 75%) times the level of expropriation (Xnb ·$1.1 billion). In addition, B suffers a loss on his
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E(πB) = ($1.1 billion)(0.5 + 0.125Xnb)
Note that as shareholders expect incumbent managers to expropriate a
higher level of firm value in Period 2 (based on the managers’ choice of a
relatively high value of potential private benefits Xnb through the corporate
governance structure) the expected profit to B from engaging in a takeover
increases. As well, the cost of engineering a takeover will decline as the
expectation of the pivotal shareholder of the value of the firm without such
a takeover E(V) is reduced (corresponding to a lower level of Xnb).
Given the above reasoning for B, consider now the ex ante incentives
of M, who will anticipate the possibility that B will acquire the firm if it is
managed too poorly. The more that M ties her own hands through her
choice of X, the lower the benefit to the outside investor from obtaining
control. At the same time, the large cost of assembling a control block
provides the manager with a bit of slack to appropriate at least some value
without tempting a takeover. Managers will therefore set the level of
private benefits just under the cost to an outside investor of assembling a
control block. Put another way, M will set Xnb such that the outside
potential block shareholder B will find it unprofitable to assemble a control
block.
Solving for Xnb in the above example yields the condition that M can
forestall a takeover by B whenever Xnb ≤ 3.67%.188 Put another way,
managers who do not “self-constrain” to appropriating 3.67% of firm value
or less will induce a hostile takeover with probability one.189 Given the
alternatives, M’s best option is to so commit to a ceiling of Xnb = 3.67%, so
that B finds it just barely unprofitable to pursue a takeover, and stays out of
50% block of shares equal to the level of expropriation. Note that we assume that both
Prob(efficiency≤ 0.5) and Prob(efficiency > 0.5) are equal to 0.5 (or 50% each).
188. B’s Period 1 cost of assembling a control block is equal to 5,000,001·(20/21)·E(V). The
present value (in Period 1) B’s expected profit from assembling a control block is equal to E(πB)/(1.1) =
($1.1 billion)(0.5 + 0.125Xnb)/(1.1). Using the fact that E(V) = (1 - Xnb)($1.1 billion)/(10 million), we
can solve for the level of Xnb that just makes B indifferent about assembling a control block. With the
specific numbers in the Acme example, Xnb is equal to 3.67%. Given this value of Xnb note that the total
cost of assembling a block of 5,000,001 shares is equal to $504.59 million. If a takeover does not
occur, B may sell the block of shares back into the market at the pre-takeover price of $96.33 for
proceeds of $481.65 million. Thus, the net cost to B is equal to $22.94 million. Similarly, the net
benefit of a takeover for B (after subtracting the value of the 5,000,001 shares without a takeover) is
equal to $22.94 million. We assume that if B is indifferent, he will choose not to assemble the block.
189. We leave for later discussion the mechanisms by which a manager might do so. See infra
Part III.C.2.
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the market. Consequently, the Period 1 market price of Acme’s shares is
equal to $96.33 per share. Managers in Period 2 then are able to extract a
maximum total value of $16.15 million (i.e., 3.67% of $1.1 billion,
multiplied by the managers’ 40% efficiency of expropriation level), whose
Period 1 present value is $14.68 million. We use the Period 1 private
benefit level of $14.68 million as the benchmark to compare with the
outcome when shareholder favoritism is allowed.
The case just analyzed—where bargaining between M and B is not
permitted—provides the baseline for our analysis in the next subsection of
favoritism towards block shareholders. When we extend the model to
allow bargaining, the manager’s decision becomes somewhat more
complex. Now M, in deciding on the level of private benefits to
appropriate, will make her decision under the shadow of either a possible
takeover, or the prospect of a “bribe” to an outside investor in order to
discourage a takeover. As we demonstrate, the added possibility that B
forms a non-control toehold block simply for its “hold up” value in
extracting a bribe can provide an additional ex ante deterrent effect on
managers seeking to pilfer private benefits.
2. Allowing Favoritism to Shareholders
Imagine now that managers are free to bestow favoritism (e.g., pay
bribes) on outside investors using corporate resources, in order to deter
takeovers, and that such bribes are enforceable (in either judicial or extrajudicial venues). Through patronage, managers may be able to obtain the
cooperation of a block of shares in supporting the managers’ efforts at
appropriating private benefits. Although the conventional wisdom is that
such bribes decrease overall corporate welfare, this section makes the
argument that from an ex ante standpoint, the ability to make bribes may
actually be welfare enhancing.
As with the above case, we will continue to assume that M can
credibly commit to an “upper bound” on the fraction of firm value she can
appropriate, or X; once managers have made a decision to commit to this
ceiling, they cannot change this commitment.190 The incentive effect of a
possible takeover therefore occurs through the M’s expectations about how
the outside investor will react to the ceiling that is chosen. Note also that

190. Although managers might try to represent (without any commitment) that they will
appropriate a reduced amount, in the absence of a commitment, this representation is not credible. In
such a case, investors that choose not to engineer an outright acquisition cannot expect any value of the
company to remain.
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without an actual takeover, extracting a bribe is the only reason B would
ever build a toehold block to begin with: for to do so requires paying a
premium over present value, and if no takeover occurs, player B cannot
recoup this premium.191 Consequently, our analysis turns on a block
shareholder who is motivated solely by holding up management to extract a
portion of M’s private benefits.192 If M acquiesces, she stays in power and
might even benefit from an enhanced ability to extract private benefits from
the firm; at the same time, however, M also loses from having to share her
spoils with another party. The manager thus faces a choice. She may
acquiesce to the appearance of an outside investor, implicitly agreeing to
pay him a portion of M’s private benefits; in anticipation of this strategy, M
may then raise her commitment ceiling X on the maximum level of private
benefits she can appropriate. Alternatively, however, M might opt for the
path of self-interested self-abnegation, committing a lower ceiling on
private benefits in order to deter the formation of a toehold block
altogether. Although the overall private benefits extracted will be lower,
the manager may keep all of the benefits.
To analyze the impact of allowing favoritism, we now explicitly
permit B to make purchases at two points during Period 1. First, she can
purchase a toehold position in the firm, which falls short of the 50%
threshold of control, but is large enough to make her threat to complete a
takeover a credible one. After this initial purchase (if any) we allow for
bargaining between M and B. We suppose that the parties have equal
bargaining power so that any gains from trade are divided into 50-50

191. On a related note, Arturo Bris presents evidence from a sample of tender offers in the United
States from 1985 to 1998 that only 3.2 percent of the bidders had a prior toehold stake. Bris
hypothesizes that assembling a toehold prior to a bid signals to the market the possibility of a takeover
and thereby may lead to a run-up in the secondary market price, making the purchase of subsequent
shares in the target more expensive for the bidder and decreasing the probability of a successful
takeover. See ARTURO BRIS, WHEN DO BIDDERS PURCHASE A TOEHOLD? (Mimeo, Jan. 2001).
192. Note that we treat B as a unified entity seeking to maximize the net worth of B. For many
institutional investors, nevertheless, this assumption may not hold true. Instead, agency problems may
exist within institutional investors between the ultimate providers of capital and the managers of the
institution. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 468–78 (1991). Money managers in charge of B that seek to
maximize their own personal wealth may, for example, choose to accept a smaller payoff (directed
toward the money managers’ own interests) from Acme’s managers in return for B’s support of the
Acme’s managers expropriation of private benefits. Money managers that are sufficiently indifferent to
the welfare of B’s ultimate owners may also choose not to have B engage in opportunistic rent-seeking
against Acme’s managers to the extent the money managers bear at least the effort cost related to
identifying a suitable target and assembling a toehold block of shares. We abstract from the issue of
agency problems within institutional investors in this paper.
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portions.193 It is this payment that constitutes the bribe. Note that
bargaining between managers and a toehold shareholder is allowed prior to
the decision on the part of the toehold shareholder to continue on to a full
control block. In the analysis of the toehold shareholder bargaining model,
we once again proceed backwards through the stages in the model.
Except for a small variation, Period 2 of the model plays out much
like before. Suppose M has already set a fixed maximum level of private
benefits, which we will now label Xb (as opposed to Xnb from before). And
moreover, suppose that M has retained control (through either deterrence or
an effective bribe). If B has been deterred entirely, M will appropriate the
entire fraction allowable, Xb, for herself. On the other hand, if B has
formed a toehold and formed a coalition, M will still appropriate the full
amount that she can, rendering unto B whatever payment is due her as per
their agreement.
Working backwards to Period 1, things become more interesting. As
noted above, prior to selecting an expropriation ceiling Xb, M has to decide
whether she will opt for deterrence or accommodation of B. If she opts for
deterrence, she must obviously choose Xb sufficiently small to vitiate any
gain to B from either (a) taking over the firm or (b) purchasing a block and
demanding patronage. We know from the above analysis that an outright
takeover never occurs so long as M commits to X= Xnb = 3.67% or less. It
turns out, however, that when bargaining is allowed, simply deterring a
takeover insufficient. Indeed, even though such a ceiling would certainly
deter B from assembling a control block in a single transaction, B has the
magic of “sunk costs” on her side.194 Explicitly, she still has the option of
purchasing a tiny fraction of Acme (e.g., one share) so that her prospective
gains from a takeover are barely positive, disregarding the now-sunk costs

193. The gain from trade in this instance is the difference if any between (a) the expected private
benefits that M can glean if she retains control; and (b) the expected benefits that a toehold shareholder
B can capture (ignoring any sunk purchases) from going through with a takeover. The results derived
below persist so long as M does not possess “too much” of the bargaining power. See Choi & Talley,
supra note ††.
194. Sunk costs are expenditures that the outside investor is unable to recover once made. Of
course, to the extent another potential acquirer exists, the outside investor may be able to resell its
toehold block to the other acquirer at a premium (and thus take the loss of such a premium as part of the
opportunity cost of undertaking a takeover). Nevertheless, in the absence of a readily identifiable
buyer, the outside investor will find it difficult to liquidate the minority, non-control toehold block
without suffering a loss (or experiencing delay). For a recent example, see Cassell Bryan-Low,
Priceline.com Founder Jay Walker Sells Stock at Bargain Price, WALL ST. J., Aug 22, 2001 (reporting
that Priceline.com founder Jay Walker sold most of his remaining minority block of shares to Cheung
Kong and Hutchison Whampoa for $4.37 for share when the secondary market price equaled $6.35 per
share).
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it took to purchase the toehold. By so doing, B can turn herself into a
credible negotiator with M, and her share of the bargaining pie might be
large enough to offset the cost of assembling the toehold.
Applying this reasoning to the instant example exposes the folly of
selecting the expropriation ceiling Xb equal to Xnb (that is, the equilibrium
value of X when no bargaining is allowed). Indeed, if M were to do so, it
would—by definition—make the immediate costs of a takeover for B (with
no toehold) exactly balance the present value of the benefits (see Figure 2
below).195

FIGURE 2: B’S DECISION TO ASSEMBLE A CONTROL BLOCK
When Xb = Xnb = 3.67%
Net Benefit
$22.94 million

Net Cost
$22.94 million

Now suppose in contrast that B purchases a single share of Acme (for
$96.33).196 With the ownership of this single share, B now faces a lower
incremental cost of assembling a full control block. In particular, the
incremental cost of assembling a full control block is now less than prior to
the purchase of the single share (since B now only needs to purchase
5,000,000 shares to obtain control). Holding the single share, B’s calculus

195. For a derivation of the numbers in Figure 2 see supra note 188 (calculating the maximum
level of Xnb where managers still deter an outright takeover given a prohibition against side payments to
shareholders).
196. We assume that the shareholder that sells the single share to B in Period 1 does so at a price
equal to the expected per share value of the firm in Period 1. The price of a $96.33 per share depends
on managers expropriating $3.67 per share of private benefits from the firm (corresponding to Xnb =
3.67%). Where, of course, managers choose to expropriate a lower amount to deter the formation of
toehold blocks—as we discuss in the paper—the expected per share value will be correspondingly
higher.
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on whether to assemble a control block when the maximum level of private
benefits set by M is equal to Xnb now is fundamentally altered. Treating the
cost of the single share as sunk, in making his second purchase, B will
consider a takeover as providing himself a net profit equal to his reduced
cost to assemble a control block. This single share purchase tips the
balance for B in favor of going forward with an outright acquisition, and
thereby gives him credible bargaining power against M (see Figure 3
below).197

FIGURE 3: IMPACT OF A TOEHOLD OF 1 SHARE
When Xb = Xnb = 3.67%
Net Benefit
$22.94 million

Net Cost
$22.94 million - $4.59

Armed with a bona fide takeover threat, B can now attempt to extract
a significant portion of M’s $14.68 million worth of private benefits.
Assuming the bargaining surplus is split 50-50, M will be forced to pay a
bribe of approximately $7.34 million in Period 1 dollars to keep B from
completing the takeover (leaving $7.34 million for M).198 Note that where
B seeks only to establish a credible takeover threat to extract rents from the
managers, B will seek the smallest toehold block that gives it credibility.
197

Calculating this net profit requires some additional steps. First, assuming that B is able to resell his
one share in the secondary market for the same $96.33 then B’s sunk cost, B’s net profit will equal the
saved premium B would otherwise have to pay on the one share if purchased as part of the control block
transaction. Where E(V) = $96.33, the Article’s assumed supply curve for shares requires an offer price
of $100.92 for B to purchase 5,000,001 shares. Thus, B’s net profit from proceeding to a takeover
(given a toehold of 1 share) will equal $100.92 - $96.33 = $4.59.
198. To see this, note that the bargaining range is the interval between $96 (constituting the
present value of B’s gain from going forward with a takeover) on the lower end, and $33.61 million
(constituting the present value of M’s benefit from appropriating 3.67% of firm value in Period 2) on
the upper end. Splitting this bargaining range in half yields B’s share.
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Purchasing a larger toehold simply raises B’s cost without increasing its
credibility.
The specter of paying off B obviously reduces M’s private benefits of
control. Thus, if she wished to avoid having to split her rents, M would
have to choose an even smaller value for Xb—sufficiently small that B will
find it unprofitable to form a toehold block from which she can generate
credibility in negotiating with M.199
As it turns out in the Acme example, in order to deter B from ever
buying a toehold in the firm, M would have to choose Xb = 2.12%, more
than 1.5 percentage points lower than Xnb. Note that at Xb = 2.12%, the
Period 1 value of each share without a takeover is equal to $97.88.200 The
price, on the other hand, B must pay to acquire 5,000,001 shares (given the
upward sloping supply function discussed above) is equal to $102.54 per
shares as measured in Period 1.201 Consequently, the net unrecoverable
cost from assembling a control block is thus equal to $23.3 million.202
Against this is the net expected Period 1 benefit that B can expect from
assembling a full control block of shares, which is equal to approximately
$13.24 million.203 Obviously, an outright takeover (starting from zero
shares) is not credible for an outside investor holding no shares (because
the takeover would result in a net loss of $10.1 million to B) (see Figure 4
below).

199

This value of Xb clearly must be lower than the value of Xnb derived in the “no patronage” case for
two reasons. First, if the manager were to set the maximal level of private benefit expropriation above
Xnb, we know from the prior section that B will simply takeover the firm, leaving managers with zero
profits. Second, as managers reduce the maximal level of private benefits below Xnb, the outside
investor B must form increasingly larger toeholds to generate a credible threat of engaging in a
takeover. Lower levels of benefit expropriation translate into a lower potential profit for B from
engaging in a takeover. All other things being equal, B will need to shift more of its costs of
assembling a block to the initial “sunk” stage—through a larger toehold purchase—to present a credible
subsequent threat of takeover to the incumbent managers. Where the cost of obtaining a toehold is
increasing with the size of the toehold, B may eventually find not worthwhile to assemble the toehold
(even given the prospects of rent extraction from managers) where managers have reduced their level of
private benefits sufficiently.
200. The Period 1 value of the shares without a takeover is derived from (1 – Xb)·($1.1 billion)
/((10 million)(1.1)).
201. The price per share to acquire 5,000,001 shares was derived in note 181 and is equal to:
((20/21)E(V)) where E(V) is ((1 - 0.0212)($1.1 billion)/(10 million)) or $107.67. See supra note 176.
The per share acquisition price is therefore equal to $102.54.
202. This is obtained from 5,000,001·($102.54 – 97.88).
203. The Period 1 value of the control block post-takeover is equal to ($1.1 billion)(0.5 +
0.125(0.0212))/1.1 or $502.65 million. The Period 1 value pre-takeover is equal to 5,000,001·$97.88 or
$489.40 million. The expected benefit is thus equal to $502.7 million minus $489.4 million or $13.24
million.
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FIGURE 4: B’S DECISION TO ASSEMBLE A CONTROL BLOCK
When Xb = 2.12%
Net Benefit

Net Cost
$23.30 million

$13.24 million

Assembling a non-control toehold may shift some of the
unrecoverable cost of assembling a control block into sunk costs. It is no
longer possible, however, for B to become a credible bargainer after
purchasing a single share. Because B starts from a net loss of $10.1 million
from engaging in a takeover, B will have to assemble a toehold of
sufficient size to reduce B’s incremental cost to constructing a control
block by least $10.1 million (corresponding to a toehold of 21.6% of the
outstanding shares) to generate a credible takeover threat.204
In deciding whether such a large toehold is worthwhile, B will
compare the costs of assembling the 21.6% toehold against the size of the
bribe that B can hope to extract. As to the latter, when Xb is equal to 2.12%
and managers extract rents with a 40% efficiency (as assumed in the Acme
example), the Period 1 present value of private benefits is equal to $8.48
million.205 Splitting this rent in half gives B an expected share of $4.24
million. As to the net cost of assembling the toehold, the required price for
the toehold shares is equal to the price necessary to acquire a block of size
204

If B assembles a toehold of 2,160,249 (corresponding to 21.6% of the shares of Acme) then B will
need to purchase an additional 2,839,752 shares to form a control block. Following the assumed supply
curve for shares, B must expend $102.54 per share (when Xb=2.12%) to purchase the remaining shares
required for control. B’s total incremental net cost will therefore equal 2,839,752 x ($102.54 – 97.88) =
$13.23 million, giving B a credible threat of engaging in a takeover.
205. Where Xb is equal to 2.12% the amount of rents extracted (measured from Period 1) is equal
to 0.0212·($1.1 billion)/(1.1) or $21.2 million. When managers suffer from only a 40% efficiency in
extraction (due to fiduciary duty constraints among other things) this leaves only $8.48 million of rents.
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21.6% of the shares, and not the full 5,000,001 necessary for a control
block, leading to a lower per share price for the toehold in equilibrium.206
From the supply curve posited above, the price of such a purchase is
therefore equal to $99.84 per share, representing an unrecoverable $1.96
premium over fair market value. The total sunk cost of assembling a
toehold of 21.6% of the shares is thus equal to $4.24 million, making B just
indifferent between assembling a credible toehold to extract rents from
managers, and doing nothing at all (and we implicitly assume that
indifference leads to intransigence). By reducing X to 2.12%, then, M can
ensure herself of a level of private benefits of $8.48 million, smaller than
what is otherwise available, but one that need not be shared with B.
The path of deterrence, however, is not the only option available to
incumbent management. Player M might alternatively respond to player
B’s threat by deliberately inviting a coalition with him. While this seems
counter-intuitive at first, note that at least theoretically, it could be in M’s
interests to do so if it allows her to appropriate even more value than would
otherwise be available under a strategy of deterrence. Under this view, a
manager might set Xb extremely high, knowing full well that it will induce
a block shareholder to appear, but even after paying B off, M may have a
significant portion left over for herself. Interestingly, however, analysis of
this option yields the result that even if M chooses accommodation, she
would still optimally set Xb equal to 3.67%. Note that Xb equals Xnb, the
value of appropriation in the case where patronage is prohibited.
One might think on first blush that an accommodating manager might
rationally go even higher still, content in the safety that a coalition with B
would bring. It turns out, however, that this strategy would not be in M’s
interests. While it would permit a higher level of private benefits to be split
between M and B, it simultaneously increases the profits that B can expect
from an outright takeover (in which M is displaced).207 Because of this
latter factor, B’s “threat point” becomes more and more demanding as X
increases above Xnb, and M must fully compensate B these foregone
takeover profits, leaving an even smaller portion of the surplus available
for M.208 For example, if M raises the level of private benefits $1 beyond
those benefits extracted with Xnb then potentially 40 cents (given M’s 40%
206

Note also that since a bribe forestalls any takeover, no one expects an outright takeover to occur,
and the market values the company as if current management will stay in power with certainty.
207. Where managers select Xnb then B is just indifferent about engaging in a takeover (and
expects zero profits from doing so).
208. More formally, we adopt the notion of bargaining to split the surplus from an agreement first
put forth in John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).
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inefficiency of extraction) of additional benefits are available to split
between M and B. B, however, will now enjoy a possible profit of 50 cents
from engaging in a takeover and maximizing firm value (given a 50%
control block) and will demand at least 50 cents compensation (if not
more)209 from M for entering into a coalition with M. M therefore must not
only give the entire 40 cents additional private benefit surplus to B but also
an additional 10 cents. Raising the level of private benefits past Xnb (where
B receives a zero profit from engaging in a takeover) therefore leaves
managers worse off.210
It therefore turns out that a manager in our model seeking to
accommodate entry would set the maximal level of private benefits Xb
equal to Xnb (or 3.67% in the Acme example). In response, player B would
purchase a single share, and would extract a bribe of approximately $7.34
million from M.211 After accounting for this side payment, M’s expected
payoff from forming a coalition with B would be $(14.68 million – 7.34
million) equal to $7.34 million.
Three aspects of these calculations described above deserve special
attention. First, and most important, note that the net value retained by M
under a strategy of accommodation ($7.34 million) is strictly less than that
yielded from a strategy of deterrence ($8.48 million). In other words, the

209. B will require at least 50 cents in compensation because at a minimum B will be able to
increase the value of its block by 50 cents by eliminating all private benefits through a takeover. B may
also enjoy the ability to extract his own private benefits (to the extent the efficiency of B’s
expropriation exceeds the size of his block of shares). See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
Managers seeking to pay off B, thus, must also compensate B for B’s own foregone potential private
benefits of control.
210. Note that this depends on the assumption that managers are relatively inefficient (less than
50% efficiency) at extracting private benefits. Where managers are more than 50% efficient at
extracting private benefits, the possibility exists that the managers may seek to commit to a level of
private benefits greater than Xnb. At higher levels of private benefit expropriation, the inefficiency from
theft is increasing (as managers find it more difficult to hide their expropriation from various legal
barriers). Thus, the assumption of less than 50% efficiency is plausible (at least at higher levels of
theft). Moreover, regulators may adjust the level of efficiency with which managers transfer side
payments to outside block shareholders. Later the Article argues that regulators may wish to allow
managers to make direct cash payments to outside block shareholders. See infra Part IV.A.1. Nothing
stops regulators from imposing a tax on such payments. A tax on side payments has the same effect as
increased manager expropriation inefficiency: for each dollar that a manager expropriates, less than one
dollar is available to transfer to the outside block shareholder making accommodation more costly. Too
high a tax, of course, may lead managers to shift their side payments back toward more indirect routes
(such as shifting corporate opportunities).
211. Where Xb is equal to 3.67% the amount of rents extracted (measured from Period 1) is equal
to 0.0367·($1.1 billion)/(1.1) or $36.7 million. When managers suffer from only a 40% efficiency in
extraction (due to fiduciary duty constraints among other things) this leaves only $14.68 million of
rents. A half-share of the rents therefore is equal to $7.34 million.
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manager finds it less profitable to split a larger private benefits pie with B
than it is to consume a small one alone. If given the choice, then, M would
opt for deterrence over accommodation, selecting a small enough value of
Xb to ensure that B never finds it profitable to buy a toehold for its hold-up
value. It is this calculation that is at the core of a central argument in this
Article: Permitting favoritism may, ironically, induce more conscientious
stewardship by incumbent management, who must now work harder to
deter the entry of opportunistic investors seeking to extract side payments
in exchange for their quiescence.
Second, note that this deterrence effect has an important impact on
share value when compared to the case where bargaining was not allowed.
Recall that in that case, M would set Xnb = 3.67%, and the resulting share
price would be $96.33. When bargaining is allowed in this example, M
chooses an even more extreme form of deterrence, setting Xb = 2.12%, so
that the resulting Period 1 share price is $97.88, a gain of $1.55 per share
over the prohibitionist status quo ante. Spread across the 10 million shares
outstanding in Acme, this implies that allowing favoritism would confer a
gain on non-block shareholders as a whole of over $15 million. Moreover,
this figure is not merely a transfer payment from management to
shareholders, but a bona fide efficiency gain. Given that M only benefits
by 40 cents on the dollar, the $15 million worth of recaptured value comes
at a cost of only $6 million to M.212 On a related note, in our model it turns
out that B does not actually benefit from the legal status of favoritism one
way or another. Indeed, in either case, M deliberately constrains herself to
induce B to walk away from any purchases, and thus B’s payoff is zero
regardless of whether favoritism is allowed or prohibited.
Finally, note that even if M decided (against her own interests) to
accommodate B rather than deter him, the level of private benefits she
would choose is no higher than (and is in fact exactly the same as) that
chosen under a regime of prohibition. In other words, even in the worst
case scenario, where coalitions form between M and B, it is far from clear
that M will choose to divert more value than she would in a world where
favoritism is prohibited. On the one hand, the result may be somewhat
more sensitive to the actual numerical parameters chosen.213 Nonetheless,
even where our formal model may indicate that M may wish to appropriate
212. At the same time, however, shareholders must pay differential taxes on this capital gain,
which would be a portion of social welfare but not of organizational welfare. But even accounting for
these taxes as per the model, the recapturing of $15 million dollars in value confers an after-tax benefit
of $1.5 million on the corporation.
213
See supra note 210.
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a level of private benefits greater than where bribes are prohibited, for good
reasons the amount of such benefits are limited. In particular, when M
decides to form a coalition with B, M still runs a real risk of setting X “too
high”: By extracting too much of the firm’s value, M might drive share
prices so low that B would prefer to engineer an outright takeover, leaving
M out in the cold. Recall, the path of accommodation entails splitting the
spoils between M and B. If Acme becomes too tempting of a takeover
target, B would prefer to buy it outright than to share any surplus with M.
It is this fear that induces M to be relatively conservative about
appropriating firm value even when she envisions a coalition with B. As
such, from the incumbent shareholders’ perspective, allowing favoritism in
this example is a no-lose proposition: is either strictly preferable to
prohibition (i.e., when M chooses deterrence), or is identical to it (when M
chooses accommodation).
Reiterating our main points, allowing patronage from managers to
block shareholders that work to entrench management may, on first blush,
seem to reduce overall corporate welfare. From an ex ante perspective,
however, the possibility that outside investors may assemble blocks of
shares simply to extract a bribe from management may have underappreciated positive welfare implications: In particular, it creates an added
incentive for management to work hard so as to avoid being held up by
opportunistic block shareholders. Viewed in this sense, two wrongs can
indeed make a right. Opportunism on the part of outside investors seeking
a bribe can dampen the effect of managerial agency costs, causing
managers to commit to a lower level of private benefits to deter the outside
investors from forming a block in the first place. Although managers may
gain from a coalition with the outside investor, they must share part of the
gain with the investor. In the case where bargaining power is roughly
equal, managers will tend to prefer not to share. Forming a coalition means
that managers must compensate the block shareholder for the loss on their
shares due to the private benefits in addition to splitting any surplus. As
well, outside constraints from fiduciary duties and reputational concerns
may limit the ability of managers to increase radically the amount of
private benefits they appropriate even with the possibility of a coalition
with a block shareholder.
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C. CAVEATS AND CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS
As with most economic arguments premised on a theoretical model,
our analysis has invoked a number of assumptions intended to simplify the
analysis and isolate the most critical interactions at play. While such
simplifications are quite standard for economic models, we would be
remiss to rely too confidently on the numerical results above without
exploring whether—and to what extent—they depend critically on
assumptions that are either implausible or cannot withstand being relaxed.
To the extent that they do so depend, we would be forced to cabin the
practical reach of our theory accordingly. In this subsection, then, we
briefly explore what we believe to be the four assumptions of our model
that are most open to question, assessing (a) their realism, and/or (b) the
robustness of our argument to their relaxation.
1. Premiums and Block Size
A central conceptual feature of our model relates to the cost of
purchasing shares in the market. Indeed, key to our analysis is the
assumption that outside investors must pay a premium over the prevailing
secondary market price to construct a block, and that this premium
increases on the margin with the size of the block purchased.
Consequently, we argued, it is significantly cheaper on a per-share basis for
B to form a modest toehold (as a baseline for subsequent bargaining) than it
is to engineer an outright acquisition. It is management’s knowledge (and
fear of) of this modest toehold cost that induces M to work particularly
selflessly in situations where favoritism is allowed. Clearly, then, if the
required premium did not increase with block size, the cost advantage of a
forming toehold would begin to narrow. As such, the advantage for
management of choosing deterrence over accommodation also becomes
less pronounced.
Nevertheless, we contend that our assumptions about premia and
block size are eminently realistic, and, in any event, not absolutely critical
to the model. First, both intuitively and empirically, there are numerous
reasons to believe that block purchases become more costly as the block
size increases. As explored in our model above, shareholders may face
differential tax consequences from selling their shares. At one end of the
spectrum are non-profit institutions that are not subject to any tax from
selling their shares.214 Where shares have appreciated in value, non-profit
214.

See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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institutions will be the most willing, all other things being equal, to part
with their shares for any given price. Shareholders that face a tax on the
sale of their shares, on the other hand, give up the deferral of tax on this
gain and therefore may require a premium in compensation. Among
taxable investors, the U.S. tax laws impose two levels of tax. Gains on
shares held under one year are subject to ordinary income tax.215 Gains on
shares held for one year or more, on the other hand, are limited to the longterm capital gains rate ceiling.216 Shareholders with a mix of more recently
purchased shares will face primarily ordinary income rates while those with
a mix consisting more of shares purchased over one year in the past will
face lower rates. Moreover, where the stock price is volatile, some
shareholders may hold a portfolio of shares in the same company with
different size gains and losses (depending on when the shares were
purchased), thereby receiving differential tax treatment based on their
relative mix of gains and losses.217
But even beyond tax liability, upward-sloping supply curves can be
artifacts of other realistic phenomena. For example, shareholders may hold
heterogeneous expectations with respect to the value of a particular firm.218
Determining the true value of a firm’s shares is both a costly and uncertain
process. Shareholders with different beliefs and information may hold
varying expectations about firm value. Although the market price may
reflect the median valuation, individual shareholders may differ around this
median.219 Any outside investor seeking to assemble a block then will find
it initially less costly to purchase shares as those shareholders with a belief
that the share price is overvalued sell their shares. As the block size
increases, however, the outside investor must purchase shares increasingly
from investors that hold beliefs that the secondary market price
undervalues the firm.

215. Termed “short-term capital gains,” taxpayers may use such gains to offset capital losses
without limit. See I.R.C.§ 1211. See generally Chapter 16 of WEST FEDERAL TAXATION: INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAXES (2001 Edition) (providing a discussion of capital gains and losses under the federal
income tax).
216. Termed “long-term capital gains,” taxpayers presently face a 20% maximum tax rate for such
gains. Taxpayers in the 15% tax bracket face a 10% maximum tax rate. See I.R.C. § 1(h).
217. For example, Jake is an investor in Acme. Jake may have purchased 1,000 shares in Acme
over a year ago at $50 per share. Jake may have also purchased 2,000 shares 6 months ago at a cost of
$200 per share. Given Acme’s present secondary market price of $100 per share, Jake will face a
capital gains tax on the 1,000 shares purchased over a year ago as well as a potential short-term capital
loss deduction on the 2,000 shares purchased 6 months ago.
218. See Stout, supra note 44, at 625–35 (1995) (advancing the theory that investors in the stock
market may hold heterogeneous expectations as to share values).
219. See id.
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Alternatively, shareholders that construct relatively small blocks do
not face any mandatory disclosure requirements under the federal securities
laws. Once a block shareholder beneficially owns greater than 5% of the
outstanding shares of a company, however, the Williams Act imposes
reporting requirements on the shareholder. Section 14(d)(1) of the
Williams Act, in particular, requires the owner of more than five percent of
a class of a firm’s securities to make a filing with the SEC containing
information disclosure required under Section 13(d) of the Williams Act
and the SEC’s own rules and regulations.220 Among the required
disclosure items include the identity of the owner, the source and amount of
the funds used to make the purchase, and any plans the owner may have to
liquidate, merge, and make a major change to the corporation if the purpose
of the owner is to acquire control.221 To the extent the market reacts to
news of the formation of a large block positively, the cost to the outside
investor of constructing a larger block increases. The market, for example,
may take the construction of a large block as a sign that a takeover of the
firm is more likely. Even past the 5% threshold, announcements of the
intention to assemble increasingly larger blocks provide a stronger signal of
a potential takeover to the market, leading to a larger secondary market
price increase and thereby a higher cost to purchase additional shares in the
block.222 Consequently, then, our assumption that the supply curve for
Acme’s shares is upward sloping does not appear to be overly brave or
unrealistic. On the contrary, there are many good reasons to believe that
shares of virtually any publicly traded firm have similar qualitative
characteristics.
But even if one were not prepared to accept this assumption, it is not
absolutely necessary for our principal thesis to hold. Indeed, so long as the
block shareholder must pay some premium on the margin over fair actuarial
value to buy Acme’s shares, purchasing a toehold in order to extract a side
payment can still dominate a hostile acquisition. Where a premium exists
for each share (even if not increasing in block size), the block shareholder
still has the ability to reduce his incremental costs of engaging in a takeover
through the prior purchase of a toehold. Through a toehold (and the sunk
cost expense of assembling the toehold), the block shareholder may
increase the credibility of his takeover threat and thereby extract part of the
220. See Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 14(d)(1), 82 Stat. 454 (1968).
221. See id. at § 13(d).
222. On the other hand, outside acquirers that conduct a coercive tender offer may “force” outside
investors to tender their shares for less than their actual value. For a general discussion, see Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1695, 1696 (1985) (describing the impact of coercive tender offers on efficiency).
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managers’ private benefits of control. Thus, while our assumption about
increasing marginal premiums accentuates the quantitative aspect of our
argument, it is not altogether critical for our qualitative thesis to hold.
2. Credible Commitments
A second critical assumption in our analysis is that managers are able
to use corporate governance or other mechanisms to commit up front to a
ceiling on their ability to appropriate firm value, and in a fashion that was
binding on potential acquirers. Without such an ability to commit,
managers may not credibly deter the entrance of a block shareholder. For
example, recall that absent a threat from the takeover market, Acme’s
management would appropriate all of the firm’s value of $1.1 billion.223
Eager to exploit this potential, Acme’s management might consider simply
“announcing” that they plan to appropriate only $20 million worth of the
company’s assets. Without any form of commitment, however, once the
outside investor passes on the opportunity to form a toehold block, Acme’s
managers would simply appropriate the full value of the firm. Realizing
this commitment problem, the outside investor will treat Acme’s managers’
representations as mere “cheap talk,” treating matters as if Acme
management had made no representations whatsoever. Thus, for the
deterrence arguments in this paper to work, it is important that managers
have the capacity to commit credibly to an upper bound on their ability to
appropriate value.
As above, however, we contend that this assumption is also eminently
plausible. In fact, several methods exist for Acme’s managers to commit to
a particular level of private benefits. First, managers may utilize various
corporate governance devices to control the possibility of managerial
opportunism. For example, managers may install a board of directors
consisting of outside independent directors with a reputational interest in
monitoring managers. The credibility of such a board over time, moreover,
may be enhanced through the use of a staggered board structure that limits
the ability of managers and shareholders to remove certain directors
without significant delay. Alternatively, the corporation could employ a
confidential voting policy aimed at increasing the willingness of
shareholders to vote against management during a proxy contest. Although
managers may later attempt to reverse such corporate governance choices,
223
Note that this result abstracts from other mechanisms that may constrain the ability of managers to
expropriate private benefits including contractual devices, reputation, and fiduciary duties.
Nonetheless, the point remains that the amount of private benefits which managers may expropriate
increases absent the ever present threat of a takeover.
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reversal may be difficult. Reversal, for example, may send a negative
signal to the market reducing share value and attracting the attention of
potential corporate acquirers. Managers may also commit to certain
devices through a corporate charter amendment to reduce the risk of
reversal.224
A second means of commitment is to utilize state corporate law more
directly. Managers may incorporate the firm in a state with more stringent
fiduciary duty standards or weaker derivative suit demand requirements on
shareholders. To the extent reincorporation requires a shareholder vote,
managers lose the ability to exit unilaterally from the state law fiduciary
duty protections.225 Managers may also choose to initiate the process to
opt-out of state law antitakeover devices.226 State law fiduciary duties also
often place great importance on the status quo. Given the business
judgment rule, managers enjoy great leeway in the amount of private
benefits they may appropriate from the firm. Courts often lack the
expertise to assess directly the value of particular managerial decisions.
Once a particular management team chooses to appropriate a particular
level of private benefits, however, courts then have a benchmark for the
level of shareholder value possible in the firm. To the extent the managers
choose to increase drastically the amount they appropriate from the firm
resulting in a large drop in corporate profits, courts and shareholders may
use this as a signal that managerial opportunism has increased.227 Other
factors, of course, may cause a drop in corporate profits; nevertheless, the
signal may be particularly strong when a new control block shareholder
immune to subsequent takeover assumes control over the firm.

224. For example, managers may place a term in the corporate charter requiring a two-thirds
supermajority vote on the part of shareholders to approve a reversal.
225
See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435, 1460 (1992) (noting that while shareholders
have to power to approve a corporate reincorporation only the board of directors may initiate a
reincorporation).
226
In Delaware, for example, a decision to opt out of § 203’s moratorium period as a categorical matter
requires an amendment to either the company’s charter or the by-laws, through a vote of the
shareholders. See Del. Gen. Corp. L. § 203(b)(3). The board could propose such a charter or by-law
amendment at an annual or special shareholder meeting.
227
Russia has provided examples of corporations where large drops in the amount of corporate profits
may indicate opportunism. See Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova, Russian
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1731 (2000) (describing
how the Russian corporation “Noyabrskneftegaz earned $600 million in 1996, before [Boris]
Berezovski acquired control of Sibneft [Noyabrskneftegaz’s parent company], and $0 in 1997. Most of
the missing $600 million showed up as Sibneft profit, even though under the company law, transactions
between parent and subsidiary require approval by the subsidiary's minority shareholders, which was
never obtained.”)
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Third, managers may choose to have the firm take on a higher level of
debt financing. A greater amount of debt forces the firm to pay out its free
cash flow to the debtholders.228 To the extent managers seek to avoid
financial distress, managers will then have an incentive to engage in
projects that generate cash flow instead of projects more geared to their
own personal preferences. Managers, as well, will be forced to pay out this
cash flow to the debtholders rather than re-invest the cash into a valuereducing project that increases the managers’ own welfare.
Fourth, managers may install long-term executive compensation
packages that rely on options and other means of aligning the incentives of
managers and their shareholders. Managers with option-based
compensation, for example, possess a reduced incentive to appropriate
private benefits of control to the extent their options suffer a reduction in
value as a result.229
Fifth, managers may enter into long-term contracts with particular
customers and suppliers that penalize the firm for failing to meet certain
targets. For example, a contract with a customer may require the delivery
of a set amount of products at a fixed quality level. Failure to meet the
terms of the contract may result in a large penalty payment that reduces the
amount of value available for managers to appropriate or places the firm at
risk of financial distress. Such a contract may therefore force managers to
operate the firm at the minimum level of efficiency necessary to ensure that
the customer’s contract terms are met. Managers seeking to appropriate
value from the firm through a reduction in work effort, for example, may
find a decreased ability to do so given a long-term supply contract with
large penalty terms. Managers that seek to appropriate value through the
diversion of production to their own benefit, as well, may face a reduced
ability to make such diversion.230
And finally, Acme management itself may develop a long-term
reputation that acts as a commitment device. A manager, for example, may
enjoy a reputation as a low appropriator of private benefits. Because of this
reputation, the manager is able to negotiate for a higher compensation

228. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV., PAPERS & PROC. 323, 324 (May 1986); Rene M. Stulz, Managerial Discretion and
Optimal Financing Policies, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1990).
229
For a discussion of the usefulness of executive compensation as a means of controlling managerial
agency problems see Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and Agency
Costs, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 399 (1998).
230. On a related note, a robust competitive product market also reduces the ability of managers to
appropriate private benefits. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 564.
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package, making the reputation valuable to the manager.231 Rather than
risk the reputation, the manager may therefore limit the amount it
appropriates to levels consistent with her reputation.
Significantly, not all commitment devices are created equal. While
some are easily negated by management’s successors, others have a
significantly longer shelf life. Firms that rely on the reputation of
incumbent managers, for example, often face an entirely new slate of
managers after a change of control, and thus any reputation-based
commitments made by the erstwhile management would be virtually
irrelevant once an acquisition has occurred. Other commitment devices,
however, such as long-term contracts, financial leverage, and restrictive
debt covenants are likely to remain potent long after a control shift. As
well, the state of incorporation may also remain the same. We would
predict, therefore, that the favored forms of commitment devices are those
that are also durable, robust to changes in management. With a long-lived
limitation on their expected private benefits, outside investors may not
expect to gain as much from appropriating private benefits and instead seek
only to gain pro rata with other shareholders.
Of course, if we are correct in arguing that managers have significant
abilities to commit to a ceiling on their private benefits, we must also
address the affiliated question of why firms would ever want to leave
managers any flexibility to commit to begin with. Put another way, one
might legitimately wonder why the incorporators and promoters of the firm
wouldn’t simply pre-commit its subsequent managers to some maximum
level of private benefits at the time of the initial corporate charter?232 To
the extent private benefits of control result in value transferred from
shareholders to managers, the argument goes, shareholders that initially
invest in the firm will reduce their willingness to pay for the firm’s shares.
The incorporators of the firm may increase the amount they receive from
the initial sale of securities to the public through the adoption of limits on
such private benefits.
While we believe this argument to be a strong one in some instances,
as noted above233 its usefulness is limited by the costs of setting up such ex
ante schemes. Indeed, for the incorporationist argument to work, it must be
the case that the incorporators can anticipate with significant accuracy all
the ways in which managers can appropriate value, and formulate effective
231. See Alchain, supra note 5 (discussing the incentive effect of the labor market for managers).
232. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 305–07.
233
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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means of tying their hands from doing so. Such ex ante approaches to
governance, however, rarely come at a low cost, particularly in the early
stages of forming a corporation, where the vicissitudes of the firm’s
business environment have yet to run their course. Instead, within such an
environment, incorporators may wish to give their managers flexibility to
determine how to monitor for managerial diversion of private benefits of
control. To the extent specifying fully state-contingent corporate charters
is prohibitively costly, then, giving managers the flexibility to determine
the mix of optimal monitoring and incentive devices to control managerial
opportunism may work to increase shareholder welfare.
Consequently, it may be more prudent and less costly for
incorporators to let the market for corporate control induce managers to
make their own decisions about how to select value-maximizing corporate
governance devices. Once given such an incentive, managers are able to
use their own expertise and informational advantage to select the most
efficient forms of corporate governance devices, without requiring the
founders of the firm to expend considerable resources on anticipating them.
When the acquisitions market is a relatively effective means of deterrence
(and we have argued that allowing favoritism may make it so), such a
strategy can make a great deal of sense.
3. Relative Bargaining Power
Another important assumption of our model concerns the bargaining
power of incumbent management relative to the outside investor. Recall
that in the numerical example above, we assumed that M and B split any
gains from bargaining in equal portions. While this seems a sensible
assumption in the abstract, it implicitly presupposes that the parties are
similarly situated, sophisticated, and patient. Because there are plausibly
bargaining settings in the real world that differ from these preconditions, it
is important to consider how our conclusions might change if one player
had significantly more bargaining power than the other.
Perhaps the best vehicle for addressing this question is to consider the
two “extreme” cases in which either B or M possesses all the bargaining
power. Consider first the case where the outside investor B has the power
to make a “take it or leave it” offer, extracting the full value of the surplus
from M. Such a situation is not terribly implausible, given that many block
shareholders are large, well-capitalized arbitragers and institutions, capable
of having great influence on corporate management. In such a situation, as
it turns out, our central thesis not only persists, but it is actually
strengthened by having a strong bargainer as a block shareholder.
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To understand the intuition behind this result, recall that when
bargaining is permitted the principal purpose that B has for building an
initial toehold is to become a “credible” threat of a takeover: That is, B
wishes to build a sufficient ownership block so that his prospective net
benefits of completing a takeover of Acme are positive (even if just barely
so). At this point, B would be able to claim a share of the difference
between his prospective takeover payoff and the incumbent manager’s
payoff in the absence of a takeover. When the block shareholder possesses
all the bargaining power, the payoff he can expect from becoming a
credible negotiator grows even larger than in our baseline case of equal
bargaining power. Indeed, now B enjoys more than simply a “share” of the
bargaining surplus, but instead can claim all of it. As such, B will be
willing (if necessary) to build even a larger toehold when he knows he can
expect all the fruits of the bargain.
For these very same reasons, then, player M has even stronger reasons
to fear B’s entry, and will even more strongly favor deterrence to
accommodation. Indeed, if M were to accommodate B, it would now
necessitate a bribe that robs M of all of her private benefits of control,
leaving her with nothing. As such, M is substantially more motivated to
deter B from entering in those situations where B has most or all of the
bargaining power. Accordingly, M will choose an even sharper constraint
on her ability to appropriate value.234
Now consider the opposite case, in which M has sufficient bargaining
power to capture the entire surplus from forming a coalition. In this case,
the incumbent manager is much less fearful of a block shareholder who
forms a toehold. Indeed, when M possesses all the bargaining power, all
gains from negotiating go directly to M; player B receives nothing more
than her expected takeover payoff. Consequently, B has very little
incentive to form a credible toehold in the first place, given that she cannot
extract any additional rents from player M. Thus, when M has all the
bargaining power, the players will behave just as if bargaining were
prohibited, with M committing to appropriate at most 3.67% of firm
value,235 and B deciding against forming a toehold.
From this discussion, it should be clear that the benefits of allowing
favoritism are most pronounced when the incumbent manager’s bargaining
234

Indeed, when B has all the bargaining power, the unique equilibrium of the model entails M deciding
to constrain herself even further, committing to appropriate no more than 1.70% of the firm’s value
(compared to 2.12% in the equal bargaining power case).
235
See supra text accompanying notes 188-189 (noting that 3.67% represents the benchmark level of
managerial expropriation of private benefits when shareholder favoritism is prohibited).
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power is not “too large” compared with the block shareholder. For only in
those situations will management have a clear incentive to deter the
formation of a toehold block of shares. Such was the case when either B
had all the bargaining power or when M and B have equal bargaining
powers. When, in contrast, mangers have much or all of the bargaining
power, permitting favoritism does not have a clear advantage over
prohibition. Nevertheless, as noted above, even in this situation, permitting
favoritism may simply bring about the same equilibrium outcome as does
prohibition. Although B may choose not to form a toehold and negotiate a
coalition with M, B may still undertake an outright takeover to displace M
when private benefits are sufficiently high. As such, even though our
bargaining power assumption is important, a weak form of our argument
still holds regardless of the parties’ relative bargaining power.
4. Thick Acquisition Markets
Fourth, our analysis simplified strategic considerations by assuming
that there was but a single outside investor (that is, B) capable of mounting
a hostile acquisition of the company. In the real world, where capital
markets are well developed and arbitrageurs are numerous, this assumption
appears to be somewhat limited. One might justifiably wonder, then, how
we might generalize our example to allow for two, three, or an arbitrary
number of “N” potential block shareholders, each of whom was capable of
purchasing up to a control block in the company.
As it turns out, our model is capable of such a generalization, albeit at
the price of added complexity. Without going too far into the details,
however, generalizing our example to allow for multiple block
shareholders actually strengthens our central thesis rather than undercuts it.
The intuition here is simple: When multiple block shareholders await in the
wings, incumbent managers who might otherwise prefer to form a coalition
must now worry about having to make multiple bribes in order to retain
control.236 Particularly since their initial toehold purchases can be
relatively small, each block shareholder now poses the credible threat of
completing a takeover. Thus, since we have demonstrated that incumbent
management has an incentive to choose deterrence over accommodation
with only one outside investor in the picture, this incentive almost certainly
236. Having multiple parties willing to purchase a significant block is quite possible in the capital
markets. Michael Bradley, Anand Desai, and E. Han Kim found that 46% of tender offer contests
during early 1980s involved a multiple bidder situation. See Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han
Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of
Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 29 (1988).
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becomes stronger when multiple block shareholders stand at the ready.
Indeed, because each of the investors is similarly situated, choosing a level
of X private benefits sufficient to deter one of them would have a similar
effect on all investors. Thus, we are relatively confident that our central
arguments would have as much or more force in a more realistic setting
where the takeover market harbors numerous potential acquirers.
5. Initial Ownership Structure
Finally, our analysis above has presumed throughout that the firm’s
shareholdings begin from a dispersed position, where no existing
shareholder owns an appreciable stake. This assumption was deliberate,
particularly given that managerial agency problems are perceived to be
most pronounced in such situations. At the same time, however, our
argument was based on the premise that allowing patronage would cause
managers to act in ways that deter opportunistic block shareholders from
emerging. When a block shareholder already exists, however, such
deterrence arguments are significantly less coherent.
Consequently, we acknowledge that our theoretical argument is
substantially weaker for firms who already have significant block
shareholding in place. For here, allowing favoritism may induce
incumbent block shareholders simply to extract side payments, providing
little incentive for managers to take deterrent action. To be sure, preexisting block shareholders may serve other valuable purposes, such as
monitoring the firm’s managers, which we have downplayed in the above
analysis.237 To the extent that this monitoring effect is pronounced, there
may be an independent justification for favoritism that emanates for
reasons outside those offered above.

IV. REFORM POSSIBILITIES
With the conclusions of the previous subsection in hand, we turn in
this Part to a more policy-oriented discussion of the regulatory reform
possibilities suggested by these conclusions. To be sure, one must always
exercise a prudent dose of caution in interpreting results from theoretical
models such as that presented above. But at the same time, the intuitions
that such models expose deserve serious consideration by legislatures,

237

Indeed, this is precicely the argument offered in Ayres and Cramton, supra note 146.
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courts, and other policymakers. It is these very intuitions (and their
implications) that we pursue below.
One of the more important insights from the previous section is that
the very form of opportunism that regulators fear in the context of
shareholder favoritism can, ironically, serve as a beneficial restraint on
managerial self-dealing at the ex ante stage. As such, efficiency-minded
regulators would be well advised to keep this potential benefit in mind,
focusing less on whether “opportunism” has motivated some instance of
favoritism, but rather on whether the requisite preconditions exist for
favoritism to have the efficiency-enhancing ex ante effects we have
suggested. Such conditions include the following:
a. Whether the block shareholder extracting favoritism is relatively
new (rather than a pre-existing block shareholder);
b. Whether there are numerous potential purchasers of blocks;
c. Whether incumbent management’s bargaining power against the
block shareholder is not “too large”;
d. Whether management has credible devices at its disposal by which
it might constrain its own ability to appropriate value; and
e. Whether purchasing a block of shares requires the payment of a
premium over fair market value.
Indeed, considerations such as these could (and, we believe, should)
come into play when courts evaluate the particular forms of shareholder
patronage outlined in Part II. Subsection A discusses various reforms
regulators may wish to consider within the present regulatory framework.
Subsection B raises several additional concerns regulators may wish to
consider. Subsection C then sketches a new market-based approach to
regulating selective payments to shareholders.
A. REFORMS TO THE REGULATORY SYSTEM
It is perhaps no overstatement to characterize much of the existing
corporate governance landscape as focusing centrally on preventing
opportunism. Indeed, it is widely recognized that corporate law focuses on
the agency problem between managers and dispersed public shareholders
(and, in some cases, other constituencies). The regulatory prohibitions
against many forms of selective payments, therefore, draw much of their
legitimacy from the putative dangers implicit in managerial
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opportunism.238 To the extent, however, that the intuitions exposed above
are valid, regulators would be well advised to apply their scrutiny only after
accounting for the efficiency promoting effects on opportunism. Such
considerations may play a role in a number of existing doctrines governing
shareholder favoritism, and we therefore revisit some of them below.
1. Selective Payments Reconsidered
As noted in Part II, conventional wisdom reflects significant
skepticism about shareholder patronage, viewing it as a manifestation of
managerial opportunism. Regulators have responded to this perceived risk
by systematically prohibiting such selective patronage, starting—quite
logically—with those types of favoritism that are easiest to verify (such as
outright non-pro rata distributions of cash and property). Over time, such
legal prohibitions have expanded piecemeal to proscribe successively less
verifiable categories of patronage, in a sort of regulatory back-and-forth
game with managers, who in turn respond by shifting their activities toward
more indirect and opaque mechanisms of patronage.239
As we have already suggested, this regulatory dance may impose
significant inefficiencies, since indirect forms of patronage are likely to be
progressively more costly to implement and confer less value on recipients
(resulting in a dead weight loss from an efficiency perspective). The
potential inefficiency becomes even more severe, however, if shareholder
favoritism has a welfare-enhancing effect on corporations. Most obviously,
our arguments suggest that regulators should think twice before
categorically banning a form of patronage simply because of perceived
opportunism. While such payments may indeed have an opportunistic
intent, we have argued that the very ability to make such payments can
impose an even stronger ex ante deterrent effect on managers. Permitting
such payments becomes attractive precisely because it will induce
managers to choose the path of deterrence, thereby bypassing the necessity
to make such transfers (at least under the conditions specified above).
More subtly, however, once regulators understand that even
opportunistic payments can enhance corporate welfare, it follows that the
efficacy of favoritism is maximized when the medium for conferring
patronage is as direct as possible. Viewed in this light, distributions
consisting of outright transfers of cash or property are, ironically, the best
238.
239.
Part II.

See supra Part II.
For a taxonomy of different methods managers may favor particular shareholders, see supra
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vehicles of deterrence, in that they avoid the inefficiencies involved in
indirect forms of patronage.240 For example, direct payments provide a
clear and verifiable form of rent transfer upon which outside potential
block shareholders may rely. The uncertainty in the value of “in kind”
transfers, in contrast (such as selective information disclosure), affords
managers with the ability to conceal the amount of transfer without the
outside investor necessarily attributing the drop to the manager’s actions.
Outside investors, as a result, will treat such in kind patronage with
enhanced skepticism, thereby diluting the deterrent effect we have
spotlighted.
Regulators may therefore wish to relax prohibitions against selective
cash distributions to favored shareholders (allowing such payments without
regard to motivation). Doing so will result in a shift from opportunistic “in
kind” transfers toward more direct cash favoritism, reducing the dead
weight loss inefficiency from favoritism. Regulators can also assist the
incentives of outside investors to form blocks along at least two additional
dimensions. First, regulators may help the division of a private benefit
surplus between managers and a toehold block through devices (such as
enforcement of patronage contracts) designed to increase the credibility of
both parties. In some situations, for instance, a firm may be sufficiently
cash constrained that managers can only credibly promise to transfer funds
over time to the toehold block. To ensure that the toehold block continues
to support the managers into the future, managers may wish to stagger
payments across time. Regulators, then, may be in a position to provide
centralized mechanisms for enabling managers to commit to such longterm contracts. For example, regulators might help to encourage or suggest
standard form agreements, standing ready to monitor and enforce such
agreements.
Likewise, block shareholders also benefit from being able to commit
credibly to support management into the future (in for example proxy
contests) and abstaining from acquiring additional shares to obtain control.
Regulators may enhance the credibility of such promises as well, providing
legal liability for block shareholders who breach such a promise. Once
again, the benefits of such credibility emanate from an ex ante perspective,
where the ability of a block shareholder to patronage imposes increased
pressure on managers to manage companies efficiently.
In some ways, these regulatory changes would not necessitate a
complete overhaul the existing system. Under current law in most states,
240.

See id.
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for instance, shareholders already enjoy limited ability to enter into voting
trusts and vote pooling agreements with one another.241 At the same time,
however, various limitations exist on the use of such devices to bond a
shareholder to support management, thereby rendering them less reliable
than they might otherwise be. For example, even though Delaware law
permits any shareholder to sign over an irrevocable proxy as consideration
for some other contractual agreement, it limits enforcement only to those
that are “coupled with an interest sufficient in law to support an irrevocable
power.”242 Given the open-ended nature of this condition, it is entirely
possible for a court to conclude that the entrenching effect of an
opportunistic agreement between incumbent management and a block
shareholder is not of the type of envisioned by the statute.243
Second, regulators may assist the pool of potential outside investors
by encouraging informational disclosure on existing relationships between
managers and pre-existing block shareholders.244 Consider an outside
investor making the decision whether to assemble a toehold block of shares
to extract rents from managers. Part of the uncertainty facing the outside
investor is whether other blocks of shares are present in the market and
their relationship with management. The presence of a competing block
already in a coalition with management, for example, may raise the cost of
a takeover for the new outside investor even after forming a toehold. The
higher cost of a takeover, in turn, reduces the negotiating strength of the
outside investor with management, reducing the expected amount of rent
extraction. The added uncertainty imposes risk-bearing costs on the
outside investor and may thereby deter formation of toehold blocks.
Through mandating disclosure (through, for example, a publicity
requirement frequently seen with voting trusts245), regulators may reduce
the risk facing outside investors contemplating the formation of a block of
shares.

241. See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 218 (voting trusts and other voting arrangements). Through
standstill agreements, moreover, shareholders may already agree to abstain from further purchases of a
corporations stock in return for consideration. See supra note 10.
242. DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 212(e).
243. For a general discussion on the validity of voting trusts and vote pooling arrangements see 5
FLETCHER, supra note 52, at § 2064. For a discussion of cases relating to voting trusts and vote pooling
arrangements, see CLARK, supra note 1, at 772–81 (1986).
244
Already block shareholders with more than 5% beneficial ownership of a corporation’s class of
equity stock must make a number of disclosures pursuant to the Williams Act. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
245. See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 218 (requiring a copy of a voting to be filed with the Secretary of
State and subject to inspection by other shareholders).
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As noted above, regulators should be mindful the relative bargaining
strengths of managers and outside toehold blocks in determining whether to
allow selective payments. Recall that our principal argument is at its
strongest when incumbent management did not wield “too much”
bargaining power against the block shareholder. As such, a permissive
legal posture toward favoritism is likely to have the greatest effect in
precisely these situations.
At the same time, however, the relative bargaining strengths between
managers and outside investors are often context specific, and thus the task
of developing a general rule is difficult. Nevertheless, regulators may still
be able to identify some canonical situations where incumbent management
is unlikely to dominate negotiations with block shareholders, and enforce
patronage agreements in those contexts. Although we cannot offer a
complete catalogue of such instances, they are likely to include situations
in which (i) incumbent management stands to incur a large reputational
should a hostile acquisition occur; or (ii) the outside investor has a
reputation for effectively extracting rents from management.246
Alternatively, regulators might be able to modify directly the
bargaining range itself, by perhaps conditioning their approval of patronage
on whether the bribe received by the block shareholder exceeds a specified
minimum amount. Managers with superior bargaining power that wish to
payoff a particular toehold shareholder are then unable to do so with only a
de minimis bribe but must exceed at least the regulatory minimum.
Shareholders may then have an incentive to construct a block of shares
even where managers otherwise hold most of the bargaining power.
2. Fiduciary Duties
State corporate law imposes significant mandatory restrictions on the
ability of managers to appropriate private benefits in the form of fiduciary
duties, and particularly the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Under the duty of
loyalty, courts require that managers not profit at the expense of corporate
welfare.247 The duty of loyalty, therefore, provides a mechanism that may
complement the takeover market to help control managerial opportunism.
246. Ironically, therefore, rather than condemn the so-called greenmail “artists” of the 1980s, we
should be celebrating their actions. See Fred R. Bleakley, Outrage Over Disney Buyout, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 1984, at D1.
247. In what has become the most celebrated (if not a little overwrought) statement of this duty,
Judge Benjamin Cardozo famously wrote that the duty of loyalty required “[n]ot honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). For more on the duty of loyalty see supra note 57.
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For example, takeovers are most likely during a decline in share price,
which in turn may deter managers from engaging in a series of small
actions that extract value—actions that eventually have a large impact on
share price. But for extremely large value diversions, takeovers may
provide inadequate deterrence, since the risk of displacement would pale in
comparison to the significant gains that managers might glean from a onetime act of disloyalty. The duty of loyalty, on the other hand, is well suited
to regulate one-time acts of self-dealing. Litigants who can prove such
breaches of the duty, then, will enjoy a much more secure avenue for
redress.
Likewise, fiduciary duties can also play a complementary role in
ensuring that managers entering into a coalition with a toehold shareholder
are unable to increase substantially the amount of firm value they
appropriate for themselves past the benchmark level where side payments
are prohibited.248 Too high levels of expropriation, for example, may
simply induce the outside block shareholder to takeover the firm
outright.249 Managers, as a result, will tend to choose deterrence over
accommodation even when shareholder favoritism is allowed. Imposing
fiduciary duties that focus on egregious levels of private benefit
expropriation on the part of managers (excluding selective payments to
outside shareholders) serves as a safety net to ensure that managers will not
increase their ability to extract private benefits through a coalition with a
toehold shareholder.
At the same time, the potential complementary role of fiduciary duties
does not come cost-free. The presence of fiduciary duties, for example,
exposes a firm’s managers to the possibility of costly and sometimes
frivolous derivative suits,250 pursued simply to extract a settlement.
Because of the expense inherent in such lawsuits, corporations may
routinely settle derivative suits rather than expend resources in defense, no
matter how legitimate the claim.251 Adding to this incentive to settle,
248

See supra text accompanying notes 205-212.
See id.
250. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 55 (1991). For evidence of non-meritorious securities litigation, see Janet Cooper Alexander,
Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497
(1991); James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996).
251. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats
to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996); Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519
(1997); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
249
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director and officer (or “D&O”) liability insurance policies often will pay
for settlements but not for judgments at trial.252 The value of fiduciary
duties, moreover, may vary depending on the specific firm. In firms where
managers have many opportunities to engage in significant episodes of rent
extraction, fiduciary duties are likely to be much more valuable than in
firms where such opportunities are more limited. Firms, for example, that
operate in highly competitive markets may operate on such thin margins
that managers cannot extract many rents without inviting bankruptcy.
Moreover, not every form of fiduciary duty is entirely complementary
with our underlying thesis. In particular, it is important to note that state
corporate law universally imposes fiduciary duties on dominant
shareholders, including (perhaps) those who purchase a significant block253
seeking to extract rents from managers. Even though we have highlighted
the potential benefits of such activities, courts with an eye toward fiduciary
principles may treat a toehold block in coalition with management as
equivalent to a controlling shareholder. The application of fiduciary duties
to toehold blocks in coalition with management, then, can impair the ability
of such shareholders to extract private benefits from management. Outside
investors therefore will have a reduced incentive to form a block in the first
place, thereby retarding the disciplining threat that shareholder patronage
represents. Hence, while fiduciary duties are quite possibly a complement
of our thesis, their application does not uniformly cohere with the
arguments presented above.254 Regulators should not rely too comfortably
on the ability of enhanced fiduciary duties to substitute for (or augment)
takeover markets effectively.

252. See Alexander, supra note 250, at 550–51.
253. For Delaware cases imposing a duty of loyalty on controlling shareholders, see Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1982); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109–10 (Del. 1952). See also supra note 57 (discussing the
fiduciary duty of loyalty).
For an examination of the fiduciary duty owed by controlling shareholders to minority
shareholders, see John C. Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823,
831–36 (1988). See also Eric Seiler, Daniel M. Taitz, & Ellen A. Harnick, Issues Relating to
Controlling Shareholders, 711 PLI/COMM 455 (1995) (noting the uncertainty of court-based fiduciary
duty doctrine as applied to controlling shareholders).
254
We would therefore allow managers to freely make payments to outside shareholders (and allow
such shareholders to accept such payments) without regard to fiduciary duty. On the other hand,
imposing a fiduciary duty on other actions that managers may take (e.g., executive compensation and
self-dealing transactions directly involving the managers) will then help limit the amount of increased
private benefit expropriation that is possible through a coalition between managers and outside
shareholders.
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3. Antitakeover Devices and Statutes
Obviously critical to our analysis of shareholder favoritism is
background possibility of a hostile takeover. Thus, if managers can
implement antitakeover devices that reduce or completely cut off the
possibility of a takeover, then two unappetizing consequences result. First,
and most directly, managers become more entrenched, enjoying a greater
ability to appropriate private benefits without fear of a takeover.
Consequently, in the presence of such measures, only those non-takeover
methods of deterrence are likely to be effective. Fiduciary duties, for
example, remain as one possible limit to excess opportunism even when
anti-takeover devices reduce the threat of a takeover. In addition, it may be
possible for outside investors to use the proxy system to vote out a firm’s
current board of directors.255
Second, antitakeover provisions reduce the threat of an outside
investor forming a toehold block to extract rents from management. This
disincentive can be bad news for other shareholders, since—as we argued
above—the formation of a toehold can give the outside investor sufficient
credibility to extract patronage from managers, an ability that ultimately
deters agency costs. Antitakeover devices that reduce the threat of a
takeover, then, also diminish the block shareholder’s bargaining credibility,
thereby deterring the formation of the toehold in the first place.
Consider, for example, antitakeover devices that impose a minimum
amount of shares that a potential acquirer must own prior to obtaining
control. Delaware, for example, employs a so-called control share
acquisition statute. Contained within Section 203 of Delaware’s General
Corporation Law, the control share acquisition statute prohibits persons
acquiring 15% or more of a corporation’s voting stock from undertaking a
business combination without prior board approval for a three-year
period.256 Persons who cannot obtain board approval must either wait for
the moratorium period to pass, or be willing to purchase at least 85% of the
corporation’s outstanding voting stock (excluding shares held by directors
or officers of the corporation as well as certain employee-owned stock).257

255. Firms, nevertheless, may install classified boards to deter the use of even proxy contests to
change control.
256. See DEL. GEN CORP. L. § 203(a)(1).
257. See DEL. GEN CORP. L. § 203(a)(2). Other methods of avoiding board approval are possible.
An acquirer, for example, may seek the approval of a supermajority of disinterested shareholders. See
DEL. GEN CORP. L. § 203(a)(3).
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Requiring an outside investor who seeks control to purchase a
supermajority of shares makes takeovers considerably more difficult.
Particularly where the cost of assembling a block is increasing with block
size, outside investors may face prohibitively large costs putting together
the larger required control block. In the context of the paper’s framework,
the prospective harm to managers occurs through the amount of rent a
toehold shareholder is able to extract. Increasing the cost of a takeover
reduces the ability of the toehold at the time they bargain with managers to
extract rents, thereby reducing the deterrent effect on managers.258
Despite the negative impact of antitakeover devices for our central
thesis, some variation on Delaware’s antitakeover statute may in fact have
some salubrious effects. Recall that managers forming a coalition with a
toehold block must compensate the shareholder for the reduced value of his
stake that the manager’s appropriations will bring about.259 The larger the
toehold, then, the more overall anticipated loss to shareholders that
managers must internalize when paying off the block shareholder.
Notwithstanding this observation, recall also that the outside investor
has an incentive to form the minimal possible toehold that still makes his
takeover threat a credible one. Indeed, forming a larger toehold would buy
him little in the way of bargaining credibility, and would come at
significant cost. Indeed, for each dollar the outside investor expends to
form a larger toehold, he recoups only a fraction of the resulting bargaining
surplus.
Regulators may be able to exploit these competing incentives by
adopting a permissive view toward shareholder favoritism, but limited
solely to those toehold blocks that meet a certain minimum level of
ownership. Such a minimum share ownership requirement may work to
push outside investors to form larger toeholds than they otherwise would,
and under certain circumstances this might benefit of all shareholders in a
corporation. Indeed, now an incumbent manager will realize that she will
have to make an even larger payment to buy off a block shareholder, and

258. On the other hand, where the outside investor may seek to appropriate its own private
benefits after a takeover, forcing the outside investor to conduct an acquisition with a larger control
block may benefit all shareholders. Once the outside investor owns a larger control block, it will
internalize more of the cost from private benefit appropriation, thereby deterring such appropriation.
259. Formally in the model, because the toehold shareholder owns a significant block, they benefit
more from a takeover. The greater the private benefit level, the more the toehold block benefits from
the takeover. Managers seeking to enter a coalition with the toehold shareholder must then compensate
the toehold shareholder for their foregone takeover benefits when they enter into the coalition. See
supra notes 205–212 and accompanying text.
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might have an enhanced incentive to work hard before such a shareholder
emerges.
On the other hand, conditioning enforceability of patronage on
minimum share ownership can also have counterproductive effects. For
instance, setting the minimum too high can cause some outside investors to
choose simply to forego assembling a toehold altogether (due to the
expense), notwithstanding the commitment by management to exercise
restraint. Regulators must therefore take care in setting the minimum level
of share ownership such that an outside investor will in fact seek to expand
their block. Unlike under Delaware’s present control share acquisition
statute,260 regulators should also remove the ability of a corporation’s board
to waive application of the statute. Given such ability, managers will
simply waive the minimum share ownership requirement to avoid the threat
of larger toeholds.

B. OTHER REFORM CONSIDERATIONS
In designing policy to take into account the ex ante incentive effects of
shareholder patronage, regulators may also wish to consider a few other
considerations that affect the paper’s analysis. This Section discusses two
of them: (1) the possibility that managers may negotiate with a toehold
block prior to committing to a maximum level of private benefits; and (2)
the impact of manager-owned blocks.
1. Timing of The Managers’ Commitment
The paper’s analysis assumes that shareholders are initially dispersed
and hold insignificant stakes. In such situations, of course, it is unlikely
that managers will render patronage toward any prospective block
shareholder before he purchases a significant block. For example,
managers may find it difficult to identify which existing shareholders have
the liquidity to form a block of significant size. Even where identification
is possible, managers may view the threat of an outside shareholder to form
a block as not credible. Any outside shareholder may represent that she
plans to assemble a block of shares to extract rents from managers, even
though her outside options for such capital would in actuality be more

260. See DEL. GEN CORP. L. § 203(a)(1) (allowing the board of directors to approve a business
combination with a shareholder that does not meet the minimum share ownership requirements of the
statute).
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attractive. Managers may therefore prefer to wait for a toehold to actually
form in the market before commencing negotiations. Thus, in situations
where firms truly begin with a relatively dispersed shareholder base, our
assumption was probably well founded.261
In several real-world situations, however, managers may be able to
negotiate with a prospective toehold block shareholder prior to committing
to a fixed level of corporate governance. For example, firms with a pool of
pre-existing block shareholders may already have an obvious bargaining
partner for management from the very beginning. Concentrated ownership
may be particularly common for firms on the eve of a public offering,
where a pool of pre-existing blocks (e.g., founders, initial investors, and
venture capitalists) enjoys close relations with managers.262 Second, and
more generally, even within dispersed-ownership firms, managers may
have the ability to identify particular outside investors with the credible
capability of forming a block in advance. Some investors, for example,
may have a reputation for forming blocks to extract rents from managers.
This reputation may make the threat on the part of the outside investor to
form a toehold credible to managers.263
If managers negotiate with a potential or pre-existing block
shareholder prior to making a commitment to a maximum level of private
benefits, our central argument loses some of its force. Indeed, by locking
up any outside threats before making any commitment about future
expropriations, managers can exploit small-scale shareholders
considerably. Returning to the Acme hypothetical, if Acme’s managers are
able to negotiate with an actual or potential block shareholder prior to
committing to a maximum level of private benefits, they may buy the
shareholder’s quiescence, and then make no commitment at all, implicitly
promising to loot the entire worth of the company.264 Such a deal must
make managers better off than the alternatives, since the managers can
always refuse to bargain and then commit to a ceiling of Xnb, thereby
deterring any entry by a block shareholder. Managers therefore are more
261. But see supra note 30 (citing evidence that many companies outside the United States and the
United Kingdom have significant block owners).
262. As discussed later in the paper, however, firms about to go public may have strong incentives
nevertheless to impose corporate governance devices that maximize share value to increase the
proceeds from the offering.
263. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (greenmail recipient had reputation for
extracting rents from management).
264
In our model, this corresponds to X = 1. Of course, fiduciary duties among other mechanisms act as
external limits (not covered explicitly in our model) that also limit the ability of managers to
expropriate private benefits of control.
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willing to make opportunistic bribes in a manner that reduces overall
corporate value when bargaining precedes commitment.
Efficiency-minded regulators, then, would be wise to consider
whether an instant situation affords management the ability to lock up preexisting or potential block shareholder prior to committing to a fixed level
of private benefits. Regulators, for example, may apply greater scrutiny to
agreements between managers and shareholders just prior to when a firm
opts into a regime that permits favoritism.265 As well, regulators may
choose not to enforce any agreements between managers and an outside
investor negotiated prior to when an outside investor forms a toehold block.
Or finally, regulators may wish to remain conscious of how competitive the
takeover market is in each case: Where there are numerous possible block
shareholders, reaching ex ante agreements with some of them may be of
only little solace to management, who may rather simply choose the path of
deterrence.
2. Manager-Owned Blocks
One possible response managers may have to the threat of outside
investors forming a toehold block is to form their own block of shares. To
be sure, this strategy is not always possible: In large publicly held
corporations, for instance, managers may lack the financial resources to
assemble a significant block, or would be forced to compromise the
diversification of their portfolios in order to do so. Nevertheless, the
possibility exists that managers in at least some firms may form a defensive
block of shares.
Managers that hold defensive blocks of shares will increase the cost to
outside investors seeking to form a block in at least two ways. First, the
very presence of the managerial block raises the number of shares an
outside investor might need to acquire in order to obtain “effective” control
over the firm, as it can no longer count on as much support from
unaffiliated shareholders. The larger the block an outside investor must
form, the more expensive a takeover becomes.266 Second, managers who
buy their own blocks are likely to purchase from existing shareholders who
value their shares the least, because of different expectations as to firm
value, varying tax rates, and so forth.267 Subsequent outside investors,
265. See infra Part IV.C. (setting forth the argument that firms should have the ability to opt out of
prohibitions against shareholder favoritism).
266
See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing the rationales behind the Article’s assumption of an upward
sloping supply curve for shares).
267
See id.

CLEAN COPY CHOI.TALLEY USC REVISED 12-24-2001

1/2/2002 9:37 AM

198

[Vol. 75:276

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

therefore, may be left having to purchase shares from higher valuing
shareholders, which increases the marginal cost of forming a block.
Despite the impact that a manager-owned block may have on the costs
faced by potential acquirers, managerial block ownership is probably not a
large cause for concern. Indeed, unlike fiduciaries who own no shares in a
firm, managers that own a significant block will at least partially bear the
cost of the appropriation of private benefits.268 The net effect of a
manager-owned block is therefore inconclusive.
This fundamental indeterminacy appears to be borne out in empirical
data as well. Professors Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert
Vishny have previously made the observation that the risk of a takeover
alone can result in similar conflicting impacts from a management-owned
block.269 On the one hand, the more shares management holds, the more
expensive a takeover for an outside investor, leading to greater
management entrenchment. On the other hand, the more shares in the
hands of managers, the more managers internalize the cost of their
appropriation of private benefits. For levels of board share ownership
under 5%, they find that overall firm value appears to increase in the size of
the managerial stake.270 Between 5% and 25%, board share ownership
negatively correlates with firm value.271 Above 25% of absolute share
ownership, increased board ownership again increases firm value.272
The ability to engage in opportunistic bribes raises the cost to
managers from appropriating private benefits. Accumulating shares in a
management-controlled block therefore will provide managers with a
correspondingly higher benefit than where managers are faced solely with
the risk of a takeover. All other things being equal, we conjecture that
managers will accumulate larger blocks under a system where opportunistic
bribes are allowed to outside shareholders.273 But at the same time, such
accumulations should not necessarily raise the ire of regulators.
268

For example, managers that own 25% of the outstanding common stock will suffer a loss of 25 cents
for every dollar they expropriate as private benefits.
269. See Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988).
270. See id. at 311 (using the Tobin’s Q measure of firm value).
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. From an overall efficiency standpoint, of course, this may not be so swell. Indeed, greater
ownership concentration in the hands of management, while providing a partial solution to agency cost
problems, also causes managers to hold a larger amount of undiversified risk than they would otherwise
be inclined to hold. This enhanced risk is a true inefficiency, but perhaps one that is necessary in a
second best world.
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C. MARKET-BASED REFORMS
The reform suggestions thus far assume that regulators are able to
assess correctly the costs and benefits of different methods of controlling
managerial opportunism. Although perhaps defensible in some situations,
it may be too much to presume as a general matter that regulators have
sufficient knowledge to diagnose correctly the needs of every corporation.
And even when they have such knowledge, regulators may also simply
make mistakes. In the presence of such imperfections, firms may find
themselves locked into legal protections that are systematically
unresponsive to their needs.
To make matters worse, however, even where regulators possess
adequate information and expertise, they are subject to influence on the
part of the very parties they seek to regulate. Regulators that seek a job
after they finish government service, for example, often find employment
in the very industry they regulated.274 Regulators seeking an industry job
may avoid imposing regulations that impose too high costs on their future
employers. Other regulators may expand the breadth and complexity of
regulations to justify increasing the size and scope of their regulatory
agency.275
In state corporate law, many have cited the above problems to argue
that competition among the states provides a strong check on the ability of
regulators to deviate from regulatory provisions that maximize share
value.276 While we do not wish to enter this debate ourselves,277 it may at
the very least make sense for regulators to consider allowing firms to opt274. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971);
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J.
ECON. 371 (1983).
275. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 36–
42 (1971).
276. For a discussion of the race-to-the-top argument, see Daniel Fischel, The “Race to the
Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L.
REV. 913, 919–20 (1982). See also Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 258 (1977) (making the argument that state corporate
law competition results in a race to the top). For a discussion of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, see
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992). See also William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (contending that state corporate
law competition results in a race to the bottom).
277. One of us, nevertheless, has written on the topic. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman,
Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961 (2001); Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation,
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).
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out of state corporate law prohibitions dealing specifically with selective
payments to block shareholders.
The rationale for permitting firms to opt out of corporate governance
rules is, in our estimation, relatively persuasive, at least insofar as these
provisions deal predominantly with manager-shareholder relations.
Entrepreneurs of firms, for example, at the time they initially sell securities
to the public will have strong incentives to put in place both contractual as
well as legal investor protection devices that investors find worthwhile.278
To the extent rational and informed, investors then will increase their
willingness to pay for the firm’s shares, putting more money into the
pocket of the entrepreneurs in control of the firm when it goes public.
Whether the practice of shareholder favoritism substantially benefits a
particular firm, moreover, is often specific to that firm. For companies that
start at the time of their IPO with significant block shareholders already
present, the ability to make side payments could conceivably result in an
increased overall level of private benefit appropriation.279 Such firms,
therefore, may choose to keep prohibitions against selective payments in
place. Other firms conducting an IPO, in contrast, may not have any large
block shareholders aside from the share ownership of corporate insiders. In
these situations, the ability to play favorites with shareholders may have the
salubrious effects we have suggested. Similarly, the inefficiency cost of
different forms of selective payments may also vary by firm. A firm, for
example, may benefit greatly from the ability to employ a particular
shareholder for her expertise; banning selecting payments to shareholders
then may impose a disproportionately large cost on the firm.
Consequently, giving individual firms the ability to determine their own
selective payment policy may substantially increase overall corporate
welfare.
While we are cautiously optimistic about the benefits of allowing optouts, we are also mindful of some of the potential pitfalls of such a regime.
Most notably, entrepreneurs at the time of a firm’s IPO may fail to select a
patronage policy that maximizes overall corporate welfare due to
constraints on information and expertise. Professors Robert Daines and
Michael Klausner, for example, argue in a study of antitakeover provisions
present in corporate charter terms that firms often do not implement charter
278

See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
279. See supra Part IV.B.2. Recall, however, from our analysis there that even when management
chooses to accommodate block shareholders, there may be strong reasons against appropriating too
much value, since so doing would make a takeover extremely cheap, thereby allowing the block
shareholder to force management out of the bargain entirely through an outright takeover.
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provisions that maximize firm value.280 The increase in firm value from an
optimal selective payment policy, for example, may not exceed the cost to
entrepreneurs of taking the time and resources to determine and implement
such a policy. Regulators may be able to take some steps to mitigate such
information and contracting costs, such as providing a “menu” of optional
methods of selective payments that a firm may choose in its charter to
permit. Regulators may also provide a checklist of the range of possible
wealth transfers allowable under each form of payment. Such mechanisms
are often an effective, low cost means of disclosing the possibilities for
effecting a selective payment policy within a firm. Having been made
aware of the possibilities, investors may have an easier time evaluating and
valuing the chosen policy of any particular firm.
Second, a liberal opt-out policy may fall prey to abusive practices,
particularly if it allows opting out at any time. Once a firm is public and its
shares are dispersed, for example, managers may then attempt to change its
patronage regime in a self-serving way—a so-called “mid-stream” shift.281
One solution to the problem of mid-stream shifts is to allow firms to optout only at the time they initially sell securities to the public. While a
standard objection to this solution is that it creates organizational
inflexibility down the road, there are particularly strong reasons to prefer
ex ante opt-outs in the context of shareholder favoritism. Once a firm
decides to allow opportunistic payments, the benefit to shareholders comes
from the ever-present threat imposed on managers that an outside investor
will appear to extract rents from the managers. Allowing managers to
prohibit selective payments at a later point in time, in turn, reduces the
incentive of an outside investor ex ante to form a toehold, thereby reducing
the threat on managers.
Third, firms considering whether to opt-out of various regulatory
prohibitions against selective payments to shareholders may fail to take
into account the interests of other stakeholders at the firm. When managers
appropriate private benefits, for example, they may harm third parties.
Customers, for example, may suffer a reduction in product quality if
managers appropriate resources away from production, research, or quality
control in order to line their own pockets. Nevertheless, many such
stakeholders are themselves connected to the corporation through some
contract form of relationship. As such, these parties may be in a position to

280. See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001).
281. See supra note 28.
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demand better terms in their contractual dealings with the company,
thereby causing the firm to internalize the cost of opportunism.282
Thus, while allowing some form of opt-out when it comes to
shareholder favoritism is not without costs, such costs do not appear to be
prohibitive. Moreover, providing an opt-out option does not force
legislatures to engage in the complicated exercise of attempting to specify
the precise preconditions under which shareholder favoritism would
desirable or undesirable for each firm. To a large extent, firms making
their opting decision before going public can be trusted ex ante to specify
policies governing the manager-shareholder relationship that are reasonably
responsive to their own idiosyncrasies.
V. CONCLUSION
Received wisdom within corporate law maintains that “favoritism”
toward block shareholders has dangerous implications for overall corporate
welfare. On first blush, the concerns raised by conventional wisdom have
obvious merit: shareholder patronage frequently has the intent and the
effect of co-opting the very individuals who are the most viable takeover
threats toward incumbent management, causing them to fall short of their
enormous potential as credible monitors of corporate welfare. When such
individuals become the puppets of management, other shareholders and
stakeholders stand to lose.
In this Article, we have questioned the overall persuasiveness of this
received wisdom on at least two fronts. On a pragmatic level, we have
argued that the regulatory apparatus used to scrutinize shareholder
patronage has been more effective at relocating than eliminating the
282. Even where not connected through contract, moreover, third parties (such as surrounding
communities) often receive little deference under state corporate and federal securities laws. For
example, Merit Fox has made the argument that labor has a strong interest in the accuracy of securities
market prices. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should
Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2562–69 (1997). The SEC, nevertheless, has not made the
protection of labor a factor in its decisionmaking. See Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in
Securities Regulation, 2 VA. J. INT’L L. 613, 628 n.56 (2001). Indeed, determining the precise impact
on third parties often is extremely costly. Without a precise estimate on the impact to third parties,
simply mentioning third parties as an additional interest which firms must take into account may
provide managers with a convenient pretext to engage in opportunism. The decision to take into
account the interest of third parties, moreover, is one that affects not only the paper’s proposal, but all
corporate regulatory provisions that deal with managerial opportunism.
Similar arguments have been made against so-called shareholder constituency statutes. For a
description of shareholder constituency statutes, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971 (1992); William J. Carney, Does Defining
Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990).
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phenomenon. Because regulation is most able to deter the most patent and
verifiable forms of favoritism, managers seeking to play favorites can (and
do) find more indirect and more costly means for accomplishing the task,
all to the detriment of the corporation as a whole.
On a more fundamental level, however, we have argued that even if
eliminating patronage were practically feasible, the underlying arguments
for doing so categorically seem far from compelling. Indeed, we have
demonstrated how the ability to make bribes can, ironically, make
managers worse off and all shareholders better off than in a world of
effective prohibition. Indeed, when legal rules permit favoritism, managers
are forced to choose between (i) sharing their private spoils with an
opportunistic block shareholder attempting to extract a bribe, and (ii)
reducing the amount of value they appropriate, deterring block ownership
and enjoying it alone. As we have demonstrated, in many situations283
managers will prefer the deterrence option, a choice that redounds to the
benefit of shareholders.
These conclusions place the extant legal prohibitions against many
forms of selective payments to shareholders in a somewhat different (and
more critical) light. At the very least, our analysis suggests a slightly
different role for regulators than they have heretofore played. Rather than
seeking to determine when an instance of favoritism is motivated by
opportunism, courts and legislatures would more productively spend their
time analyzing whether the preconditions exist for the beneficial effects we
identify to take hold. On one end of the spectrum, managers of widely held
firms operating under a potential threat from numerous rent-seeking outside
investors will have strong incentives to make use of their own expertise to
limit the amount of private benefits available to extract. On the other
extreme, companies with pre-existing block shareholders or those operating
in dysfunctional or small takeover markets are less amenable to the
permissive regime we have suggested. But be that as it may, the very
heterogeneity of business characteristics renders questionable the “onesize-fits-all” form of regulation that has historically attached to managers
who play favorites with shareholders. A first step in moving away from
that existing regime would be to allow companies a limited ability to opt
out of the regulatory status quo. In the pages above, we have suggested a
number of modest ways to introduce this and other regulatory reforms.
Although our arguments have been limited to the manager-shareholder
relationship and the market for corporate control, the fundamental point
283.

See the conditions listed in the text accompanying notes 205-213, supra.
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that having to share rents with others can act as a strong form of deterrence
against opportunism is probably more general still. While not developed
here, there are a number of other applications of this insight to corporate
law, particularly insofar as other corporate stakeholders’ claims are
concerned. For example, our arguments might be redirected not to the
takeover market, but rather to the corporate proxy system, in which B
represents a dissident shareholder who attempts to convince a block of
other shareholders to side with him and against management. In this case,
the supply curve from our analysis would represent the marginal cost of
assembling political support for the dissident’s alternate slate. Just as in the
case of a block shareholder, management may wish to “buy off” dissidents
who appear to pose a credible threat of displacing management.
Other applications of our theory might even transcend the shareholdermanager relationship. For instance, while creditors usually enjoy a
relatively fixed return on their investment, the default risk that the firm
presents can inject greater uncertainty into this claim. (A similar point
applies to other fixed claimants, including labor, suppliers, and customers).
Such fixed claimants may, at some expense, investigate the firm to
determine the current risk of insolvency. Managers of companies near
default may then attempt to favor a particular pivotal creditor of the firm
(that has uncovered the firm’s impending insolvency), allowing the
manager to stay in control while fending off or delaying bankruptcy.
Arguably fearing the opportunistic dangers for other creditors that this
incentive creates, federal law vests bankruptcy trustees with the power to
void preferences given to a creditor close to the filing of bankruptcy.284
Our analysis presents a potential cost of such prohibitions. Indeed, if the
terms of the agreement with the pivotal creditor force management to
surrender a substantial value of its private benefits (from delaying
bankruptcy), permitting such favoritism may give management an incentive
to take actions that avoid financial distress altogether. Not only does such
restraint help debt holders, but maintaining a strong equity cushion may
284. See generally David B. Young, Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers, 819 PLI/COMM 881
(April, 2001) (providing a summary of voidable preference doctrine inside the United States). See also
Vern Countryman, The Concept of Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1985)
(tracing the history of prohibitions against preferential transfers near bankruptcy).
Under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee in bankruptcy may void transfers
made to a shareholder within 90 days of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C.A. §
547(b)(4)(A). The trustee may void preferences given to insiders up to a year prior to the filing of a
petition for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4)(B). Although a variety of exceptions exist,
including the contribution on the part of a creditor of “new value” in return for the preference, none of
the exceptions apply to preferences given on the part of managers to delay opportunistically the filing of
a bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(1)(A) (setting forth the new value exception).
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also be in the interests of overall corporate welfare. While such extensions
are interesting, we leave them for future endeavors.

